People v. Neale, 77 N.Y.2d 488 (1991)

An individual acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect and subsequently escaping from a non-secure mental health facility is not considered to be escaping from “custody” as defined in the second-degree escape statute, but may be considered in custody for a third-degree escape charge.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant, acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect and placed in a non-secure facility, could be charged with escape in the second degree after leaving the facility without authorization. The court held that escape in the second degree requires escape from custody, which in this context, requires more than mere supervision in a non-secure environment. However, the court also considered the possibility of a charge of escape in the third degree. This case highlights the nuances of defining “custody” within the framework of mental health law and penal law related to escape.

Facts

The defendant, Neale, was acquitted of criminal charges due to mental disease or defect under CPL 330.20. Following the acquittal, the court ordered Neale to be placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health. Initially, Neale was confined in a secure psychiatric facility. Later, the court granted permission for Neale to be transferred to a non-secure facility. Neale subsequently left the non-secure facility without permission and was charged with escape in the second degree.

Procedural History

The trial court dismissed the second-degree escape charge, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Neale’s unauthorized departure from the non-secure facility constituted escape in the second degree because he was still in the “custody” of the Commissioner of Mental Health.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant who has been acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect and who elopes from a non-secure mental health facility is considered to have escaped from “custody” within the meaning of Penal Law § 205.10, thus justifying a charge of escape in the second degree.

Holding

No, because the “custody” required for escape in the second degree necessitates a level of restriction greater than that present in a non-secure facility. However, the court suggested the possibility of a charge for escape in the third degree.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “custody,” as used in the escape statute, implies a significant restraint on liberty. The court acknowledged that CPL 330.20 places individuals acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect under the supervision of the Commissioner of Mental Health. However, it distinguished between secure and non-secure facilities. The court found that the level of supervision and freedom afforded in a non-secure facility did not constitute the type of “custody” contemplated by the second-degree escape statute. The court emphasized the difference between the restriction of liberty in a secure facility versus the relative freedom in a non-secure facility. A dissenting opinion argued that escape from a non-secure facility still constituted escape from the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and should be considered escape in the third degree, pointing to the language of CPL 330.20 which refers to acquittees, whether in secure or non-secure facilities, as being in the “custody” of the Commissioner. The dissent cited People v Walter, 115 AD2d 52, 55-56 and People v Buthy, 85 AD2d 890 in its reasoning.