New York Law Review

Tag: People v. McLean

  • People v. McLean, 22 N.Y.3d 127 (2013): Police Can Rely on Attorney’s Statement of Discontinuance

    People v. McLean, 22 N.Y.3d 127 (2013)

    When police are told by a suspect’s lawyer that the lawyer no longer represents him, they may question the suspect without violating his right to counsel.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that police did not violate a defendant’s right to counsel when they questioned him after his attorney stated he no longer represented him. McLean, previously represented by Kouray for a robbery charge, provided information about a murder in exchange for a plea deal. Years later, after Baker implicated McLean in the murder, detectives spoke with Kouray, who stated he no longer represented McLean. Subsequently, the detectives questioned McLean, who provided a new statement implicating himself in the murder. The Court of Appeals found that the police reasonably relied on Kouray’s statement and were not required to take further steps to ascertain the status of the attorney-client relationship.

    Facts

    In 2003, McLean, represented by attorney Kouray, offered information about a murder to get a lighter sentence on a robbery charge. He provided a statement to Detective Sims in Kouray’s presence. In 2006, after Antoan Baker implicated McLean in the murder, Detective Sims contacted Kouray to inquire if he still represented McLean. Kouray stated he did not. Detectives then interviewed McLean in prison, after administering Miranda warnings, about the murder. McLean provided a new, more incriminating statement.

    Procedural History

    McLean was indicted for murder. His motion to suppress the 2006 statement was denied, and he pleaded guilty. His direct appeal, arguing a violation of his right to counsel, was initially rejected due to an insufficient record. McLean then moved to set aside his conviction under CPL 440.10, again arguing a right to counsel violation. The County Court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The dissenting Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated McLean’s right to counsel when they questioned him after his attorney told them that he no longer represented him.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had a reasonable basis to believe that the attorney-client relationship had ceased when McLean’s attorney explicitly stated he no longer represented him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle established in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325 (1968) and People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370 (1993), which generally prohibits questioning a defendant in the absence of counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding, unless the defendant affirmatively waives his right to counsel in the attorney’s presence. However, the Court distinguished the present case from West, where police failed to make any inquiry regarding the status of the attorney-client relationship. Here, the police specifically asked Kouray if he still represented McLean, and Kouray responded in the negative.

    The Court reasoned that the police are not required to take all imaginable steps to protect a defendant’s right to counsel. The court stated: “Where they follow the rules laid down in our cases — rules that are, in general, highly protective of the attorney-client relationship — they need do no more.” The Court found that by inquiring with Kouray and receiving an unequivocal answer, the police discharged their burden to ascertain the status of the representation. This decision emphasizes the importance of direct inquiry with the attorney of record and provides a clear standard for police conduct in such situations. The Court indicated that its holding does not mean that “the right to counsel is interminable” as stated in West. It clarified that the outcome would be different if police had reason to believe the attorney-client relationship had ended, which in this case, they did.

  • People v. McLean, 17 N.Y.3d 118 (2011): Appellate Review of Unpreserved Right to Counsel Claims

    People v. McLean, 17 N.Y.3d 118 (2011)

    An unpreserved claim of a right to counsel violation may be reviewed on appeal only when the violation is established conclusively on the face of the record.

    Summary

    McLean pleaded guilty to murder. On appeal, he argued that his statements to police in 2006 should have been suppressed because his right to counsel had indelibly attached in 2003 when he discussed the same crime with the same detectives in the presence of his lawyer. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that while right to counsel claims can be raised even if unpreserved, appellate review is only available if the violation is clear on the record. Because the record was insufficient to establish conclusively that the attorney represented him in the homicide case, the Court declined to review the claim.

    Facts

    Leonder Goodwin was fatally shot on January 27, 2002. In October 2003, McLean, awaiting sentencing on an unrelated robbery charge, met with detectives and his lawyer, Steven Kouray, to discuss the Goodwin murder in exchange for a more favorable sentence. In December 2006, McLean again met with the same detectives without Kouray present and made statements about his role in the homicide. McLean was subsequently indicted on 16 counts, including two counts of second-degree murder for Goodwin’s death.

    Procedural History

    McLean moved to suppress his 2006 statements, arguing they were involuntary. County Court denied the motion after a Huntley hearing. McLean raised a right to counsel claim for the first time in the Appellate Division, which declined to consider it due to an insufficient record. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an unpreserved claim of a right to counsel violation can be reviewed on appeal when the record does not conclusively establish the violation.

    Holding

    No, because the record must conclusively establish the right to counsel violation for appellate review of an unpreserved claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the exception to the preservation rule for right to counsel claims, citing People v. Arthur, which states that once an attorney enters a proceeding, police cannot question the defendant without counsel present unless there is an affirmative waiver in the attorney’s presence. However, the Court emphasized that this exception applies only when the constitutional violation is “established on the face of the record” (People v. Ramos, 99 NY2d at 37). The Court found the record inadequate because it was not clear whether Kouray represented McLean in the homicide case in 2003, or only in the robbery case. The Court stated: “Where the right to counsel claim is not raised in the trial court, neither the People nor the trial judge have reason to know that it is in the case… Thus where the record does not make clear, irrefutably, that a right to counsel violation has occurred, the claimed violation can be reviewed only on a post-trial motion under CPL 440.10, not on direct appeal.” The Court declined to speculate on what evidence the People might have presented to rebut the claim, noting that the officers were not asked about their understanding of Kouray’s role and that Kouray himself did not testify. The Court concluded that the absence of conclusive proof of a violation precluded appellate review.

  • People v. Mclean, 81 N.Y.2d 409 (1993): Harmless Error Analysis and Improper Jury Instructions

    People v. Mclean, 81 N.Y.2d 409 (1993)

    When a jury is instructed on a theory of criminal liability unsupported by sufficient evidence, a general guilty verdict will be reversed unless the error is harmless; harmless error analysis applies unless the error involves an illegal theory leading to an unconstitutional conviction.

    Summary

    Mclean was convicted of drug offenses. The trial court instructed the jury on the “drug factory” presumption, allowing them to infer knowing possession based on the presence of drugs in open view under circumstances indicating intent to prepare them for sale. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding insufficient evidence to support the drug factory presumption because the drugs were concealed. The court held that submitting this unsupported theory was not harmless error because the jury returned a general verdict, making it impossible to know if they relied on the presumption. The dissent argued that the error was an evidentiary charge subject to harmless error analysis and that the evidence of possession was overwhelming. The dissent also cited that the error was not an illegal ground for conviction in the sense of Griffin v. United States.

    Facts

    Police raided an apartment and found Mclean and a co-defendant present. Drugs were discovered concealed behind a couch. The prosecution presented evidence of prior drug sales observed at the apartment. At trial, the judge instructed the jury on the “drug factory presumption,” stating the jury could infer knowing possession of the drugs based on their being in open view under circumstances evincing an intent to unlawfully mix, compound, package or otherwise prepare for sale. Mclean was convicted of drug possession and sales.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Mclean of drug possession and sales. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the drug factory presumption and that the error was not harmless.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the “drug factory” presumption of knowing possession of a controlled substance?
    2. Whether submitting such an unsupported theory to the jury was reversible error, or subject to harmless error analysis?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was insufficient evidence to support the drug factory presumption since the drugs were not in open view.
    2. Yes, reversible error, because the jury returned a general verdict, and it’s impossible to determine if they relied on the presumption.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that charging the jury on the “drug factory” presumption when the drugs were concealed was error. Citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991), the Court distinguished between submitting a theory of liability that is unconstitutional or illegal and submitting one that is merely unsupported by sufficient evidence. The Court stated that because the jury returned a general verdict, it was impossible to determine whether they relied on the improperly charged presumption. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Grega, 72 N.Y.2d 489 (1988), where a similar error was deemed harmless. Here, there was some evidence from which the jury might have applied the drug factory presumption, making it impossible to say the error was harmless. The dissent argued that the drug factory presumption is merely an evidentiary charge, not a theory of liability, and should be subject to harmless error analysis like any other erroneous evidentiary ruling. The dissent also emphasized the overwhelming evidence of Mclean’s possession and control over the drugs. The dissent cited Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), as properly applying harmless error analysis to the claim that it was error to charge a statutory presumption of criminal distribution from the defendant’s possession of heroin, stating, “So, too, the instruction on the presumption is beside the point, since even if invalid, it was harmless error; the jury must have believed the possession evidence which in itself established a distribution barred by the statute”.