New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Morhouse

  • People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967): Establishing Aider and Abettor Liability

    People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967)

    To be liable as an aider and abettor, a defendant must share the intent of the principal actor and take actions that encourage or induce the commission of the crime.

    Summary

    Morhouse, a political leader, was convicted of bribery and taking unlawful fees for his role in securing a liquor license for the New York Playboy Club by bribing Martin Epstein, Chairman of the State Liquor Authority. The prosecution argued Morhouse aided and abetted both the Playboy people in bribing Epstein and Epstein in taking unlawful fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to show Morhouse knew Epstein was to be bribed and that he encouraged the bribers, establishing a sufficient identity of interest between Morhouse and Epstein. The court remanded for a hearing on potential eavesdropping violations.

    Facts

    Playboy representatives initially agreed to bribe Epstein for a liquor license. This deal stalled. Epstein suggested involving Morhouse to resolve the issues. Morhouse agreed to help secure the license for $100,000, indicating knowledge of the prior corrupt arrangement with Epstein. After Morhouse’s involvement, Epstein told Berger, a Playboy representative, that he and Morhouse had discussed the deal and instructed Berger to pay Epstein his $50,000. Epstein eventually received half of his bribe.

    Procedural History

    Morhouse was convicted in the Supreme Court, New York County, of bribery and taking unlawful fees. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove Morhouse’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2. Whether the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated.
    3. Whether the court orders authorizing eavesdropping were properly issued and executed and, if not, whether the evidence presented at trial was tainted by any improper eavesdropping.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Morhouse knew of the corrupt agreement and encouraged the bribers to continue, satisfying the requirements for aider and abettor liability.
    2. Yes, because there was non-accomplice evidence fairly tending to connect Morhouse with the commission of the crime.
    3. Remanded for a hearing to determine whether the court orders authorizing eavesdropping were properly issued and executed under the law as it was understood at the time and to determine if the People’s evidence was tainted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Morhouse could be held liable as an aider and abettor because he knew Epstein was to be bribed and attached himself to the bribers’ cause, encouraging them to continue with the corrupt agreement. Morhouse’s representation that he could handle Epstein induced them to consummate the agreement. The court distinguished this case from others where the defendant had no personal interest in the crime’s commission. Here, Morhouse’s payment depended on the Playboy Club getting the license, requiring Epstein to fulfill his bargain. The court found sufficient corroboration of the accomplice testimony. Non-accomplice testimony showed Morhouse’s arrangement for payment by Playboy through its publishing affiliate and his efforts to shift the payment on the books after the Grand Jury investigation began. Regarding the eavesdropping, the court held that Morhouse had standing to object to bugs and wiretaps of his own business office and phone calls. The court remanded for a hearing to determine the propriety of these eavesdrops and whether they tainted the evidence. The court noted that the prosecution’s conduct in maintaining electronic surveillance of Morhouse’s office after he became a suspect and was known to confer with his attorney raised concerns about potential interference with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

  • People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967): Standing to Challenge a Wiretap

    People v. Morhouse, 21 N.Y.2d 66 (1967)

    A defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a wiretap and subsequent search if the defendant’s own privacy was violated, but not merely because evidence obtained from the violation of another person’s rights incriminates the defendant.

    Summary

    Morhouse was convicted of conspiracy based on evidence obtained from a wiretap on a phone not belonging to him and a search of premises he did not own. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether Morhouse had standing to challenge the legality of the wiretap and search. The court held that a defendant has standing only when their own privacy rights have been violated, not when evidence against them is derived from violations of another’s rights. Because Morhouse failed to demonstrate a violation of his own privacy, the court held that he lacked standing to challenge the wiretap and search.

    Facts

    The essential facts are that evidence used to convict Morhouse of conspiracy was obtained from:
    1. A wiretap on a telephone that was not owned by Morhouse.
    2. A search of premises not owned by Morhouse.
    Morhouse was charged with conspiring with the owners of the phone and the possessors of the searched apartment. Morhouse challenged the validity of the wiretap and the subsequent search, arguing that they were unlawful.

    Procedural History

    The District Court convicted Morhouse. The defendant appealed, arguing he had standing to challenge the legality of the wiretap. The Court of Appeals withheld determination of the appeal and remitted the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has standing to challenge the validity of a wiretap or search when the defendant’s own privacy was not invaded, but the evidence obtained from the wiretap or search is used against them in a conspiracy charge?

    Holding

    No, because the right to privacy is personal, and a defendant cannot complain merely because the violation of another person’s right reveals evidence incriminating them.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the essence of the Fourth Amendment is privacy and that the exclusion of evidence is a means to secure that privacy. Citing Jones v. United States, the court emphasized that restrictions on searches and seizures are for protection against official invasion of privacy. The court stated that “ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search * * * that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy.” The court distinguished Jones v. United States, noting that in Jones, the defendant was required to assert possession of the contraband to establish standing, which would force him to confess to the crime. Also, the defendant in Jones had a sufficient interest in the premises searched to claim a right of privacy. In Morhouse, the court found that Morhouse did not claim ownership of the phone tapped or the premises searched, nor could he. The court noted that Morhouse’s primary concern was to avoid any contact with the phone or premises. The court concluded that Morhouse was merely a “user” of the phone, which was insufficient to establish standing under the rationale of Jones. The dissenting opinion argued that Morhouse lacked standing because his privacy was not invaded. The dissent emphasized that the fact that the wiretap revealed Morhouse’s participation in the conspiracy did not, in itself, give Morhouse standing to challenge the wiretap.