New York Law Review

Tag: People v. McMahon

  • People v. McMahon, 81 N.Y.2d 386 (1993): Defendant’s Right to be Present During Jury Questioning on Case-Specific Issues

    People v. McMahon, 81 N.Y.2d 386 (1993)

    A defendant has a right to be present during the questioning of prospective jurors when the questioning concerns issues touching upon the merits of the case, such as the jurors’ knowledge of pretrial publicity and their attitude toward key witnesses.

    Summary

    Defendants McMahon and Sloan were convicted of robbery and weapons possession. Prior to the formal voir dire, the trial judge conducted a side-bar voir dire of prospective jurors regarding their exposure to pretrial publicity and their familiarity with John Roland, a television newscaster involved in the robbery. The questioning occurred outside the presence of the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the defendants had a fundamental right to be present during questioning that delved into attitudes and feelings concerning events and witnesses involved in the case.

    Facts

    Defendants McMahon and Sloan allegedly robbed the Racing Club restaurant. Newscaster John Roland attempted to disarm Sloan during the robbery, leading to a struggle. Roland was hit on the head with a pistol by McMahon. Defendants were apprehended near the scene after a waiter alerted the police. Roland and other witnesses identified the defendants. Prior to the formal voir dire, the judge questioned prospective jurors about their exposure to pretrial publicity regarding the case and Roland’s involvement. Jurors were questioned on their ability to weigh Roland’s testimony fairly and whether their knowledge of him as a newscaster would affect their impartiality. Defendants were not present during this questioning.

    Procedural History

    Defendants were convicted of robbery and weapons possession after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has a right to be present during conference questioning of prospective jurors concerning issues touching upon the merits of the case, such as their knowledge of and reaction to pretrial publicity and their attitude toward a key witness.

    Holding

    Yes, because the questioning went beyond general qualifications and delved into attitudes and feelings concerning some of the events and witnesses involved in the case, which could have substantially affected the defendant’s ability to defend against the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle that defendants have a fundamental right to be present with counsel at all material stages of a trial. The court distinguished this case from People v. Velasco, which held that a defendant’s presence was not required when the court posed questions relating only to the general qualifications of jurors (physical impairments, family obligations, etc.). Here, the questioning went beyond general qualifications and delved into attitudes and feelings concerning events and witnesses involved in the case. “The effect on the jurors of the pretrial publicity, their attitudes toward and possible predisposition to believe Roland, a key prosecution witness, and their ability to weigh the evidence objectively were subjects properly addressed in a formal voir dire.” The court reasoned that the defendants’ presence could have been critical in making proper determinations relating to challenges for cause and peremptories, as assessing jurors’ facial expressions, demeanor, and subliminal responses could reveal bias or hostility. The court noted that, “[a]part from our statutory provision, due process requires the presence of a defendant at his trial ‘to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.’” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108). Because their exclusion from the questioning was error, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial.

  • People v. McMahon, 46 N.Y.2d 447 (1978): Improper Jury Communication by Court Clerk

    People v. McMahon, 46 N.Y.2d 447 (1978)

    Unauthorized communications by a court clerk to a deliberating jury regarding the judge’s supposed desire for a verdict constitute reversible error, especially when the communication is not authorized by the court and occurs outside the presence of the defendant and counsel.

    Summary

    McMahon was convicted of robbery. During jury deliberations, the court clerk allegedly told the jury that the judge wanted them to continue deliberating because a lot of time and money had been invested in the case. The defense moved to set aside the verdict based on this improper communication, submitting affidavits from jurors. The prosecution did not dispute the affidavits but argued that even if true, they were not grounds for vacating the verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the unauthorized communication was a fundamental error requiring a new trial because the defendant has a right to be present during all critical stages of trial, including supplemental jury instructions. The court also noted that expert testimony bolstering the victim’s credibility was improperly admitted.

    Facts

    McMahon was accused of hijacking a truck. The jury deliberated for a significant time, sending notes indicating deadlock. After repeated deliberations spanning multiple days, the jury ultimately reached a guilty verdict. Following the verdict, two jurors provided sworn affidavits stating that the court clerk had entered the jury room and told them the judge wanted them to continue deliberating because a lot of time and money had been invested in the case. The judge had not, in fact, sent this message.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted McMahon. The Appellate Division affirmed. McMahon appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the clerk’s communication with the jury was improper. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an unauthorized communication by a court clerk to a deliberating jury, conveying the impression that the judge desires a verdict due to the time and money invested in the case, constitutes reversible error.
    2. Whether the admission of expert testimony that essentially bolsters the credibility of a witness is permissible.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a defendant has an absolute right to be present with counsel during all critical stages of trial, including communications with the jury, and unauthorized communications from court personnel violate this right.
    2. No, because it is the sole province of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, and expert testimony designed solely to bolster a witness’s testimony is an improper usurpation of the jury’s function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the defendant’s right to be present, with counsel, at all stages of trial where his presence has a relation to his opportunity to defend against the charge. This right extends to communications with the jury, especially supplemental instructions after the jury has retired. CPL 310.30 requires notification of counsel and the defendant’s presence during court communications with the jury. The court stated, “Where the court’s instructions are supplemental, coming after the jury has already once retired, they may well be determinative of the outcome of the case, coming as they do in response to questions raised by the jurors themselves. As such, the presence of the defendant and his counsel is constitutionally required whenever supplemental instructions are given, and failure to notify them is a fundamental error”. The court found the clerk’s communication was improper, even though the judge did not authorize it, as court officers are prohibited from communicating with jurors except as authorized by the court or for purely administrative duties (CPL 310.10). The court found that the People did not dispute the facts alleged in the affidavits, which were sufficient to support the motion to set aside the verdict. Regarding the expert testimony, the court held that it was improper because it effectively affirmed the credibility of the victim, which is solely the jury’s role. “This ‘opinion’ evidence was the precise equivalent of affirming the credibility of the People’s witness through the vehicle of an opinion that many hijackings occur as the victim had related.” This type of bolstering is not permitted.