New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Moore

  • People v. Moore, 6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006): Anonymous Tip Plus Evasion Insufficient for Reasonable Suspicion

    6 N.Y.3d 496 (2006)

    An anonymous tip, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; reasonable suspicion requires predictive information or observation of suspicious conduct.

    Summary

    Police officers, responding to an anonymous tip about a Black male with a gun, approached the defendant, who matched the description and began walking away. The officers drew their guns and ordered him to stop. The defendant then reached towards his waistband, and a subsequent search revealed a firearm. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the gun should have been suppressed because the initial gunpoint stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion. The anonymous tip, lacking predictive information, and the defendant’s act of walking away did not establish the necessary level of suspicion for a forcible stop under established Fourth Amendment principles.

    Facts

    On November 12, 1997, police officers received an anonymous radio call regarding a dispute involving a Black male with a gun, described as approximately 18 years old, wearing a gray jacket and red hat.
    The officers arrived at the scene within one minute and observed the defendant, who matched the description, but no dispute was in progress.
    As the officers approached, the defendant began to walk away.
    Without any verbal inquiry, the officers drew their guns and ordered the defendant to stop.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and moved to suppress the gun.
    Supreme Court denied the motion to suppress.
    The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the defendant’s movement toward his waistband justified the frisk.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an anonymous tip, combined with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, provides reasonable suspicion to justify a forcible stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because an anonymous tip lacking predictive information, even when coupled with a suspect’s act of walking away from police, does not provide reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop and frisk; such a stop requires a higher level of suspicion based on predictive information from the tip or independent observation of suspicious conduct by the officers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied the four-level test from People v. De Bour, which distinguishes between permissible police encounters based on the level of suspicion. Here, the gunpoint stop constituted a seizure requiring reasonable suspicion.
    An anonymous tip alone is insufficient for reasonable suspicion unless it contains predictive information that allows police to test the tip’s reliability, as established in Florida v. J.L. and People v. William II. The Court emphasized, “[R]easonable suspicion ‘requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.’” (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)).
    Defendant’s act of walking away from the police, while potentially generating a common-law right of inquiry, did not elevate the encounter to reasonable suspicion justifying a forcible stop. The Court noted that “[T]he police may not forcibly detain civilians in order to question them . . . without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (quoting People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 728 (1992)).
    Elevating a common-law inquiry to a forcible stop based solely on walking away would eliminate the “right to be let alone.” Additional information or observations of suspicious conduct are necessary to justify a forcible stop.
    The Court rejected the dissent’s argument that the combination of the anonymous tip and evasion created reasonable suspicion, asserting that a forcible stop requires more than just the possibility of a crime; it requires reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts.

  • People v. Moore, 5 N.Y.3d 725 (2005): Third-Degree Criminal Trespass Requires Fencing or Enclosure of Building

    5 N.Y.3d 725 (2005)

    To be convicted of third-degree criminal trespass under Penal Law § 140.10(a) for entering a building, the prosecution must prove the building was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.

    Summary

    Defendant Jerry Moore was charged with third-degree criminal trespass for entering a building on the SUNY Buffalo campus, violating a persona non grata letter. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the charge, holding that the information was jurisdictionally defective. The Court reasoned that to establish third-degree criminal trespass under Penal Law § 140.10(a) for entering a building, the prosecution must allege and prove that the building was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders. The information lacked such allegations, rendering it facially insufficient.

    Facts

    Jerry Moore was issued a “persona non grata” letter in 1999 and again in 2000, barring him from the SUNY Buffalo campus. On September 4, 2002, Moore entered a public building on the SUNY Buffalo campus. A verbal exchange occurred between Moore and a university employee.

    Procedural History

    The City Court granted Moore’s motion to dismiss the information, finding it jurisdictionally defective for failing to set forth every element of criminal trespass in the third degree. The County Court affirmed the City Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an information charging a defendant with third-degree criminal trespass for entering a building is facially sufficient when it fails to allege that the building was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, as required by Penal Law § 140.10(a).

    Holding

    No, because the information failed to allege a necessary element of the crime, namely that the building entered was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the plain language of Penal Law § 140.10(a), which states that a person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when they knowingly enter or remain unlawfully in a building or upon real property “which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.” The Court emphasized that the 1987 amendment to the statute made this requirement explicit. Before the amendment, the statute had been interpreted as not requiring a building to be fenced or enclosed. The Court reasoned that if knowingly entering any building was sufficient, then the additional elements for trespass in specific buildings (schools, public housing) would be unnecessary, and the violation of trespass would be identical to criminal trespass in the third degree.

    The Court cited People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 136 (1987), stating that “an information which fails to contain nonhearsay allegations establishing `if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof’ . . . is fatally defective.” Because the information and supporting deposition failed to allege that the campus building was fenced or enclosed, a required element of the crime, it was insufficient to establish criminal trespass in the third degree.

    The Court stated, “The plain language of the statute as amended, however, clearly requires that both buildings and real property be fenced or otherwise enclosed in order to increase the level of culpability from trespass (see Penal Law § 140.05) to criminal trespass in the third degree.”

  • People v. Moore, 96 N.Y.2d 509 (2001): Justification for Police Pursuit Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. Moore, 96 N.Y.2d 509 (2001)

    Flight from police, combined with other specific suspicious circumstances, can create reasonable suspicion justifying police pursuit, even if the initial encounter was merely a common-law right of inquiry.

    Summary

    This case addresses the legality of a police pursuit and subsequent search based on reasonable suspicion. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked car observed the defendant acting nervously in a drug-prone area. His reaction to the police vehicle, coupled with his hand movements suggesting he was concealing a weapon, led the officers to attempt a brief inquiry. The defendant fled, and during the pursuit, he discarded a gun. The Court of Appeals held that the officers’ initial observations, combined with the defendant’s flight, established reasonable suspicion justifying the pursuit and the subsequent recovery of the discarded weapon.

    Facts

    On February 19, 1998, at approximately 11:00 p.m., three plainclothes NYPD officers were patrolling a drug-prone area on 152nd Street in New York City in an unmarked vehicle. The officers observed the defendant walking with another individual, appearing nervous and looking around. When the defendant noticed the officers’ car, his “eyes bulged out.” As the car approached, he placed his hand under his jacket in a cupping motion, leading the officers to suspect he was adjusting a gun. The defendant then maneuvered to keep his right side away from the officers’ view. When the car drew parallel, the defendant abruptly changed direction and fled, abandoning his companion.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially suppressed the gun and the defendant’s statements. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the officers had a “founded suspicion” justifying a common-law right of inquiry. They further held that the defendant’s flight, combined with the initial suspicion, created reasonable suspicion to justify the pursuit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to pursue the defendant based on his initial behavior and subsequent flight.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s nervous behavior, coupled with his suspicious movements suggesting he was concealing a weapon, and his subsequent flight upon the approach of the officers, provided reasonable suspicion justifying the police pursuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, relying on the principle articulated in People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444 (1992), that reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is the standard for a police stop or detention short of actual arrest. The court stated that “a ‘defendant’s flight may be considered in conjunction with other attendant circumstances’ in determining whether reasonable suspicion justifying a seizure exists.” The Court found that the defendant’s actions prior to the flight, specifically his nervous behavior, his “eyes bulging out” upon seeing the police, and his cupping motion under his jacket, combined to provide a reasonable basis for the officers to suspect criminal activity. The court emphasized the significance of the defendant’s flight, stating it further heightened the suspicion. Because the record supported the Appellate Division’s determination that reasonable suspicion existed, the Court of Appeals upheld the legality of the pursuit and the admissibility of the discarded weapon. The court noted, “Whether the particular circumstances of a case give rise to reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact beyond our review if there is support in the record.”

  • People v. Moore, 66 N.Y.2d 1028 (1985): Inadmissibility of Withdrawn Guilty Pleas

    People v. Moore, 66 N.Y.2d 1028 (1985)

    A guilty plea, once withdrawn, is inadmissible as evidence against the defendant for any purpose, including impeachment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, reiterating the established rule that a withdrawn guilty plea is inadmissible in court for any purpose. This includes both the fact of the plea and the content of the plea allocution. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Evans, where a pre-plea statement was admissible because it was specifically bargained for as part of the plea agreement. The Court emphasized that using a withdrawn plea or its allocution against a defendant would be inherently unfair, as the People did not bargain for the subsequent use of those statements should the plea later be withdrawn.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying crime are not detailed in this memorandum decision. The key fact is that the defendant had previously entered a guilty plea, which was subsequently withdrawn.

    Procedural History

    The lower court ruled that the withdrawn guilty plea was inadmissible. The People appealed this ruling. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a withdrawn guilty plea and statements made during the plea allocution are admissible as evidence against the defendant at trial.

    Holding

    No, because a withdrawn guilty plea is “out of the case forever and for all purposes.” The subsequent use of those statements should the plea later be withdrawn is not something the People have bargained for and would be decidedly unfair to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on established New York precedent, citing People v. Droz, People v. Spitaleri, and People v. Burd, which clearly state that a withdrawn guilty plea cannot be used against the defendant, either in the prosecution’s direct case or for impeachment purposes. The Court distinguished People v. Evans, explaining that in Evans, the pre-plea statement was admissible because it was a specific condition of the plea bargain. The Court reasoned that the People had bargained for that statement, and preventing its use would be unfair to the prosecution. In contrast, the Court stated, “The same considerations do not apply to the plea itself or to admissions made during the plea allocution since the subsequent use of those statements should the plea later be withdrawn is not something the People have bargained for and would be decidedly unfair to the defendant.” The key policy consideration is fairness to the defendant. To allow the use of a withdrawn plea would undermine the defendant’s right to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial. The Court emphasizes that a withdrawn plea is considered a nullity, and its content should not prejudice the defendant’s case.