Tag: People v. Mullen

  • People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1 (1978): Defendant’s Right to be Present at Trial Limited

    People v. Mullen, 44 N.Y.2d 1 (1978)

    A defendant’s right to be present at trial, whether derived from statute or due process, is not absolute and is only required when their absence would have a substantial effect on their ability to defend against the charges.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s absence from an in-chambers questioning of a juror, conducted by the trial judge with the prosecutor and defense counsel present, violated CPL 260.20 or due process. The court held that it did not, finding that the defendant’s presence was not essential because the inquiry was informal, occurred after jury selection, and did not substantially affect the defendant’s ability to defend himself. The presence of counsel was deemed sufficient to ensure a fair hearing.

    Facts

    Defendant Mullen was indicted on multiple drug-related charges. During jury selection, after eight jurors were sworn, one juror stated the defendant looked familiar, mentioning a past break-in at his workplace. After the jury was impaneled and sworn, the judge held a hearing in chambers with the juror, prosecutor, and defense counsel present, but without the defendant. The juror assured the court that his prior knowledge would not influence his verdict. Defense counsel did not question the juror. Both counsel agreed with the court’s conclusion that no statutory disqualification existed.

    Procedural History

    The jury found Mullen guilty of criminal possession of dangerous drugs and criminally using drug paraphernalia. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed, challenging the trial court’s in-chambers questioning of the juror in the defendant’s absence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an in-chambers questioning of a seated juror by the trial judge, in the presence of the prosecutor and defense counsel but in the absence of the defendant, violates CPL 260.20 or denies the defendant due process.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s absence did not have a substantial effect on his ability to defend himself, and the presence of counsel was sufficient to ensure a fair hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 260.20, requiring a defendant’s presence during trial, does not demand literal application. Substantial performance of its terms is sufficient. Quoting Maurer v. People, the court acknowledged that proceedings such as impaneling of the jury, introduction of evidence, summations and the court’s charge are all part of trial because the defendant’s presence is considered essential to justice. Due process requires a defendant’s presence only when a fair hearing would be thwarted by their absence, focusing on whether the absence substantially affects the ability to defend. The court distinguished this case from situations where the defendant’s presence is crucial, citing People ex rel. Fein v. Follette, where questioning jurors about a newspaper article outside the defendant’s presence was deemed not to violate a substantial right. The court noted, “[t]urning to an analysis of the present case, we conclude that the Trial Justice’s questioning of the juror in chambers under the circumstances present here did not constitute a material part of the trial.” The court concluded that the in-chambers questioning was informal, occurred after jury selection, and did not prejudice the defendant, as counsel was present. The court emphasized that the hearing had nothing to do with guilt or innocence.