New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Michael

  • People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1 (1979): Double Jeopardy Must Be Raised at Trial to Be Preserved for Appeal

    48 N.Y.2d 1 (1979)

    A defendant’s failure to raise a double jeopardy claim at trial constitutes a waiver of that defense for appellate review unless the error affects the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s failure to raise a double jeopardy defense before or during the second trial waived the right to assert it on appeal. The Court reasoned that the double jeopardy defense, while constitutionally significant, is a personal right that must be timely asserted. The majority distinguished this case from errors affecting the court’s organization or mode of proceedings, which can be raised for the first time on appeal. The dissent argued that established precedent required preservation of the double jeopardy defense at trial and that the majority’s decision undermined the state’s interest in efficient criminal procedure.

    Facts

    The defendant was initially tried for a crime, but the outcome of that trial is not specified in this excerpt. The defendant was then retried for the same crime. Before or during the second trial, the defendant did not raise a defense of double jeopardy, arguing that being tried again for the same offense violated his constitutional rights.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The specific ruling of the Appellate Division is not detailed in this excerpt. The Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant’s failure to raise the double jeopardy defense at trial precluded him from raising it on appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s failure to assert a double jeopardy defense prior to or during trial waives the right to raise that defense on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because the constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is a personal right which if not timely interposed at trial may be waived.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the “constitutional immunity from double jeopardy is a personal right which if not timely interposed at trial may be waived.” The court relied on prior case law, including People v. La Ruffa, which reaffirmed the principle that a double jeopardy defense can be waived if not raised at trial. The court distinguished the double jeopardy claim from errors affecting the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings, such as trial by a jury of fewer than 12 members or prosecution by information for an infamous crime when a Grand Jury indictment is constitutionally required. The court reasoned that permitting a defendant to raise a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal would undermine the State’s interest in enforcing its criminal law efficiently. As the dissent stated, “[a] defendant cannot be permitted to sit idly by while error is committed, thereby allow the error to pass into the record uncured, and yet claim the error on appeal.” The court also distinguished Menna v. New York, noting that while a guilty plea does not automatically waive a double jeopardy claim that was unsuccessfully raised before the plea, it does not preclude a finding that the defendant waived the claim by failing to raise it timely and preserve it for appellate review.

  • People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972): Double Jeopardy and Defendant-Induced Mistrials

    People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972)

    A defendant may be retried without violating double jeopardy protections when the defendant’s own actions caused the mistrial, creating a ‘manifest necessity’ to halt the initial proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of double jeopardy when a mistrial is declared due to the unavailability of witnesses, where the unavailability is attributed to threats made by the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible because the defendant’s actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial. Allowing retrial in such circumstances does not violate double jeopardy principles, as the defendant should not benefit from obstructing the judicial process.

    Facts

    During jury selection in the initial trial, the prosecutor discovered that two witnesses were difficult to locate. Following a holiday adjournment, the prosecutor informed the court that the missing witnesses had been threatened and that their disappearance was attributable to the defendant. At the subsequent trial, one witness testified to leaving the state because his life was threatened, and another testified that the defendant’s uncle and another person threatened her with a knife.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s application for a mistrial on November 28, 1967, after the jury had been sworn but before any witnesses were called. The defendant was then retried. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine whether the retrial violated the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the mistrial granted on the People’s application due to witness unavailability, where the unavailability was allegedly caused by the defendant, precludes a subsequent trial based on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s own actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that if a defendant’s actions cause a trial to be aborted, they should not be allowed to claim double jeopardy as a constitutional safeguard. This situation falls within the scope of “manifest necessity,” which justifies interrupting a trial. The court distinguished this case from Downum v. United States, where the witness absence was due to the prosecutor’s failure to ensure their presence. Here, the defendant’s alleged intimidation of witnesses directly impeded the prosecution’s ability to present its case.

    The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from frustrating the trial process. Citing United States v. Perez, the court reiterated that “manifest necessity” allows for the interruption of a trial. The court held that the retrial was permissible under the precedent established in Matter of Bland v. Supreme Ct., County of N.Y., indicating that actions taken by the defendant to disrupt the trial can waive double jeopardy protections.

    The court stated, “If the act of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy.”

  • People v. Michael, 22 N.Y.2d 831 (1968): Discretion in Presentence Report Disclosure

    People v. Michael, 22 N.Y.2d 831 (1968)

    The sentencing court has discretion in deciding whether to disclose presentence reports, and disclosure is not required unless the court must make additional factual findings beyond the underlying conviction to impose a special mode of punishment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment, holding that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disclose the presentence reports. The court distinguished cases where additional fact-finding was required for a special punishment. While recognizing that disclosing the report may sometimes be harmless or desirable, it emphasized legislative attention would be appropriate in this area, while re-affirming the discretionary power of sentencing courts on the matter. The court highlighted the need to balance the defendant’s right to a fair sentencing process with the confidentiality required for effective presentence investigations. The court suggested legislative action could provide more detailed guidelines.

    Facts

    The defendant, Michael, was convicted of a crime. At sentencing, his attorney requested disclosure of the presentence report to ensure fair sentencing.

    The sentencing court denied the request, exercising its discretion not to disclose the report.

    The defendant appealed the sentencing decision, arguing that he was entitled to review the presentence report.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after the defendant appealed the sentencing court’s decision. The Court of Appeals reviewed the sentencing court’s denial of the disclosure of the presentence report.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion as a matter of law by refusing to permit disclosure of the presentence report.

    Holding

    No, because the case did not involve a situation in which the court was without power to impose a special mode of punishment unless it first made an additional finding of fact beyond the underlying conviction for crime; therefore the sentencing court was within its discretion to deny disclosure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the sentencing court has discretion in deciding whether to disclose presentence reports. The Court distinguished Specht v. Patterson and People v. Bailey, noting those cases involved situations where the court needed to make additional factual findings beyond the conviction to impose a specific type of punishment. Because Michael’s case didn’t require such additional fact-finding, the sentencing court was within its discretionary power. However, the court acknowledged that there may be situations where disclosure could be harmless or even desirable, without requiring a showing of compelling necessity. The Court also pointed to the need for legislative attention and guidance in this area, citing the American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, and the Model Penal Code. The court stated, “There may be occasional situations in which disclosure, in whole or in part, may be harmless or even desirable without a showing of compelling necessity, in which case the discretion of the sentencing court should be exercised favorably.” This reinforces the importance of considering the specific facts of each case when making decisions about presentence report disclosure. The holding clarifies that withholding presentence reports is generally permissible unless additional findings of fact are needed to impose a specific punishment. The court acknowledged potential benefits to disclosing the report. This encourages sentencing courts to consider disclosure in appropriate circumstances.