People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550 (1969)

The rule in Bruton v. United States, which prohibits the admission of a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant in a joint trial, does not apply where the defendant has also made a full and voluntary confession that is substantially similar to the co-defendant’s confession.

Summary

Defendants McNeil and others were convicted of felony murder. Each defendant had voluntarily made detailed confessions implicating themselves and the others. At trial, these confessions were admitted with limiting instructions that each confession was only to be considered against the declarant. The defendants argued on appeal that admitting the confessions violated their rights under Bruton v. United States. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that Bruton is inapplicable when each defendant has made a full and voluntary confession that is almost identical to the confessions of their co-defendants. The court reasoned that the devastating risk of relying on a co-defendant’s confession is absent when the jury has also heard the defendant’s own confession.

Facts

Defendants McNeil, along with other co-defendants, were indicted and tried for the murder of a New York City Police Detective Donald Rolker.
Following their apprehension, each defendant voluntarily provided detailed confessions implicating themselves and each other in the murder.
The confessions were substantially similar in their accounts of the crime.

Procedural History

At trial, the defendants’ confessions were admitted into evidence. The trial court gave limiting instructions to the jury, stating that each confession should only be considered against the defendant who made it.
The jury convicted McNeil and the other defendants of felony murder but could not reach a verdict for one co-defendant.
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction.
The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of a judge of that court.

Issue(s)

Whether the rule in Bruton v. United States, which prohibits the admission of a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant in a joint trial, applies when each defendant has made a full and voluntary confession that is substantially similar to the confessions of their co-defendants.

Holding

No, because the rationale of Bruton is inapplicable when each defendant has made a full and voluntary confession that is almost identical to the confessions of their co-defendants.

Court’s Reasoning

The court distinguished the case from Bruton v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that admitting a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant at a joint trial violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment, even with limiting instructions.
The Court of Appeals relied on the reasoning in United States ex rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, which held that the Bruton rule does not apply when the defendant himself has confessed and his confession interlocks with and supports the confession of the co-defendant. The court quoted Catanzaro: “Where the jury has heard not only a codefendant’s confession but the defendant’s own confession no such ‘devastating’ risk attends the lack of confrontation as was thought to be involved in Bruton.”
The court reasoned that the limiting instructions were sufficient to protect the defendants’ rights in this case because each defendant had already confessed to the crime. The risk that the jury would improperly rely on a co-defendant’s confession was minimized because the jury also had before it each defendant’s own confession, which was substantially similar.
The court found the defendants’ other contentions to be without merit and affirmed the judgments of conviction.