27 N.Y.2d 90 (1970)

A defendant who consents to be tried without a jury to obtain youthful offender status, with the advice of counsel, cannot later challenge the proceeding based on the denial of a jury trial.

Summary

This case addresses whether a defendant can challenge a youthful offender adjudication on the grounds that he was denied a jury trial when he had previously consented to be tried without a jury as part of the youthful offender proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant who, with the advice of counsel, expressly consents to youthful offender treatment, which includes waiving a jury trial, cannot later attack the proceeding on the basis of that waiver. The court reasoned that the defendant cannot embrace the benefits of the youthful offender statute while simultaneously rejecting its mandatory provisions.

Facts

The defendant, Michael A.C., was subject to a youthful offender proceeding. Prior to the commencement of the proceeding, the defendant consented to be tried without a jury, as required by Section 913-g (subd. 3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After being adjudicated a youthful offender, the defendant challenged the adjudication, arguing that his right to a jury trial had been violated.

Procedural History

The lower court upheld the youthful offender adjudication. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant waived his right to a jury trial by consenting to the youthful offender proceeding.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant, who with the advice of counsel, expressly consents to youthful offender treatment, including waiving the right to a jury trial, may later attack the proceeding on the ground that he was denied a jury trial.

Holding

No, because a defendant cannot retain the benefits of the youthful offender statute without complying with its mandatory provisions, including the waiver of a jury trial when consent is given with advice of counsel.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that Section 913-g (subd. 3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the defendant with a choice: to be tried as an adult with a jury, or to waive the right to a jury trial by consenting to adjudication in Youth Part to potentially obtain the benefits of the youthful offender statute. The choice is the defendant’s. The court distinguished this case from Duncan v. Louisiana, noting that Duncan involved a situation where the defendant was denied a jury trial without an alternative. Here, the defendant actively chose to participate in the youthful offender proceeding, knowing that it involved a waiver of the jury trial. The court stated, “The defendant herein does not seek to be tried as an adult where concededly he is entitled to a jury trial, but rather insists upon retaining the benefits of the youthful offender statute without complying with the mandatory provisions thereof.” The court emphasized that allowing a defendant to challenge the proceeding after consenting to it would emasculate the statute and allow the defendant to freely choose when to embrace and reject its provisions. The dissent argued that the consent requirement does not cure the underlying constitutional issue regarding the right to a jury trial. They believed the defendant should not be forced to waive a constitutional right in order to potentially benefit from the youthful offender statute.