New York Law Review

Tag: People v. McGrath

  • People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12 (1978): Admissibility of Consensual Eavesdropping Despite Employer Rules

    People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12 (1978)

    It is not unlawful to eavesdrop on telephone conversations with the consent of one party, even if the consenting party is a government employee who may have acted contrary to their employer’s rules.

    Summary

    Defendant, a postmaster, was charged with aggravated harassment for making harassing phone calls to a co-employee. The co-employee, with the knowledge of other postal employees, recorded these conversations. The defendant moved to suppress these recordings, arguing they violated postal regulations. The trial court granted the motion, and the County Court affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that consensual eavesdropping is permissible, irrespective of whether the consenting party violated their employer’s regulations. The court relied on existing penal law and the principle that evidence obtained in violation of internal agency rules is not necessarily inadmissible.

    Facts

    The defendant, McGrath, was the Postmaster of the Germantown Post Office. He made a series of telephone calls to a female co-employee both at the post office and at her home. These calls formed the basis of a charge of aggravated harassment under New York Penal Law § 240.30(1), alleging that McGrath intended to harass, annoy, threaten, or alarm the co-employee. The co-employee, with the knowledge and advice of fellow postal employees, recorded these telephone conversations.

    Procedural History

    McGrath was arraigned in Town Court. He moved to suppress the tape recordings of his phone calls. The Town Court granted the motion to suppress the recordings of calls completed at the post office, citing a violation of Postal Regulation 668.291. The County Court affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether tape recordings of telephone conversations, made with the consent of one party but in potential violation of that party’s employer’s (Postal Service) regulations, are admissible in court.

    Holding

    No, because it is not unlawful to eavesdrop on telephone conversations with the consent of one of the parties, and the fact that the consenting party may have violated her employer’s rules does not render the evidence inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals grounded its decision in New York Penal Law § 250.00 and Criminal Procedure Law § 700.05(3), which permit eavesdropping with the consent of one party to the conversation. The court also cited Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, to support the principle of permissible consensual eavesdropping. The court addressed the argument that the postal employee’s actions violated Postal Regulation 668.291, which prohibits employees from recording or intercepting communications without the consent of all parties involved. The court, citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, held that a violation of internal agency regulations does not automatically render evidence inadmissible. The Court emphasized that the key factor was consent from one party to the conversation, irrespective of any potential violation of internal employer rules. The Court stated: “It is not unlawful to eavesdrop on telephone conversations with the consent of one of the parties to the conversation (Penal Law, § 250.00; CPL 700.05, subd 3; Rathbun v United States, 355 US 107), nor is the tape recording evidence in this case to be excluded because the consenting party, who was a government employee, may have acted contrary to the rules of her employer (see United States v Caceres, 440 US 741).” There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.

  • People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 941 (1979): Procedure for Challenging Grand Jury Testimony Based on Illegal Wiretapping

    People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 941 (1979)

    A grand jury witness who believes questions are based on illegal wiretapping must request to be brought before the court to raise the objection, after which the court can inquire into the basis of the questioning.

    Summary

    This case addresses the procedure a grand jury witness must follow when they suspect questions are derived from illegal wiretapping. The Court of Appeals held that while a witness cannot be compelled to answer questions based on illegal wiretaps, the prosecutor isn’t automatically obligated to confirm or deny the wiretapping. The witness must request to be brought before the court to raise the objection. The court can then investigate, including questioning the prosecutor, to determine if the objection is valid. Because the defendant didn’t seek court advice, the Appellate Division’s order was reversed.

    Facts

    A grand jury witness, McGrath, was questioned and believed the questions were based on illegally obtained wiretap evidence. McGrath did not request to be brought before the court for guidance or to formally raise his objection.

    Procedural History

    The specific procedural history before the Court of Appeals is not detailed in the provided text, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the Appellate Division, First Department, and remitted the case back to that court for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a grand jury witness, objecting to questions on the grounds of illegal wiretapping, must request to be brought before the court to trigger a judicial inquiry into the validity of the objection?

    Holding

    Yes, because when a witness believes the Grand Jury questioning is based on illegal wiretapping, they must request the court’s intervention; the prosecutor is not obligated to automatically address the objection during the Grand Jury proceeding itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a witness cannot be compelled to answer questions based on illegally obtained wiretap evidence (citing U.S. Code, tit. 18, § 2515), the burden is on the witness to raise the objection before the court. The court emphasized that the prosecutor doesn’t have an automatic obligation to affirm or deny the existence of illegal wiretapping during the Grand Jury proceeding unless the witness asks to be brought before the court. Once the witness makes that request, “the Presiding Justice may make appropriate inquiry whether the witness’ objection is sound.” The court explicitly grants discretion to interrogate the prosecutor, even in camera, regarding the basis for questioning the witness. The court distinguished state procedure from federal procedure under U.S. Code, tit. 18, § 3504, noting the omission of a similar requirement for prosecutors to affirm or deny in state grand jury proceedings was intentional. Because the defendant failed to seek the court’s advice or instruction, the Court of Appeals found the Appellate Division’s order was in error.