People v. Montalvo, 86 N.Y.2d 826 (1995)

A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on a lesser included offense if (1) the additional offense is a lesser included offense and (2) there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser included offense but not the greater offense.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. The court reasoned that while the defendant intentionally stabbed the victim, a reasonable view of the evidence could suggest he was unaware that the stabbing would result in death, thus supporting a finding of criminal negligence rather than intentional manslaughter. The court also held that the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation was unpreserved for review.

Facts

The defendant, Montalvo, stabbed the victim, Golofit. He was charged with manslaughter in the second degree. At trial, Montalvo requested that the judge also instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense.

Procedural History

The trial court denied Montalvo’s request for a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide. Montalvo was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.
2. Whether there was a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed criminally negligent homicide but not manslaughter in the second degree.
3. Whether the prosecutor’s remarks during summation were so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

Holding

1. Yes, because it is undisputed that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.
2. Yes, because a reasonable view of the record evidence supports a finding that defendant was not aware that stabbing Golofit would result in his death.
3. No, because the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing that Montalvo was entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide. The court reiterated the two-pronged test for entitlement to a lesser included offense charge: (1) the additional offense must be a lesser included offense, and (2) there must be a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser included offense but not the greater offense. The court found that both prongs were satisfied. First, it was undisputed that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree (citing People v. Stanfield, 36 NY2d 467). Second, the court emphasized that the intentional nature of the stabbing did not preclude a finding of criminal negligence. The court stated, “In criminal negligence, a person acts with the requisite culpable mental state when such person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the act in question will cause the statutorily described result (Penal Law § 15.05 [4]).” The court further clarified that “criminal negligence analysis focuses on the actor’s awareness of the risk that death will result from the act, not whether the underlying act is intentional.” Because a reasonable view of the evidence could suggest that Montalvo was unaware that stabbing Golofit would result in death, the instruction should have been given. Finally, the court held that Montalvo’s claim regarding the prosecutor’s summation was unpreserved because defense counsel did not object further or request a mistrial after the trial judge issued curative instructions. The court cited People v. Williams, 46 NY2d 1070, 1071, stating that under these circumstances, “the curative instructions must be deemed to have corrected the error to the defendant’s satisfaction”.