New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Medina

  • People v. Medina, 13 N.Y.3d 260 (2009): Double Jeopardy and Partial Verdicts on Lesser Included Offenses

    People v. Medina, 13 N.Y.3d 260 (2009)

    When a jury returns a guilty verdict on a lesser-included offense but fails to reach a verdict on the greater offense, a retrial on the greater offense is barred by double jeopardy unless the defendant affirmatively waived double jeopardy protections with specific knowledge of the implications.

    Summary

    Medina was charged with third-degree and seventh-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. The jury found him guilty on the seventh-degree charge (a lesser-included offense) but could not reach a verdict on the third-degree charge. A mistrial was declared on the unresolved count. Before a second trial, Medina argued double jeopardy barred retrial on the third-degree charge. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that because Medina did not explicitly waive his double jeopardy rights with knowledge of the implications of CPL 300.40(3)(b), retrial on the third-degree charge was impermissible.

    Facts

    The defendant, Medina, was indicted on charges of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and seventh degrees. During the trial, the jury deliberated and returned a partial verdict, finding Medina guilty of the seventh-degree possession charge, a misdemeanor and a lesser-included offense of the third-degree charge. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the third-degree felony charge. A mistrial was declared solely as to the third-degree charge, and the jury was discharged.

    Procedural History

    Prior to the commencement of the second trial on the third-degree charge, Medina moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that retrial was barred by double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion, and Medina was subsequently convicted of third-degree criminal possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retrial on the third-degree charge violated double jeopardy principles.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s retrial on the charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree was barred by double jeopardy after the jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser-included offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree but was unable to reach a verdict on the third-degree charge, and a mistrial was declared on that count.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the jury returned a guilty verdict on the lesser-included offense, it operated as an acquittal on the greater offense by operation of law, and the defendant did not affirmatively waive his double jeopardy protections with sufficient knowledge of the implications before the mistrial was declared.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on CPL 300.40(3)(b), which states that if a jury renders a partial verdict of guilty on a lesser included offense, but is unable to agree on a verdict on a higher offense, that is deemed an acquittal of the higher offense. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Echevarria, 6 N.Y.3d 89 (2005), where the defendant explicitly disavowed the protection against double jeopardy. Here, the Court noted the absence of any such explicit waiver. The Court emphasized that for a waiver of double jeopardy to be effective, it must be knowing and intelligent. In this case, neither the court nor the parties discussed the double jeopardy implications of taking a partial verdict. Therefore, Medina’s failure to object to the mistrial did not constitute a waiver of his double jeopardy rights. The court cited People v. Fuller, 96 N.Y.2d 881 (2001), reaffirming that once a defendant is acquitted of a greater charge due to a verdict on a lesser-included offense, they cannot waive the protections of double jeopardy. The dissent argued that the case was indistinguishable from Fuller, and that Medina’s actions were based on a misunderstanding of the law, similar to the defendant in Fuller. The dissent argued that, absent an explicit, knowing waiver of double jeopardy rights, the retrial should be barred. The majority rejected the argument that simply requesting a mistrial constitutes a waiver, especially when the defendant is unaware of the double jeopardy implications.

  • People v. Medina, 16 N.Y.3d 95 (2010): Reversible Error for Failing to Define ‘Deprive’ and ‘Appropriate’ in Larceny Cases

    People v. Medina, 16 N.Y.3d 95 (2010)

    In larceny-related crimes, a trial court’s failure to provide the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” to the jury, when those terms are essential to understanding larcenous intent, constitutes reversible error if it creates a likelihood of confusion and prejudices the defendant.

    Summary

    Medina, a DEA informant, was convicted of first-degree robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury expressed confusion about the meaning of intent. The trial court had not provided the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate,” which are components of larcenous intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the failure to define these terms was reversible error because the jury’s notes showed they struggled with the concept of intent, and the omission created a likelihood of confusion regarding whether Medina intended to permanently deprive the victim of property.

    Facts

    Medina, a paid DEA informant, participated in an unauthorized break-in at Jose Oleaga’s home. During the incident, Medina took Pena’s cell phone. Pena and Oleaga later claimed several thousand dollars were missing. Medina was arrested and told police conflicting stories, initially claiming he was trying to stop a robbery, then admitting he was offered money to participate. He implicated others, including Nelson Guerrero, whom he had previously informed on.

    Procedural History

    Medina was indicted on multiple counts, including first-degree robbery. He was convicted of first-degree robbery. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to instruct the jury on the statutory definitions of “deprive” and “appropriate” was reversible error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s failure to charge the jury with the statutory definition of “appropriate” and/or “deprive,” which forms part of the definition of larcenous intent, is reversible error.

    Holding

    Yes, because the omission of the definition of “appropriate” and/or “deprive” did not adequately convey the meaning of intent to the jury and instead created a great likelihood of confusion such that the degree of precision required for a jury charge was not met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the failure to define “deprive” and “appropriate” was reversible error. The Court emphasized that, based on prior precedent (People v. Blacknall), omission of these definitions “could have misled the jury into thinking that any withholding, permanent or temporary, constituted larceny.” The court highlighted that the concepts of “deprive” and “appropriate” are essential to defining larcenous intent because they “ ‘connote a purpose … to exert permanent or virtually permanent control over the property taken, or to cause permanent or virtually permanent loss to the owner of the possession and use thereof’ ” (quoting People v. Jennings). The court found that the jury’s notes during deliberations indicated confusion about intent, demonstrating that the omission was not harmless. The court explicitly stated: “in this case, no such speculation is necessary as the jury’s confusion concerning the concept of intent is evident from its own messages to the court during deliberations. Taken together with the facts underlying the conviction in this case, we find that the jury notes provide a clear basis for our conclusion that the court’s failure to define ‘appropriate’ and/or ‘deprive’ was not harmless.” The court noted that it is critical that the jury understands whether the defendant intended to permanently deprive the victims of their property. Because of this failure, the court reversed the conviction.

  • People v. Medina, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990): Sufficiency of Affidavit for Establishing Value Before a Grand Jury

    People v. Medina, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990)

    An affidavit submitted to a Grand Jury stating the worth of stolen property or damage to it must indicate the basis for that valuation to sustain an indictment where value is an element of the offense.

    Summary

    The case concerns the sufficiency of an affidavit used to establish the value of stolen property before a Grand Jury. Defendant Medina was indicted for grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal mischief after being arrested in a stolen car. The indictment relied on an affidavit from the car’s owner stating its value exceeded $2,500 and the damage exceeded $250, without providing any basis for these valuations. The New York Court of Appeals held that such a conclusory affidavit, lacking a foundation for the stated value, is insufficient to sustain an indictment where value is a necessary element of the crime charged.

    Facts

    Pedro Medina’s 1985 Pontiac was stolen. When recovered, the car had a broken window, trunk lock, luggage rack, and steering column. An affidavit from Medina stated he owned the vehicle, the defendant lacked permission to use it, the damage exceeded $250, and the vehicle’s value was over $2,500. The affidavit did not provide any basis for these valuations. Based on this affidavit, the defendant was indicted for grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and criminal mischief, all felonies with value as a necessary element.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment to the extent of reducing the felony counts to misdemeanors, finding the affidavit insufficient proof of value. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an affidavit submitted to a Grand Jury pursuant to CPL 190.30(3), stating in conclusory terms the value of stolen property and damage to it, without indicating the basis for that valuation, is legally sufficient evidence to sustain an indictment where value is an element of the offense charged.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.30(3) does not eliminate the need for the victim’s statement of value to have a basis of knowledge before it can be accepted as legally sufficient evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while CPL 190.30(3) allows an owner’s statement to establish value, it doesn’t eliminate the requirement that the statement have a basis in knowledge. The court noted the Appellate Divisions in all four Departments have uniformly held that a victim must provide a basis of knowledge for their statement of value. The purpose of the statute is to eliminate the need for complainants to personally appear before the Grand Jury, not to lower the standard of evidence required to prove value. The court pointed to the legislative history, noting that a sponsor’s memorandum recognized that “in most instances an owner cannot actually testify to the value of this property.” The court stated that requiring a basis of knowledge in the affidavit ensures the Grand Jury can reasonably infer the property or damage has the requisite value, rather than merely speculate. The court clarified that its decision does not require the victim to be physically present at Grand Jury proceedings, but simply that the affidavit submitted contains a basis of knowledge for the witness’ statement as to value. Without such a basis, the affidavit is insufficient to support an indictment for crimes where value is an element.

  • People v. Medina, 61 N.Y.2d 951 (1984): Duty to Inquire About Prior Representation

    People v. Medina, 61 N.Y.2d 951 (1984)

    When a police officer has actual knowledge that a suspect has been arrested on a prior charge, the officer has a duty to inquire whether the suspect was represented by counsel on that prior charge before questioning the suspect.

    Summary

    Medina was questioned regarding a crime. The questioning officer knew Medina had been arrested eight months prior for sodomy by the same police department and assumed Medina had an attorney for that charge. The New York Court of Appeals held that the officer had a duty to inquire whether Medina was represented by an attorney on the prior sodomy charge before questioning him. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, suppressed the statements obtained from Medina, and granted a new trial. The court also held that evidence obtained from a vehicle used by Medina was admissible because the registered owner consented to the search.

    Facts

    The defendant, Medina, was questioned by a police officer about a crime. The officer knew that Medina had been arrested eight months prior on a sodomy charge by the same police department. The officer also assumed that Medina had an attorney on the prior sodomy charge. During the questioning, Medina made statements that were later used against him.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted Medina’s statements into evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Medina appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a police officer who knows that a defendant has been arrested on a prior charge by the same police department and assumes the defendant had an attorney on that prior charge is under an obligation to inquire whether the defendant was represented by an attorney on the earlier charge before questioning the defendant.
    2. Whether evidence obtained from a vehicle used by the defendant should be suppressed when the registered owner of the vehicle consented to the search, even though the police initially mentioned a search warrant (later found invalid) before obtaining consent.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when a police officer has actual notice that a defendant was arrested on a prior charge and assumes that the defendant had an attorney, the officer is under an obligation to inquire whether the defendant was represented by an attorney on the earlier charge.
    2. No, because an affirmed finding of consent of the registered owner negates the claim that the consent was merely acquiescence to a search warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that because the officer had actual knowledge of the prior arrest and assumed Medina had an attorney, the officer was obligated to inquire about the representation. The court relied on People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 232, stating that the officer was “under an obligation to inquire whether defendant was represented by an attorney” on the earlier charge. The court also cited People v. Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 617-618. This duty to inquire is triggered by the officer’s actual knowledge of the prior representation. If the officer had no such knowledge, the rule would not apply.

    Regarding the vehicle search, the court found that the woman with whom Medina was living, who was also the registered owner of the vehicle, consented to the search. The fact that the police mentioned a search warrant (later found invalid) before she consented did not automatically mean she was merely acquiescing to the warrant. The court found that her statement that “it wouldn’t be necessary, that she would cooperate and [the police] could look at the car, to do anything we want to do” indicated valid consent. The court emphasized that there was an “affirmed finding of consent of the registered owner.” This suggests a high level of deference given to the lower court’s factual finding on the consent issue.