2 N.Y.3d 32 (2004)

When a judgment of conviction is vacated and a defendant is resentenced while subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the discretion to determine whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently rests with the last judge in the sentencing chain.

Summary

Murray was originally convicted of drug charges and sentenced to 7½ to 15 years. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a consecutive sentence of 7½ to 15 years. His drug conviction was then overturned, and he pleaded guilty again to a drug charge, agreeing to a concurrent sentence of 4½ to 9 years. The Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), relying on a since-overruled case, computed his sentences as consecutive. The Court of Appeals held that the last sentencing judge has the discretion to decide whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively and that DOCS must follow the commitment order.

Facts

Murray was initially convicted of criminal possession and sale of a controlled substance and sentenced to concurrent terms of 7½ to 15 years.

He then pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to 7½ to 15 years, to run consecutively with the prior drug sentence. This was per the negotiated plea agreement.

The Appellate Division reversed the drug convictions and remitted for a new trial, but affirmed the manslaughter conviction.

In lieu of retrial, Murray pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance, with an agreed sentence of 4½ to 9 years, to run concurrently with the manslaughter sentence.

The third trial judge sentenced Murray accordingly, but DOCS computed his sentences as consecutive, relying on Matter of Muntaqim v Herbert.

Procedural History

Murray initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging DOCS’s computation of his sentence.

The Appellate Division ruled in favor of Murray, holding that the last sentencing judge has the discretion to determine whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether, when a judgment of conviction is vacated and the defendant is resentenced while subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the discretion to decide whether the sentences should run consecutively or concurrently remains with the second judge who acted in the sentencing sequence.

Holding

No, because the sentencing discretion afforded by Penal Law § 70.25 (1) devolves upon the last judge in the sentencing chain.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 70.25 (1) grants sentencing discretion to the court at the time of sentencing regarding whether terms should run concurrently or consecutively. The court noted that divesting the last sentencing judge of this discretion would limit the parties’ latitude in negotiating a plea.

The Court explicitly overruled Muntaqim, stating it is no longer good law.

The Court emphasized that DOCS is “conclusively bound by the contents of commitment papers accompanying a prisoner” (Middleton v State of New York, 54 AD2d 450, 452 [3d Dept 1976], affd 43 NY2d 678 [1977] on op below [emphasis added]). DOCS’s only option is to comply with the last commitment order received.

The Court indicated that prison officials are not free to disregard a commitment order. The court stated DOCS must comply with the plain terms of the last commitment order received, and further indicated that DOCS claimed to have been forced to choose between inconsistent directives.