New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Mills

  • People v. Mills, 11 N.Y.3d 527 (2008): Eligibility for Resentencing Under the Drug Law Reform Act

    11 N.Y.3d 527 (2008)

    To be eligible for resentencing under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2005, a class A-II felony drug offender must not be eligible for parole within three years of applying for resentencing.

    Summary

    This case interprets the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) of 2005, specifically who is eligible for resentencing. The Court of Appeals held that to qualify for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA, class A-II felony drug offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application. The Court reasoned that the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history support this interpretation. The Court rejected arguments that prior parole or subsequent offenses should alter this eligibility requirement, emphasizing the legislature’s intent to target offenders facing the longest prison terms. The orders of the lower courts were affirmed, denying resentencing to both defendants.

    Facts

    Donald Mills pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in 1995 and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of three years to life. He was denied parole multiple times. Jose Then pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in 1999 and was sentenced to five years to life, then paroled in 2002. He was arrested again on drug charges, convicted in 2003, and sentenced to six years to life. His parole on the 1999 conviction was revoked.

    Procedural History

    Mills moved for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA, which was initially granted but later vacated by the County Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the vacatur. Then moved for resentencing on both his 1999 and 2003 convictions; the Supreme Court granted it for both. The Appellate Division reversed the resentencing for the 1999 conviction. Both Mills and Then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Drug Law Reform Act of 2005 applies to A-II felony drug offenders who are eligible for parole within three years of applying for resentencing.

    2. Whether a defendant who has been released on parole for a class A-II drug felony conviction is eligible for resentencing under the 2005 DLRA for that conviction after parole revocation and re-incarceration.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute explicitly requires applicants to be more than twelve months from being an “eligible inmate,” as defined by Correction Law § 851(2), which includes those eligible for parole within two years. Therefore, to qualify for resentencing, offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application.

    2. No, because once a defendant has been released to parole supervision for a class A-II drug felony conviction, they no longer qualify for 2005 DLRA relief for that particular conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the 2005 DLRA, specifically referencing Correction Law § 851(2), unambiguously requires that A-II felony drug offenders must not be eligible for parole within three years of their resentencing application. The Court rejected alternative interpretations, finding no support in legislative history or policy considerations. The Court cited letters from the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services and the Executive Director of the New York State Defenders Association, both of which explicitly mentioned the three-year limitation.
    Regarding Then, the Court reasoned that allowing a resentencing opportunity based on a subsequent offense would create an illogical outcome. The Court emphasized that the Legislature did not intend for fresh crimes to trigger resentencing opportunities. “A valid and more sensible reading of the statutory text is that in order to be eligible for resentencing, an inmate must be more than three years from parole eligibility for the same class A-II drug felony for which resentencing is sought.” In short, the 2005 DLRA was designed to “ameliorate[] the conditions of those A-II offenders facing the longest prison time“.

  • People v. Mills, 1 N.Y.3d 269 (2003): Waiver of Statute of Limitations by Requesting Lesser Included Offense

    1 N.Y.3d 269 (2003)

    A defendant forfeits or waives a statute of limitations defense for a lesser included offense when the indictment is based on legally sufficient evidence and the defendant requests that the jury be charged on the lesser included offense.

    Summary

    Arthur Mills was indicted for second-degree murder in the 1978 drowning death of a 12-year-old. Mills requested the jury be instructed on the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide, which had a five-year statute of limitations that had long expired. The trial court agreed, conditioning the charge on Mills waiving any statute of limitations defense. Mills maintained his right to appeal on statute of limitations grounds, but the court charged the jury with the lesser offense. Mills was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. The Court of Appeals held that by requesting the charge, Mills waived his statute of limitations defense, provided the original indictment for second-degree murder was based on legally sufficient evidence.

    Facts

    In 1978, Arthur Mills (age 17) pushed 12-year-old Raymond Umber off a pier into Oneida Lake. Umber hit his head and drowned. Mills told his companions to keep quiet, threatening them with jail if they revealed the incident. The death was initially ruled accidental. Twenty years later, Mills’s brother, motivated by anger over an affair, reported the incident to the police. Mills’s wife also provided incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    Mills was indicted for second-degree murder. He requested that lesser included offenses be submitted to the jury. The trial court granted this request, conditioning it on a waiver of any statute of limitations defense for the lesser charges. At the charge conference, Mills requested criminally negligent homicide be submitted, but maintained he reserved the right to appeal on statute of limitations grounds. The jury acquitted Mills of second-degree murder but convicted him of criminally negligent homicide. Mills’s motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed. Leave to appeal was granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by requesting that the jury be charged on a lesser included offense that is normally time-barred, forfeits or waives the statute of limitations defense to that lesser included offense, when the indictment is based on legally sufficient evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because where an indictment is based on legally sufficient evidence, a defendant’s statute of limitations defense is forfeited or waived by his request to charge the lesser included offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that can be waived. CPL 300.50(1) allows for lesser included offenses to be submitted if there’s a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the lesser offense but not the greater. CPL 300.50(2) requires the court to submit a lesser included offense when requested by either party if authorized by CPL 300.50(1). By requesting the charge, Mills waived his right to challenge the submission of the lesser charge on appeal. The court emphasized that its holding eliminates the danger of prosecutorial overcharging to circumvent the statute of limitations, because the court would still have to decide if the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to support the depraved indifference charge.

    The Court found the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case of depraved indifference murder. The Court stated, “Legally sufficient evidence is defined as ‘competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged’ (CPL 70.10 [1]). In the context of grand jury proceedings, ‘legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ (People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523, 526 [1998]; see People v Mayo, 36 NY2d 1002, 1004 [1975]).” The actions of pushing Umber, and then misleading Mills’ friends to discourage them from helping established a prima facie case.

    Regarding the marital privilege, the Court found statements made during the course of physical abuse are not considered confidential because the speaker isn’t relying on the marital relationship to keep the statements secret. Because Mills was choking and threatening his wife when he made the incriminating statements, the privilege did not apply.