New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Owens

  • People v. Owens, 1 N.Y.3d 611 (2004): Admissibility of Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense Without Psychiatric Evidence

    People v. Owens, 1 N.Y.3d 611 (2004)

    A defendant asserting an extreme emotional disturbance defense must present sufficient evidence demonstrating a mental infirmity at the time of the homicide that impaired self-control, even if psychiatric testimony is not offered.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of intentional murder, felony murder, and robbery for the death of a 71-year-old victim. She claimed she suffered from extreme emotional disturbance due to a sexual relationship with the victim. The trial court excluded her testimony and layperson testimony offered to support this defense due to a lack of pretrial notice. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that even without the notice issue, the defendant’s offer of proof was insufficient to establish the defense because it did not demonstrate a loss of self-control resulting from a mental infirmity at the time of the killing. This case underscores the evidentiary threshold for establishing the extreme emotional disturbance defense, even absent expert psychiatric testimony.

    Facts

    The 16-year-old defendant and a co-defendant went to the victim’s home with the intention to rob him. The defendant and the co-defendant choked and suffocated the 71-year-old victim, ultimately resulting in his death. Following the victim’s death, the defendant and co-defendant stole the victim’s automobile.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of intentional murder, felony murder, and robbery. She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding her testimony and that of laypersons regarding her extreme emotional disturbance. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding the defendant’s offer of proof insufficient to warrant an extreme emotional disturbance charge to the jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant presented sufficient evidence to warrant a jury charge on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, absent psychiatric testimony, considering the defendant’s failure to provide pretrial notice of intent to offer psychiatric evidence?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s proffered testimony did not establish that she was affected by her relationship with the deceased to such a degree that a jury could reasonably conclude she acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the homicide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while extreme emotional disturbance can be established without psychiatric testimony, the defendant must still demonstrate a mental infirmity, not rising to the level of insanity, that caused a loss of self-control at the time of the homicide. Citing People v. Roche, 98 N.Y.2d 70, 75 (2002), the court emphasized that the defense requires both a subjective element (that the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance) and an objective element (that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance), citing People v. Moye, 66 N.Y.2d 887, 890 (1985). The court found that the defendant’s testimony regarding her sexual relationship with the victim was insufficient to establish that she acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the killing, citing People v. White, 79 N.Y.2d 900, 903 (1992). The court declined to rule on whether pretrial notice under CPL 250.10(2) was required, as the offer of proof was insufficient regardless. The court held, “[D]efendant ‘cannot establish an extreme emotional disturbance defense without evidence that he or she suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity at the time of the homicide, typically manifested by a loss of self-control’”.

  • People v. Owens, 69 N.Y.2d 585 (1987): Improper to Submit Only Portions of Jury Charge in Writing Over Objection

    People v. Owens, 69 N.Y.2d 585 (1987)

    It is reversible error for a trial court to provide the jury with only selected portions of its jury charge in writing over the defendant’s objection, as it creates a risk of undue emphasis and prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that it is improper for a trial court, over defense counsel’s objection, to distribute only selected portions of the jury charge in writing to the jury during deliberations. The Court reasoned that this practice creates a risk that the jury will place undue emphasis on the written portions, potentially prejudicing the defendant, especially when critical defenses are omitted. The Court reversed the convictions in both cases, ordering new trials, emphasizing the importance of fairness and impartiality in jury instructions.

    Facts

    In People v. Owens, an undercover officer allegedly purchased cocaine from the defendant. Owens raised the defense of agency, claiming he acted solely as the officer’s agent. The trial court provided the jury with written instructions only on the elements of the crimes charged, omitting the agency defense. In People v. Boon, the defendant was charged with attempted robbery. The court provided written instructions on accessorial liability, attempt, and robbery, but excluded instructions on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt. In both cases, defense counsel objected to the selective written instructions.

    Procedural History

    In Owens, the jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In Boon, the jury found the defendant guilty of one count of attempted robbery, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and reversed both convictions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it is permissible for a trial court, over defense counsel’s objection, to submit only certain portions of the jury charge in writing to the jury for use during deliberations.

    Holding

    1. No, because submitting only a portion of the charge creates a risk that the jury will perceive the writing as embodying the more important instructions, inviting greater attention to the principles repeated in writing than those simply recited orally, potentially prejudicing the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the importance of fairness and impartiality in jury instructions, citing People v. Odell, 230 N.Y. 481, 487: “The court’s charge is of supreme importance to the accused. It should be the safeguard of fairness and impartiality and the guarantee of judicial indifference to individuals.” The Court noted the absence of statutory authorization for submitting written jury instructions and drew parallels to CPL 310.30, which requires the consent of both parties before providing jurors with copies of a statute. The court reasoned that selectively providing portions of the charge, especially without any jury request for clarification, risks undue emphasis on the written portions. This could lead jurors to believe that the written instructions are more important, subordinating the oral instructions, particularly those favorable to the defense. The court found this error to be prejudicial and not subject to harmless error analysis, thus requiring a new trial in both cases. The court reasoned that unlike the marshaling of evidence—which is statutorily authorized (CPL 300.10 [2]), and constitutes error only when an imbalance results in prejudice to defendant—the distribution of written instructions to the jury is not expressly authorized by law, and error in such submissions cannot be deemed harmless.

  • People v. Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 95 (1968): Prejudice from Co-defendant’s Invocation of Fifth Amendment

    People v. Owens, 22 N.Y.2d 95 (1968)

    It is reversible error to permit a co-defendant to call another co-defendant as a witness, knowing that the witness will invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, because of the inherent prejudice to the witness, even if the court provides a curative instruction.

    Summary

    Robert Owens and Charline Brown were convicted of grand larceny for taking money from Clarice Harriss through false pretenses. During the joint trial, Brown called Owens as a witness, knowing he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court allowed this, providing a cautionary instruction to the jury. The Appellate Division reversed Owens’ conviction, finding this prejudicial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that compelling a defendant to invoke the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury is inherently prejudicial, and a curative instruction is unlikely to eliminate the harm. The court also discussed the importance of considering severance when a co-defendant’s testimony is needed.

    Facts

    Clarice Harriss was approached by Owens at a bank. Owens showed her an envelope, claiming it contained $15,000 and that she had left it in a phone booth. Brown then prompted Owens to open the envelope. Owens, Brown and Harriss then agreed to split the money, with Harriss paying $2,000 for the right to receive $5,000. Harriss withdrew $1,000 from her savings and gave it to Owens, along with the $318 she had withdrawn earlier. Owens and Brown then disappeared with the money.

    Procedural History

    Owens and Brown were jointly indicted for grand larceny in the first degree. Before trial, Brown moved for a mistrial and severance because she intended to call Owens as a witness, knowing he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. The motion was denied. Brown renewed the motion at the close of the People’s case; it was denied. Brown then called Owens as a witness. Owens invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court denied Owens’ motion for a mistrial. The jury convicted both defendants. The Appellate Division reversed Owens’ conviction. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing co-defendant Brown to call co-defendant Owens to the witness stand, knowing that Owens would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because compelling a defendant to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury is inherently prejudicial, and instructions are unlikely to cure that prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the People’s concession that it was error to allow Brown to call Owens to the stand. The court stated, “[T]he privilege against self incrimination is violated whenever a criminal defendant is compelled to take the stand and claim his privilege, whether at the behest of the prosecution or a codefendant.” The court recognized the right of a defendant to call a co-defendant as a witness but noted that this right is qualified when a joint trial is involved and the witness invokes their Fifth Amendment right. The court reasoned that the stigmatizing effect of claiming the privilege before the jury is so powerful that curative instructions are unlikely to eliminate the prejudice. The court noted that the proof of guilt was not overwhelming, so the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that trial courts must carefully consider whether to sever trials when a defendant intends to call a co-defendant as a witness, especially where there is a showing of a need for the co-defendant’s testimony. “But there must be a showing of intention to call the codefendant as a witness and a need to do so; the mere statement of intention is hardly sufficient unless the circumstances indicate sincerity of intention and reasonable need.” A defendant must make the severance motion “as early as it is reasonably feasible.”