New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Mojica

  • People v. Mojica, 21 N.Y.3d 465 (2013): Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense Doesn’t Require Proof of Mental Infirmity

    People v. Mojica, 21 N.Y.3d 465 (2013)

    The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED) does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder, but rather a reasonably explicable emotional disturbance so extreme as to result in a profound loss of self-control.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for fatally stabbing his fiancée. He requested the jury be charged on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance (EED), which would allow for a verdict of first-degree manslaughter. The trial court denied the request, believing proof of a “mental infirmity” was required. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the EED defense does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder. The court found that the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, presented a triable question as to whether the defendant acted under extreme emotional disturbance.

    Facts

    The defendant and his fiancée, Tyffany Porter, had a heated argument. Porter refused to have sex with the defendant and disclosed she had been unfaithful with one of his friends. During the argument, the defendant retrieved a knife and stabbed Porter 47 times, killing her. The defendant then drove to a friend’s house, admitting he “just snapped” and appeared “spaced out.” He later called 911, stating he “just lost it” and “blacked out.” He confessed to the stabbing, explaining he was scared and panicked and that Porter had previously been abusive towards him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in the trial court, which refused to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding the defendant’s conduct inconsistent with the loss of self-control associated with the defense. The New York Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance because the defendant failed to prove he suffered from a mental infirmity.

    Holding

    No, because the extreme emotional disturbance defense does not require proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder; it requires a reasonably explicable emotional disturbance so extreme as to result in a profound loss of self-control.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant when judging whether to charge an affirmative defense. The charge must be given if there is evidence reasonably supportive of the defense, even if there is other evidence that would negate it. The court stated that the sheer number of knife wounds was indicative of the defendant’s loss of control. The court clarified that the term “mental infirmity,” as used in prior cases, does not tether the defense to proof of an underlying psychiatric disorder. The court noted that the subjective element of EED may be inferred from circumstances indicative of a loss of control and established without psychiatric evidence. The court found the defendant’s statements that he “snapped” and his demeanor after the event, along with the circumstances of the crime, sufficient to warrant the charge. Regarding the objective element (reasonableness of the explanation), the court stated that, viewing the evidence most favorably to the defendant, the jury should have determined whether the victim’s rejection and disclosure of infidelity precipitated an onrush of emotion leaving the defendant bereft of self-control. The court emphasized that its role is limited to excluding claims that are patently insufficient due to a lack of evidence or a speculative relation between the disturbance and the triggering circumstance or homicidal acts. The court stated, “The purpose [of the extreme emotional disturbance defense] was explicitly to give full scope to what amounts to a plea in mitigation based upon a mental or emotional trauma of significant dimensions.”

  • People v. Mojica, 96 N.Y.2d 226 (2001): Rebuttable Presumption of Intoxication Based on Breathalyzer Results

    People v. Mojica, 96 N.Y.2d 226 (2001)

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2)(c) establishes a rebuttable presumption that a person with a blood alcohol level between .07% and .10% is not intoxicated, but the prosecution can overcome this presumption with other evidence of intoxication.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was entitled to rebut the statutory presumption in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2)(c), which states that a blood alcohol level between .07% and .10% is prima facie evidence of non-intoxication. The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated after a breathalyzer test showed a blood alcohol level of .08%. Despite this result, the court found that the accusatory instrument contained sufficient factual allegations, such as the defendant’s erratic driving, physical appearance, failed sobriety tests, and admission of drinking, to establish reasonable cause that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3). The case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Defendant was stopped for a traffic infraction (driving without head or tail lights). Upon stopping the vehicle, the arresting officer observed that the defendant had glassy eyes, impaired speech and motor coordination, and smelled of alcohol. The defendant failed four field sobriety tests, including a “Finger Count Test,” in which he could not correctly count his fingers. The defendant admitted to drinking five to six beers before driving and acknowledged that he should not have been operating the vehicle. A breathalyzer test, administered 45 minutes after the stop, indicated a blood alcohol level of .08%.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), common-law driving while intoxicated. The County Court reversed the City Court’s decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the factual allegations in the accusatory instrument’s supporting documentation, indicating signs of intoxication, are sufficient to allow the People to rebut the presumption established by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2)(c) despite a breathalyzer reading between .07% and .10%.

    Holding

    Yes, because the accusatory instrument contained sufficient factual allegations to establish reasonable cause that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3), entitling the People to an opportunity to rebut the presumption at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2) (c) establishes a rebuttable presumption, not an absolute bar to prosecution. The court emphasized the importance of considering all evidence presented. In this case, the supporting documentation contained factual allegations sufficient to establish reasonable cause that the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3). These allegations included: erratic driving (driving without lights), physical manifestations of intoxication (glassy eyes, impaired speech, smell of alcohol), failure of field sobriety tests (including the finger count test), and the defendant’s admission to drinking and acknowledgment that he should not have been driving. The Court explicitly disapproved of People v. Gingello, to the extent that it held to the contrary. The court determined that the People were entitled to an opportunity to rebut the section 1195 (2)(c) presumption at trial, based on the totality of the evidence presented. The Court emphasized, “[e]vidence that there was more than .07 of one per centum but less than .10 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in such person’s blood shall be prima facie evidence that such person was not in an intoxicated condition.”