New York Law Review

Tag: People v. McGee

  • People v. McGee, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013): Sufficiency of Evidence and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. McGee, 20 N.Y.3d 513 (2013)

    A defendant is not entitled to reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise sufficiency arguments that are not clear-cut and dispositive.

    Summary

    McGee was convicted as an accomplice of reckless endangerment and attempted murder. The prosecution argued McGee drove the getaway car while his codefendant fired shots at civilians and a police officer. McGee appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient and his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain arguments. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was sufficient evidence to corroborate McGee’s admission and that his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise arguments that were not clearly dispositive in his favor. The court emphasized that the defense counsel mounted a vigorous defense and that strategic reasons existed for the challenged omissions.

    Facts

    McGee drove a Chevy Equinox while Carr fired shots at civilians and homes. During a high-speed chase, McGee swerved the car, allowing Carr to shoot at Officer Clark. Carr fired two or three shots at Clark, with one bullet hitting the patrol car. McGee and Carr abandoned the vehicle and were apprehended while fleeing on foot. A handgun was found nearby with Carr’s DNA on it.

    Procedural History

    McGee and Carr were jointly tried and convicted of reckless endangerment and attempted murder. McGee appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing insufficient evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. McGee then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support McGee’s conviction.
    2. Whether McGee was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to move to dismiss the indictment based on certain sufficiency of evidence claims and other strategic decisions.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was ample independent evidence that a crime was committed, and McGee’s statement was not the only evidence connecting him to the crime.
    2. No, because the arguments not raised by defense counsel were not clear-cut and dispositive in McGee’s favor, and there may have been strategic reasons for counsel’s actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 60.50 only requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to corroborate a confession. Here, eyewitness testimony and police accounts provided ample independent evidence of the crimes. The court emphasized that a failure to make a significant argument can only lead to a finding of ineffective assistance “when the error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 152 [2005]).

    The court found that the sufficiency arguments McGee claimed his attorney should have raised were not clear-cut and dispositive. The court referenced People v. Cabassa, 79 N.Y.2d 722 (1992) to show precedent existed that undermined the argument that there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill or a shared purpose. The court also noted that the attempt to distance McGee from Carr’s actions may have been a strategic decision, even though it ultimately failed. The court noted, “a reviewing court must avoid confusing true ineffectiveness with mere losing tactics and according undue significance to retrospective analysis” (People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712 [1998]).

  • People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 54 (1979): Conspiracy Alone Insufficient for Substantive Offense Liability

    People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 54 (1979)

    Under New York law, a defendant’s participation in a conspiracy is not, by itself, sufficient to establish liability for a substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator; the prosecution must prove accessorial conduct beyond mere membership in the conspiracy.

    Summary

    McGee was convicted of conspiracy and bribery based on the actions of his co-conspirators. The New York Court of Appeals held that while McGee could be convicted of conspiracy based on the overt acts of his co-conspirators, he could not be convicted of bribery unless the prosecution proved he aided, solicited, or otherwise participated in the bribery itself. The court explicitly rejected the federal rule established in Pinkerton v. United States, which allows for conviction of a substantive offense based solely on participation in a conspiracy. The court reasoned that New York law requires a showing of accessorial conduct for liability in substantive offenses.

    Facts

    Rochester police officers Luciano and D’Aprile investigated gambling activities. They met with Quamina and Waters, who offered bribes for police protection of their gambling operations and pressure on competitors. Later, Quamina brought McGee, Edwards, and Tolliver into the scheme. Edwards, acting as a spokesman, proposed an arrangement where the officers would receive a percentage of receipts from assigned numbers writers in exchange for protection. McGee attended a meeting where these arrangements were discussed and indicated his agreement with Edwards’ goals. Edwards made payments to the officers. McGee, Edwards, and Tolliver were subsequently charged with conspiracy and bribery.

    Procedural History

    McGee, Edwards, and Tolliver were convicted in a joint jury trial of conspiracy and multiple counts of bribery. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. McGee appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that he could be found guilty of bribery based solely on his status as a conspirator.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be convicted of a substantive offense (bribery) solely based on their participation in a conspiracy to commit that offense, without evidence of accessorial conduct.

    Holding

    No, because under New York law, liability for a substantive offense cannot be independently predicated upon the defendant’s mere participation in an underlying conspiracy; accessorial conduct beyond mere membership in the conspiracy must be proven.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that New York Penal Law § 20.00 defines the conduct that renders a person criminally responsible for the acts of another, and it conspicuously omits any reference to one who merely conspires to commit an offense. The court stated, “Conduct that will support a conviction for conspiracy will not perforce give rise to accessorial liability.” The court distinguished between the crime of conspiracy, which is based on an agreement, and the substantive crime that is the object of the conspiracy. While the overt act of one conspirator can be attributed to others to establish the conspiracy, the court held that it is “repugnant to our system of jurisprudence” to impose punishment for substantive offenses in which the defendant did not participate. The court explicitly rejected the federal rule established in Pinkerton v. United States, stating, “Accessorial conduct may not be equated with mere membership in a conspiracy and the State may not rely solely on the latter to prove guilt of the substantive offense.” The court noted that earlier New York cases stating “[e]ach conspirator is liable * * * for the acts of every associate done in the effort to carry the conspiracy into effect” required the defendant to have actively participated to a degree sufficient to impose accessorial liability. Because there was no evidence of McGee’s complicity in the bribery counts, his conviction on those counts was reversed and the indictment dismissed as to those counts.