People v. Nicholas, 98 N.Y.2d 749 (2002)

A prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding their ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that they can be fair and impartial.

Summary

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The appeal centered on whether a prospective juror should have been excused for cause after expressing that they would tend to believe police testimony to some degree. The defense challenged the juror’s impartiality, but the trial court denied the challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that the juror ultimately stated unequivocally that they could be fair. The Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing the need for unequivocal assertions of impartiality and suggesting further questioning to clarify any ambiguity.

Facts

During voir dire, a prospective juror acknowledged believing that “trained police officers are good observers” and that they “would tend to believe police testimony to some degree.” Defense counsel questioned the juror about whether this belief would affect their ability to be fair and listen fairly to police testimony. The juror responded, “No, I don’t think so.”

Procedural History

The trial court denied the defense’s motion to excuse the prospective juror for cause. The defense then used a peremptory challenge to excuse the juror and subsequently exhausted all peremptory challenges. The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the prospective juror’s statement, “No, I don’t think so,” constituted an unequivocal assertion of impartiality sufficient to satisfy the legal standard for jury selection.

Holding

No, because the juror’s statements, taken in context and as a whole, were unequivocal. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s challenge for cause.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reiterated the established standard that a prospective juror must be excused if their statements raise serious doubts about their impartiality, unless they state unequivocally that they can be fair. The court acknowledged that the juror’s initial statements suggested a predisposition to believe police testimony. However, the court emphasized that the juror ultimately stated, “No, I don’t think so,” in response to the question of whether their belief would affect their ability to be fair. While the word “think” might, in some cases, render a statement equivocal, here the court found that the statement, taken in context, was unequivocal. The court noted that the use of “think” is often challenged and advised trial courts to ask additional questions to clarify a juror’s impartiality when a “yes” or “no” response is qualified. The Court cited People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 79 (1982) in support of the proposition that “the juror’s use of the word ‘think’ might not in every case render his or her statements inadequate.” The Court also observed, “Time and again this Court has been called upon to measure a particular statement by a prospective juror against the clear legal standard requiring an unequivocal assertion of impartiality.” The Court emphasized the need for trial courts to dispel any doubt as to equivocation to assure an impartial jury and avoid appeals.