New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Montgomery

  • People v. Montgomery, 96 N.Y.2d 805 (2001): Tolling Probation Upon Declaration of Delinquency

    People v. Montgomery, 96 N.Y.2d 805 (2001)

    The filing of a declaration of delinquency tolls the expiration of a probationary sentence, and a challenge to the timeliness of a violation of probation hearing must be raised at the hearing to be preserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in 1987 and sentenced to probation. He violated his probation, absconded, and was arrested in Nassau County on new charges. He pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to prison. In 1991, a declaration of delinquency was issued regarding his probation. After a violation of probation hearing in 1996, his probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to a consecutive prison term. The New York Court of Appeals held that the declaration of delinquency tolled the probationary period and that his claim that the violation of probation hearing was untimely was not preserved for appellate review because he failed to raise it at the hearing.

    Facts

    In September 1987, the defendant was convicted in Kings County of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and sentenced to five years probation and community service.

    Three and a half years into his probation, the defendant violated the terms, absconded to Nassau County, and was arrested and charged with two separate crimes.

    The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree in Nassau County and in 1992 was sentenced as a second felony offender to 9 to 18 years in prison.

    In November 1991, the Supreme Court, Kings County, issued a declaration of delinquency and a warrant for the defendant’s arrest related to the probation violation.

    In 1996, after a violation of probation hearing, the court revoked the 1987 sentence of probation and imposed a sentence of 2 1/3 to 7 years, to run consecutively to the 9-to-18-year Nassau County sentence.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Kings County, revoked the defendant’s probation after a hearing.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the filing of a declaration of delinquency in 1991 tolled the expiration of the probationary sentence pursuant to Penal Law § 65.15(2)?

    2. Whether the defendant’s claim that the violation of probation hearing was untimely under CPL 410.30 was preserved for appellate review?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the filing of a declaration of delinquency in 1991 tolled the expiration of the probationary sentence (Penal Law § 65.15 [2]).

    2. No, because the defendant did not raise his claim that the hearing was untimely under CPL 410.30 at the violation of probation hearing; thus, the argument is unpreserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division’s ruling that the filing of the declaration of delinquency tolled the expiration of the probationary sentence. This aligns with Penal Law § 65.15(2), which addresses the tolling of probationary sentences when a declaration of delinquency is filed.

    The Court emphasized the importance of preserving issues for appellate review. Because the defendant failed to raise the argument regarding the timeliness of the hearing under CPL 410.30 at the violation of probation hearing itself, he was precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal. The Court implicitly reinforces the principle that trial courts must be given the opportunity to address alleged errors or irregularities in the first instance.

    The Court’s decision highlights the practical importance of timely objections and the consequences of failing to raise issues at the appropriate stage of legal proceedings. This is a critical consideration for defense attorneys handling probation violation cases.

  • People v. Montgomery, 88 N.Y.2d 923 (1996): Admissibility of Confirmatory Identifications Without a “Drive-By”

    People v. Montgomery, 88 N.Y.2d 923 (1996)

    A police station identification by an experienced undercover officer shortly after a drug purchase from the defendant can be admissible as a confirmatory identification, even without a prior “drive-by” identification, if the circumstances ensure the reliability of the identification.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the admissibility of a station house identification as confirmatory, even without a “drive-by,” because the identification occurred shortly after the undercover officer’s second face-to-face drug transaction with the defendant. An undercover officer bought cocaine from the defendant in an apartment, secured a search warrant, bought cocaine again a week later, and the backup team arrested the defendant. The officer identified the defendant at the station house through a one-way mirror less than five hours after the second purchase. The Court held that the prompt identification following the drug purchase was a proper completion of police procedure, ensuring reliability despite the absence of a drive-by identification.

    Facts

    An experienced undercover officer purchased a gram of cocaine from the defendant inside a Manhattan apartment.

    Based on this purchase, a search warrant was obtained for the premises.

    One week later, the same undercover officer returned to the apartment and bought another gram of cocaine from the defendant.

    Immediately after leaving the building, the officer radioed his backup team that the “buy had gone down.”

    The backup team arrived at the apartment within five minutes to execute the warrant and arrested the defendant and other occupants.

    The undercover officer was not present during the search or arrest.

    Later that evening, the undercover officer identified the defendant through a one-way mirror at the station house, less than five hours after the second drug purchase.

    Procedural History

    The hearing court ruled the station house identification admissible as a confirmatory procedure.

    The Appellate Division affirmed this ruling.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police station identification can be considered a confirmatory identification and thus admissible when there was no prior “drive-by” identification to confirm that the correct individual was apprehended?

    Holding

    No, not necessarily. The absence of a “drive-by” does not automatically preclude an identification from being considered confirmatory because other circumstances can provide sufficient assurance of reliability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts, finding the identification admissible. The court reasoned that the station house identification, occurring only hours after the officer’s second face-to-face transaction with the defendant, constituted “the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure.” The Court declined to impose a per se requirement of a “drive-by” identification for police identifications to be considered confirmatory. It emphasized that courts must be vigilant in assuring the reliability of identifications that have not been shown to be free of suggestive taint. While a “drive-by” is one way to ensure reliability, it is not the only way. The Court highlighted that the search warrant was executed only minutes after the undercover officer left the apartment, which substantially reduced the risk that the wrong person would be taken into custody and the risk of a later misidentification.

    The Court acknowledged prior cases such as People v. Wharton and People v. Morales, where “drive-bys” were present. However, it clarified that those cases did not establish a rigid requirement. The key factor is the reliability of the identification, and that can be established through various means. As the court stated, the officer’s identification “constitute[d] the ordinary and proper completion of an integral police procedure.”

  • People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969): Defendant’s Right to Know About Appeal

    People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969)

    A defendant has the right to be advised of their right to appeal, and failure to do so may warrant resentencing for the purpose of taking an appeal, provided a genuine appealable issue exists.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant, convicted via guilty plea, is entitled to a hearing on a claim of not being advised of the right to appeal. The Court held that to warrant a hearing, the defendant must dispute the conviction’s validity and show a genuine appealable issue they might have raised but for ignorance of their rights. A mere claim of excessive sentencing, where the sentence is less than the maximum, is insufficient. Further, the Court clarified that applications for Montgomery relief are encompassed by CPL 460.30, requiring application to the intermediate appellate court.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree after pleading guilty. As a second felony offender, he faced a maximum sentence of 30 to 60 years. He received a sentence of 15 to 25 years. The defendant later claimed he was not advised of his right to appeal and that the District Attorney breached a promise of a lighter sentence. He sought resentencing to pursue an appeal.

    Procedural History

    The defendant previously litigated, unsuccessfully, the claim that the District Attorney breached a promise of a lighter sentence in prior coram nobis proceedings. He then sought a hearing based on the claim he was not advised of his right to appeal. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, convicted via guilty plea, is entitled to a hearing on a claim of not being advised of the right to appeal, based solely on a claim of excessive sentence where the sentence was less than the maximum permissible sentence?
    2. Whether applications seeking Montgomery relief are encompassed by CPL 460.30?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant must demonstrate a genuine appealable issue, and a mere claim of excessive sentencing, where the sentence is less than the maximum, is insufficient.
    2. Yes, because CPL 460.30 directly applies to applications for extension of time for taking an appeal, encompassing the relief sought in a Montgomery claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to be entitled to a Montgomery hearing, a defendant must dispute the validity of the conviction and demonstrate a genuine appealable issue. It cited People v. Melton, stating that an unsupported claim of excessiveness of sentence, where the defendant received less than the maximum, is not a tenable basis for relief. The Court emphasized that the defendant, facing a potential 30 to 60-year sentence, received 15 to 25 years, thus failing to establish a claim upon which Montgomery relief could be granted. The Court also noted the defendant’s claim of a breached promise had been unsuccessfully litigated previously.

    The Court further clarified the procedural mechanism for Montgomery relief. While acknowledging the traditional use of coram nobis, the Court stated that the enactment of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) sought to codify grounds for such relief. However, CPL 440.10, designed for vacating judgments, doesn’t address Montgomery claims which seek an extension of appeal time, not vacatur.

    Turning to CPL 460.30, the Court found it directly applicable to applications for extending appeal time. It stated that this statute eliminates the need for resentencing for taking a timely appeal. The application must be made to the intermediate appellate court, which may extend the appeal time if the failure to appeal was due to “improper conduct of a public servant or from improper conduct * * * of the defendant’s attorney.” The Court concluded that failing to advise a defendant of their right to appeal constitutes “improper conduct.” The Court also noted that CPL 460.30 provides for a hearing to resolve factual issues. Finally, the Court emphasized that CPL 460.30 motions must be made with due diligence and within one year of the appeal deadline and, regarding convictions prior to CPL 460.30’s enactment, within one year of the statute’s effective date.

  • People v. Coleman, 30 N.Y.2d 582 (1972): Appellate Review of Excessive Sentences After Guilty Plea

    People v. Coleman, 30 N.Y.2d 582 (1972)

    Even after a guilty plea, an appellate court can review the severity of a defendant’s sentence, and a defendant serving a sentence claimed to be excessive may be entitled to resentencing to revive their right to appeal.

    Summary

    The defendant, Coleman, claimed his sentence was excessive after pleading guilty. The lower court denied him Montgomery relief (resentencing to allow an appeal), and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant serving a sentence claimed to be excessive is entitled to appellate review of that sentence, even after a guilty plea. The court emphasized that the Appellate Division has the discretion to modify sentences. The denial of Montgomery relief was not a determination on the merits of the excessive sentence claim.

    Facts

    Coleman was serving a maximum sentence after pleading guilty. He sought resentencing under People v. Montgomery to revive his right to appeal, arguing his sentence was excessive. The hearing judge denied this relief.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Coleman’s request for resentencing. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, currently serving a maximum sentence after a guilty plea and claiming the sentence is excessive, is entitled to resentencing under People v. Montgomery to revive their right to appeal, so that the Appellate Division can review the propriety of the sentence.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a defendant is serving a sentence claimed to be excessive, they may raise that question on appeal, and are entitled to Montgomery relief to revive that right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that although the scope of appeal after a guilty plea is limited, the severity of the sentence is a reviewable question. Citing People v. Lynn, the court stated that a claim of excessive sentence is a “viable claim” in a People v. Montgomery application. The court emphasized that the Appellate Division has the power to consider the propriety of the sentence and can either affirm or modify it. The court noted that the lower courts’ denial of Montgomery relief was not a determination on the merits of the excessive sentence claim, but only a determination that no appealable issue was shown. This meant the Appellate Division never actually considered the merits of the sentence. The Court of Appeals concluded that the merits of the excessive sentence claim were a proper subject of review for the Appellate Division, and thus resentencing was required to allow that review. The court did not delve into specific policy considerations beyond ensuring defendants had the opportunity to have potentially excessive sentences reviewed on appeal, even after pleading guilty.

  • People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969): Indigent Defendant’s Right to Know of Appeal

    People v. Montgomery, 24 N.Y.2d 130 (1969)

    An indigent criminal defendant has a right to be informed of their right to appeal, and failure to do so by counsel or the court warrants a hearing and possible resentencing to allow an appeal.

    Summary

    Montgomery, an indigent defendant convicted of second-degree murder, sought a writ of error coram nobis, alleging he was never informed of his right to appeal. The New York Court of Appeals held that every defendant has a fundamental right to appeal, and due process requires that indigent defendants not be deprived of this right due to ignorance or counsel’s failure. The court reversed the lower court’s denial of Montgomery’s application and ordered a hearing to determine if he was indeed unaware of his appeal rights, potentially leading to resentencing to allow a new appeal.

    Facts

    Samuel Montgomery, a 15-year-old, was involved in a street fight that resulted in the fatal stabbing of one of the other participants. He was indicted for second-degree murder along with two companions. Montgomery was allegedly the one who brandished the knife.

    Procedural History

    Montgomery and his companions were jointly tried, with court-appointed counsel representing each. Montgomery was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life. His co-defendant May’s conviction was modified on appeal to manslaughter. Montgomery did not file an appeal at the time. Years later, Montgomery applied for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that he was not informed of his right to appeal due to indigency, ignorance, and infancy. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, denied the application without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the petitioner’s allegation that he was not informed of his right to appeal presents an issue of fact which requires a hearing to determine the veracity of the contention.

    Holding

    Yes, because basic fairness and due process require that an indigent defendant not be deprived of the right to appeal either because the defendant was unaware of its existence or counsel failed to abide by a promise to either file or prosecute an appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the right to appeal is a fundamental right. The court stated, “The time has come for us to announce clearly that every defendant has a fundamental right to appeal his conviction and that, accordingly, basic fairness and due process require that the right not be dissipated either because the defendant was unaware of its existence or counsel failed to abide by a promise to either file or prosecute an appeal.” Because the state provides an absolute right to seek review in criminal prosecutions, an indigent defendant cannot be deprived of this review simply because of their poverty. The court reasoned that since the State has the responsibility to provide legal advice to indigent defendants, the State cannot permit a critical time period to lapse without the defendant’s awareness. The court concluded that Montgomery should be afforded a hearing to determine whether he was informed of his right to appeal. If not, he was denied equal protection and should be resentenced so his time to appeal will run anew. The court noted, “An indigent defendant cannot lose his right to appeal simply because the courts have deputized a lawyer to fulfill the function and he has failed properly to carry out his duties.”

  • People v. Montgomery, 18 N.Y.2d 993 (1966): Indigent Defendants’ Right to Preliminary Hearing Transcripts

    People v. Montgomery, 18 N.Y.2d 993 (1966)

    The State violates the equal protection clause when it denies an indigent defendant a transcript of a preliminary hearing solely due to their inability to pay.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an indigent defendant is entitled to a free transcript of their preliminary hearing. The defendant requested a transcript accompanied by an affidavit of indigency, but the request was denied. The Court reasoned that while Section 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants a right to a transcript upon payment, the State cannot condition the exercise of this right on the ability to pay, as it violates equal protection. The court emphasized that such requests must be made with enough advance notice to allow for transcription without delaying the trial.

    Facts

    The defendant requested a transcript of the preliminary hearing. This request was accompanied by an affidavit of indigency, indicating an inability to pay for the transcript. The trial court denied the request.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in the Supreme Court, Queens County. After the trial court denied the defendant’s request for a free preliminary hearing transcript, the case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remitted the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State can deny an indigent defendant access to a transcript of a preliminary hearing solely because of their inability to pay, consistent with the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State cannot condition a right (access to a preliminary hearing transcript) on a defendant’s ability to pay, as this violates the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that when the State affords a defendant a right, the exercise of that right cannot be conditioned on the ability to pay. They cited Section 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which grants the right to a preliminary hearing transcript upon payment. The court found that denying an indigent defendant access to this transcript solely due to their inability to pay violates equal protection. The Court relied on precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States, including Griffin v. Illinois, which established that providing different treatment based on wealth in criminal proceedings is unconstitutional.

    The Court stated, “When the State constitutionally or statutorily affords a defendant a right, the exercise thereof cannot be conditioned upon the defendant’s ability to pay.” The Court also emphasized the importance of timely requests for transcripts to avoid delaying the trial.