New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Nieves

  • People v. Nieves, 2 N.Y.3d 310 (2004): Appealability and Preservation of Challenges to Orders of Protection Issued at Sentencing

    People v. Nieves, 2 N.Y.3d 310 (2004)

    Permanent orders of protection issued at sentencing are appealable as part of the judgment of conviction, but unpreserved challenges to those orders are generally not reviewable by the Court of Appeals unless they fall within the narrow ‘illegal sentence’ exception.

    Summary

    Defendant Nieves was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. At sentencing, the court issued orders of protection for the two men he shot, ordering him to stay away from them until a date three years after his expected release. Nieves appealed, arguing the orders (1) exceeded the permissible duration under CPL 530.13(4) because jail time credit would result in an earlier release and (2) were improperly issued to the shooting victims because he was acquitted of assault charges. The Court of Appeals held the orders were appealable as part of the judgment but that Nieves’s challenges were unpreserved and did not fall within the illegal sentence exception. Therefore, the Court of Appeals could not review the merits of those challenges.

    Facts

    Nieves shot and injured two men after an altercation outside a nightclub. He was charged with multiple offenses, including assault. At trial, Nieves claimed he acted in self-defense, but he was acquitted of the assault charges and convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. During the sentencing proceeding, the trial court issued orders of protection for the two men Nieves shot, directing him to stay away from them until October 12, 2007 – three years from his expected release date. Nieves did not object to the orders at sentencing.

    Procedural History

    At the Appellate Division, Nieves argued the orders of protection were improper in duration and scope. He argued the orders should reflect his jail time credit, which would result in an earlier release date and should not have included the shooting victims as they were not victims, but witnesses, because of the acquittal on the assault charges. The Appellate Division modified the judgment to reflect the jail time credit but rejected Nieves’s other arguments. Both Nieves and the People appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order with respect to Nieves’s appeal and dismissed the People’s appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether orders of protection issued during a sentencing proceeding in a criminal case can be challenged on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.

    2. Whether the defendant’s arguments on appeal to the Court of Appeals had to be raised before the sentencing court to be preserved for review.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 530.13(4) authorizes a court to issue permanent orders of protection for victims and witnesses “[u]pon conviction of any offense,” indicating the legislature intended such orders to be part of the final adjudication.

    2. Yes, because the defendant’s claims did not fall within the narrow exception to the preservation requirement for illegal sentences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the appealability of determinations in criminal cases is purely statutory. While CPL 530.13 does not explicitly address the appealability of orders of protection, CPL 450.10 authorizes appeals from a judgment in a criminal case, which brings up for review many preceding orders and rulings.

    Distinguishing from People v. Stevens, where the Court held that post-judgment SORA determinations were not appealable because they were not part of the criminal action, the Court relied on People v. Hernandez, which held that SORA certification at sentencing *was* appealable. The Court stated that, like the SORA certification in Hernandez, CPL 530.13(4) authorizes a court to issue permanent orders of protection for the benefit of victims and witnesses “[u]pon conviction of any offense.” The use of this language indicates the Legislature viewed orders of protection as part of the final adjudication.

    Addressing the preservation issue, the Court acknowledged the “narrow exception to the preservation rule” (People v. Samms, 95 N.Y.2d 52, 56 [2000]) where a court exceeds its powers and imposes a sentence that is illegal. However, the Court found that CPL 530.13(4) does not characterize permanent orders of protection as a component of sentencing, and the statute authorizes temporary orders during the pendency of criminal proceedings, indicating that the Legislature did not intend orders of protection to be punitive.

    The Court noted the primary intent of the statute is to ensure that victims and “witnesses who have the courage and civic responsibility to cooperate with law enforcement officials are afforded the maximum protection possible” (Governor’s Mem approving L 1998, ch 610, 1998 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1485).

    The Court observed that orders of protection are an “ameliorative measure intended to safeguard the rights of victims and witnesses both prior to and after conviction—it is not a part of the sentence imposed.” Therefore, the Court held defendant’s challenges did not fall within the illegal sentence exception and were unpreserved.

    As a practical matter, the Court noted that seeking adjustment of the order of protection from the issuing court is the most desirable means for resolving an expiration date issue. The Court stated, “Because sentencing courts are in the best position to amend permanent orders of protection, the better practice—and best use of judicial resources—is for a defendant seeking adjustment of such an order to request relief from the issuing court in the first instance, resorting to the appellate courts only if necessary.”

  • People v. Nieves, 98 N.Y.2d 318 (2002): Admissibility of Excited Utterances and Conflicting Witness Testimony

    People v. Nieves, 98 N.Y.2d 318 (2002)

    When a witness provides conflicting in-court and out-of-court testimony, a guilty verdict can be upheld if the fact-finder has a rational basis to resolve the contradictions beyond a reasonable doubt, based on factors such as the nature of the out-of-court statements (e.g., excited utterances) and impeachment evidence discrediting the in-court testimony.

    Summary

    Nieves was convicted of attempted murder and other crimes based on the shooting of Guy Peduto. Peduto made out-of-court statements identifying Nieves as one of his attackers, admitted as excited utterances. At trial, Peduto recanted, claiming someone else shot him. The prosecution presented rebuttal evidence, including testimony from another officer and a former associate of Peduto, supporting the initial identification. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court had a sufficient basis to resolve the conflicting testimony, finding Peduto’s initial excited utterances and impeachment evidence more credible than his trial testimony.

    Facts

    Guy Peduto was shot during a car chase. Immediately after the shooting, while bleeding and in pain, Peduto identified Nieves as one of the shooters to two individuals: a passerby and a police officer. He identified the car used in the assault as a white Acura Legend. Later, Peduto recanted his identification in an affidavit before trial. At trial, Peduto denied Nieves was the shooter and described a different assailant. The prosecution presented rebuttal witnesses who testified to Peduto’s initial identification of Nieves and his motive for changing his story.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, sitting without a jury, found Nieves guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Peduto’s out-of-court statements were properly admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

    2. Whether the conflicting testimony from Peduto (both incriminating and exculpating Nieves) required reversal and dismissal of the conviction as a matter of law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Peduto’s statements were spontaneous declarations made under the stress of nervous excitement resulting from a startling event, while his reflective powers were stilled.

    2. No, because the trial court had a sufficient, non-speculative basis to resolve the contradictions between Peduto’s out-of-court statements and his trial testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Peduto’s initial statements qualified as excited utterances because they were made shortly after the traumatic event while he was in distress. The Court emphasized that factors like being in response to questioning or a short time delay did not negate the spontaneity of the statements under the circumstances. Regarding the conflicting testimony, the Court distinguished this case from cases like People v. Jackson, which require dismissal when all evidence of guilt comes from a single witness providing irreconcilable testimony. The Court reasoned that if the fact-finder has an objective, rational basis for resolving the contradictions beyond a reasonable doubt, the determination of guilt is not based on impermissible speculation.

    The Court found that the trial court had such a basis here: (1) Peduto’s excited utterances were inherently more reliable than his later recantation, (2) Peduto’s cross-examination and other impeachment evidence discredited his trial testimony, suggesting he perjured himself to adhere to a criminal code of non-cooperation with law enforcement. The court noted, “as excited utterances, Peduto’s out-of-court accusatory declarations, made without opportunity for reflection while he was crying hysterically and repeatedly asking whether he was going to die, could rationally and objectively have been credited by the trial court as inherently more reliable than Peduto’s later versions, formulated once ‘there ha[d] been time to contrive and misrepresent.’”

    The court concluded that the rule of People v. Jackson did not require disturbing the trial court’s verdict, emphasizing the trial court’s role in determining credibility and weighing evidence. The court also upheld the trial court’s discretion to reject expert testimony on night visibility, considering it a matter of common experience, and found no error in the treatment of Peduto’s claimed bias, which was considered for impeachment rather than admissibility.

  • People v. Nieves, 90 N.Y.2d 426 (1997): Establishing Justification for Courtroom Closure During Undercover Testimony

    People v. Nieves, 90 N.Y.2d 426 (1997)

    Exclusion of a defendant’s family from the courtroom during an undercover officer’s testimony violates the defendant’s right to a public trial unless the prosecution demonstrates a substantial probability that the officer’s safety would be jeopardized by their presence, and the trial court makes specific findings to support the exclusion.

    Summary

    Nieves was convicted of drug charges after an undercover officer testified against him in a courtroom closed to the public, including Nieves’s wife and children. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court failed to adequately justify the exclusion of Nieves’s family. The undercover officer’s general fear for his safety, without specific concerns about Nieves’s family, was insufficient. The court emphasized the importance of balancing the defendant’s right to a public trial with the need to protect witnesses, requiring a specific showing of risk related to the individuals being excluded.

    Facts

    An undercover officer purchased heroin from Nieves in Manhattan. At trial, the prosecution requested to close the courtroom to the public during the undercover officer’s testimony, citing safety concerns. The officer testified that he continued to work undercover in the area of Nieves’s arrest and feared for his safety if his identity were revealed. Nieves objected to the closure, arguing that his wife and children should be allowed to remain. A court reporter alleged Nieves’s wife spoke to a prospective juror. The trial court closed the courtroom, excluding Nieves’s wife and children; the court stating the children would not understand the concept of confidentiality.

    Procedural History

    Nieves was convicted of criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remanding for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in closing the courtroom to the defendant’s family during the testimony of an undercover officer, thereby violating the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution did not demonstrate a substantial probability that the officer’s safety would be jeopardized by the presence of the defendant’s wife and children, and the trial court did not make adequate findings to support their exclusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the right to a public trial is fundamental, and courtroom closures should be rare and carefully considered. Citing Waller v. Georgia, the court reiterated the four-prong test for courtroom closures: the party seeking closure must advance an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives, and it must make adequate findings to support the closure. The court distinguished this case from People v. Martinez, noting that in Martinez, there were no identified family members seeking to attend. Here, the trial court was aware of Nieves’s desire to have his family present.

    The court found that the undercover officer’s general fear for his safety was insufficient to justify excluding Nieves’s family, as he expressed no specific concern about them. The court stated, “the trial court’s reasons for excluding the defendant’s family must be ‘demonstrated and documented’ in the record.” The allegation that Nieves’s wife spoke to a juror was not adequately investigated and did not establish a willingness to harm a police officer. Regarding the children, the court found the trial court’s generalized concerns about their ability to maintain confidentiality insufficient without any specific inquiry into their age or understanding. The court noted the Appellate Division’s reliance on the family’s proximity to the officer’s work area was improper because this was not a part of the trial court’s reasoning. The court concluded that because the closure order was broader than necessary to protect the People’s interest, Nieves’s conviction must be reversed.

  • People v. Nieves, 88 N.Y.2d 618 (1996): Establishes Jurisdiction for Felony Murder When Death Occurs in New York, Even if Underlying Felony Occurred Elsewhere

    People v. Nieves, 88 N.Y.2d 618 (1996)

    New York State has jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for felony murder when the homicide takes place within the state, even if the underlying felony is committed in another state, because the death within the state constitutes an element of the felony murder offense.

    Summary

    Orlando Nieves and John Stokes were convicted of felony murder after a robbery they committed in Connecticut led to a high-speed chase into New York, where their getaway car struck and killed a pedestrian. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that New York had jurisdiction because the death, an element of felony murder, occurred within the state. The Court reasoned that New York has a valid interest in prosecuting dangerous acts resulting in death within its borders, regardless of where the underlying felony occurred. This ruling clarifies the scope of New York’s criminal jurisdiction in interstate felony murder cases.

    Facts

    Defendant Nieves and a woman robbed a convenience store in Greenwich, Connecticut. Defendant Stokes drove the getaway car. Police pursued them into New York. During the high-speed chase in New York, Stokes drove recklessly to evade police. The getaway car swerved to avoid a truck and crashed into a bus shelter, killing Gladys Davis, a woman waiting there. After the crash, Nieves, Stokes, and the woman fled on foot and were apprehended by police.

    Procedural History

    Nieves and Stokes were charged in New York with, among other crimes, second-degree murder based on the felony murder provision of the Penal Law. Both were convicted by a jury. They appealed, arguing that New York lacked jurisdiction because the underlying felony (robbery) occurred in Connecticut. The Appellate Division rejected their arguments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York has jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant for felony murder when the underlying felony is committed in another state (Connecticut), but the homicide occurs in New York.

    Holding

    Yes, because the death of a nonparticipant in New York, during the immediate flight from a designated felony, constitutes an element of the crime of felony murder and thus satisfies New York’s jurisdictional requirements under CPL 20.20(1)(a).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court based its decision on CPL 20.20(1)(a), which states that New York courts have jurisdiction when conduct within the state establishes an element of the offense. Felony murder requires the commission of a felony and the death of a non-participant “in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom” (Penal Law § 125.25 [3]). The Court emphasized that the death in New York was an element of the felony murder, thus establishing jurisdiction. The Court cited People v. Berzups, stating, “the underlying felony is not so much an element of the crime but instead functions as a replacement for the mens rea or intent necessary for common-law murder.” The Court reasoned that New York has a strong policy interest in deterring and punishing acts that result in death within its borders. The Court distinguished the felony murder statute from merely a sentence enhancement for the underlying felony, stating that the “language of Penal Law § 125.25 (3) evinces the Legislature’s desire to extend liability broadly to those who commit serious crimes in ways that endanger the lives of others” (citing People v. Hernandez, 82 NY2d 309, 318). The court noted, “[i]mmediate flight and attempts to thwart apprehension are patently within the furtherance of the cofelons’ criminal objective”.

  • People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125 (1986): Admissibility of Dying Declarations and Excited Utterances

    People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125 (1986)

    For a statement to be admissible as a dying declaration, the declarant must have a settled, hopeless expectation that death is near at hand, and the admissibility of evidence cannot be sustained on appeal based on a theory (e.g., excited utterance) not raised before the trial court.

    Summary

    Angel Nieves was convicted of manslaughter based largely on statements made by the stabbing victim, Josephine Gonzalez, before she died. The trial court admitted these statements as dying declarations. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but on the grounds that the statements were admissible as excited utterances, a theory the prosecution had disavowed at trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statements did not qualify as dying declarations because the victim’s state of mind did not indicate a settled expectation of imminent death and that the Appellate Division erred in relying on the excited utterance theory because it was not raised at trial, thus depriving the defendant of the opportunity to counter it.

    Facts

    Josephine Gonzalez was brought to the emergency room suffering from a stab wound. Initially in shock and unable to speak, she later identified Angel Nieves as her assailant, stating he stabbed her out of jealousy at a party. She complained of chest pains and stated she did not want to die. The wound punctured her heart and the sac around it. Medical staff did not inform her that her condition was critical or that death was imminent. Gonzalez died approximately one and a half hours after arriving at the hospital.

    Procedural History

    Nieves was indicted for second-degree murder. The trial court denied Nieves’ motion to dismiss the indictment but ordered a pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of Gonzalez’s statements. At the hearing, the prosecution argued solely for admissibility as dying declarations, expressly disclaiming reliance on the excited utterance exception. The trial court admitted the statements as dying declarations. Nieves was convicted of second-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the statements inadmissible as dying declarations but admissible as excited utterances. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the victim’s statements were admissible as a dying declaration.
    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in affirming the trial court’s admission of the statements based on the theory of “excited utterance,” when that theory was not raised by the prosecution at trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because the victim’s state of mind did not reflect a settled, hopeless expectation of imminent death.
    2. Yes, because the defendant was denied the opportunity to present evidence to counter the factual theory supporting the admissibility of the evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated the requirements for the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule require that the declarant speaks “under a sense of impending death, with no hope of recovery.” The court emphasized that a belief that death is possible or even probable is insufficient. The court found that Gonzalez’s statements expressing a desire not to die, the lack of any statement by medical personnel about the severity of her condition, and the fact that her condition was improving at the time of the statements, all indicated she did not have the requisite state of mind for a dying declaration.

    Regarding the excited utterance theory, the Court held that the Appellate Division erred in relying on it because the prosecution had disclaimed it at trial. The court reasoned that the defendant was prejudiced because he was denied the opportunity to present evidence to counter the factual basis for the excited utterance argument, such as the time elapsed between the stabbing and the statements, the victim’s condition during that time, and whether she appeared excited or stressed when she spoke. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that because the pre-trial hearing was discretionary, the People should be allowed to raise new arguments on appeal. The court stated: “If the Appellate Division’s determination were allowed to stand, the defendant would still be denied the opportunity to present evidence to counter a factual theory advanced by the People in support of the admissibility of evidence.”

  • People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 496 (1975): Limits of ‘Premises’ Search Warrants

    People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 496 (1975)

    A warrant authorizing the search of a premises and any person found “therein” does not extend to the search of a person who is observed leaving the premises just prior to the warrant’s execution.

    Summary

    Police obtained warrants to search two apartments and any persons found “therein.” Detectives observed Nieves leaving one of the apartments, stopped him in the hallway, and searched him, finding heroin. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search was not authorized by the warrant because Nieves was not found “therein” (inside the apartment) when the search occurred. The court emphasized that a search warrant’s authority is strictly limited to the place described in the warrant, stopping at the threshold. The case was remitted to determine if probable cause existed for the arrest and search independent of the warrant.

    Facts

    Detectives obtained search warrants for two apartments based on surveillance and information from an informant who had previously provided reliable information.

    One warrant related to an apartment occupied by “Vino” at 72-74 East 119th Street, and another related to an apartment occupied by Betty Lucas at 36 West 138th Street.

    The warrants authorized the search of the apartments, the occupants, and any other person who may be found inside the apartments.

    Two days later, detectives went to the Lucas apartment to execute the warrant.

    As they proceeded along the third-floor hallway, they saw Nieves leaving the Lucas apartment.

    Detectives stopped and searched Nieves, finding a package of heroin.

    Nieves was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a dangerous drug.

    Procedural History

    Nieves moved to suppress the evidence seized from him, arguing the search was unlawful.

    The trial court denied the motion.

    Nieves pleaded guilty.

    The case was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “Vino” warrant, authorizing a search of the person of “Vino,” could be executed anywhere, justifying the search of Nieves?

    2. Whether the Lucas warrant, authorizing the search of the apartment and any person “found therein,” justified the search of Nieves after he exited the apartment but before detectives entered?

    3. Whether, if the search was beyond the scope of the warrants, it could be sustained as incident to a lawful arrest.

    Holding

    1. No, because the “Vino” warrant was tied to a specific location and did not authorize a search of “Vino” wherever he might be found.

    2. No, because “therein” means inside the apartment, and the authority to search stops at the threshold.

    3. The issue of whether the search was incident to a lawful arrest was not determined at trial; thus, the case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the “Vino” warrant, when read in conjunction with the underlying application, limited the search authority to the premises where the contraband was believed to be.

    The authority to search individuals, including the occupant, extended only to those who might reasonably be expected to conceal contraband on their persons while inside the premises.

    Regarding the Lucas warrant, the court emphasized that the authority to search is limited to the place described in the warrant. “To put it another way ‘therein’ means therein and the authority to search stops at the threshold.”

    The court rejected the argument that observing Nieves leaving the apartment justified a search at some remote location.

    The court acknowledged that the search could still be valid if it was incident to a lawful arrest, but this issue required a determination of probable cause independent of the warrants, which had not been addressed by the trial court. The court noted the importance of the prosecution presenting evidence to establish probable cause independent of the warrants:

    “[T]he People bear the initial burden of ‘going forward in the first instance with evidence to show that probable cause existed both in obtaining a search warrant and in sustaining the legality of a search made, without a warrant, as incident to an arrest.’”