New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Mayo

  • People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245 (1979): Double Jeopardy and Retrial After Insufficient Evidence

    People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245 (1979)

    When a trial court dismisses a charge due to insufficient evidence, it is equivalent to an acquittal, and retrying the defendant on that charge, even if the jury only considers lesser included offenses, violates the double jeopardy clause.

    Summary

    Mayo was initially tried for first-degree robbery. The trial court found insufficient evidence for the first-degree charge but allowed the jury to consider lesser charges of second and third-degree robbery, resulting in a mistrial. The prosecution retried Mayo on the original indictment, including the first-degree charge, but the judge instructed the jury to only consider the lesser charges. Mayo was convicted of second-degree robbery. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that retrying Mayo on the original indictment violated double jeopardy, even though he was only convicted of a lesser charge, because the initial dismissal for insufficient evidence acted as an acquittal on the first-degree charge. The court rejected a “harmless error” analysis, emphasizing the anxiety and stigma of a second trial.

    Facts

    1. Mayo was indicted on a single count of first-degree robbery.
    2. At the first trial, the court found insufficient evidence to support the first-degree robbery charge (specifically, the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon).
    3. The judge instructed the jury to consider only the lesser included offenses of second and third-degree robbery.
    4. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared.
    5. The prosecution retried Mayo on the original first-degree robbery indictment.
    6. At the second trial, the judge instructed the jury not to consider the first-degree robbery charge, but only the lesser included offenses.
    7. Mayo was convicted of second-degree robbery.

    Procedural History

    1. The trial court dismissed the first-degree robbery charge for insufficient evidence but declared a mistrial on the lesser charges.
    2. The trial court denied Mayo’s motion to dismiss the indictment before the second trial, allowing the retrial on the original indictment.
    3. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, applying a harmless error analysis, finding that the jury did not consider the first-degree robbery charge.
    4. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether retrying a defendant on an indictment that includes a charge previously dismissed for insufficient evidence violates the double jeopardy clause, even if the jury is instructed to only consider lesser included offenses.
    2. Whether a violation of the double jeopardy clause can be considered harmless error when the defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense in the second trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the initial dismissal of the first-degree robbery charge for insufficient evidence was equivalent to an acquittal, and retrying Mayo on the original indictment subjected him to double jeopardy.
    2. No, because the double jeopardy clause protects against the risk and anxiety of a second trial, regardless of the ultimate verdict; the error is too fundamental for harmless error analysis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court’s initial decision to withdraw the first-degree robbery count from the jury’s consideration due to insufficient evidence was functionally equivalent to an acquittal on that charge. Quoting Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970), the court emphasized that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause…is cast in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction, not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict.” Bringing Mayo to trial a second time on the original indictment, which included the charge he had effectively been acquitted of, violated his constitutional right not to be twice placed in jeopardy.
    The court rejected the harmless error analysis, explaining that certain constitutional errors are so fundamental that they invalidate the entire trial process. A violation of the double jeopardy clause falls into this category because it implicates the very power of the court to conduct the trial. The court found it difficult to ascertain if the first-degree charge affected the jury’s view of the evidence or the defense’s trial strategy. The court stated, “When a defendant is brought to trial in violation of his rights under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, the very power of the court to try him is implicated”. Because Mayo objected to being retried for first-degree robbery, the criminal proceeding was a nullity, requiring reversal of the second-degree robbery conviction and dismissal of the original indictment.

  • People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245 (1979): Retrial After Partial Verdict on Concurrent Counts

    People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245 (1979)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 310.70 as it existed in 1973, a defendant could not be retried on unresolved concurrent counts of an indictment after a partial verdict of acquittal was rendered, even if the defendant requested a mistrial.

    Summary

    Mayo was indicted on multiple charges stemming from a single stabbing incident. At his first trial, the jury acquitted him of attempted murder but deadlocked on assault and weapons possession. Mayo requested a mistrial, which was granted. He was then retried and convicted on the remaining charges. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under the CPL 310.70 as it existed at the time, retrial was barred because the unresolved counts were concurrent, not consecutive, to the count on which he was acquitted. The court also held that the defendant’s mistrial request did not waive this statutory protection.

    Facts

    Mayo was involved in an incident at a bar where he allegedly stabbed a patron. He was subsequently indicted for attempted murder, first-degree assault, and felony weapons possession, all stemming from the single stabbing incident.

    Procedural History

    The first trial resulted in an acquittal on the attempted murder charge, but the jury deadlocked on the remaining counts. The defendant requested a mistrial, which was granted. Prior to the second trial, Mayo’s motion to prohibit a retrial was denied. The second trial resulted in convictions on the remaining counts. The Appellate Division modified the conviction, reversing the weapons possession conviction but affirming the assault conviction and rejecting the argument that retrial was barred. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 310.70(2) as it existed in 1973, a defendant could be retried on unresolved concurrent counts of an indictment after the jury rendered a partial verdict of acquittal on another count arising from the same single act.

    Holding

    No, because the unresolved counts were concurrent, not consecutive, to the count upon which the defendant was acquitted. Further, the defendant’s request for a mistrial does not waive the statutory bar to retrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the language of CPL 310.70(2) as it existed at the time of the first trial, which allowed retrial only on “consecutive” counts after a partial verdict. The court stated that consecutive sentences are only authorized where the crimes charged are the result of separate successive acts, rather than a single act. Here, all counts stemmed from the single act of stabbing the victim. Thus, the counts were concurrent, and retrial was barred by the statute. The court reasoned that the statute’s express wording did not allow retrial of anything but consecutive counts. The court explicitly rejected the argument that Mayo’s request for a mistrial removed the statutory impediment to retrial. The court contrasted CPL 310.70(2) with CPL 310.60, which allows for retrial with virtually no limitation when a jury is discharged before any verdict, particularly when counsel consents. Because 310.70(2) makes no mention of counsel, Mayo’s mistrial request was irrelevant. The court also rejected the argument that the statute was not intended to bar retrial following a partial verdict of acquittal, noting that the express terms of the statute do not suggest any such distinction. The court stated that it “should not strain for an interpretation for which there is no express or even inferable foundation in the statute itself.”

  • People v. Mayo, 36 N.Y.2d 1002 (1975): Sufficiency of Evidence for Grand Jury Indictment

    People v. Mayo, 36 N.Y.2d 1002 (1975)

    An indictment must be supported by legally sufficient evidence establishing every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof; mere suspicion or speculation is insufficient.

    Summary

    This case concerns the sufficiency of evidence presented to a grand jury to indict a toll collector for grand larceny. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented, which primarily consisted of a shortage of commutation tickets and the defendant’s attempt to dispose of tickets upon arrest, was insufficient to establish the necessary intent and deprivation of property required for a larceny conviction. The court emphasized that the evidence did not prove that the Thruway Authority was deprived of any money or that the detached commuter stubs had any monetary value.

    Facts

    Ann Mayo worked as a toll collector for the New York State Thruway Authority at the Tappan Zee Bridge for eight years. Tolls were collected via cash, credit, or commutation tickets. An audit revealed a shortage of 2,153 commutation tickets for Mayo over a four-week period. When a State Trooper approached Mayo for arrest, she attempted to flush 122 commutation tickets down the drain. She also had a small amount of cash. There was no evidence presented that she pocketed cash tolls and her cash and credit transactions were in order.

    Procedural History

    The County Court dismissed the grand jury indictment for grand larceny in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish that Ann Mayo committed the offense of grand larceny, specifically whether there was sufficient evidence of intent to deprive the Thruway Authority of property and actual deprivation of property.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence presented did not establish every element of the offense charged, particularly the intent to deprive and actual deprivation of property. The shortage of commutation tickets and the attempt to dispose of them, without more, was insufficient to warrant an indictment for grand larceny.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to constitute larceny, there must be an intent coupled with a taking or withholding of property from its owner. The evidence failed to demonstrate that the Thruway Authority was deprived of any money, as the detached commuter stubs had no monetary value in that state and cash/credit accounts were clear. The court cited CPL 190.65, stating that a grand jury may indict only where the evidence is legally sufficient to establish the commission of the offense. The court held that the test for dismissing an indictment is whether there has been a “‘clear showing’ that the evidence before the Grand Jury if unexplained and uncontradicted would not warrant conviction by a trial jury.” The court distinguished between carelessness, stupidity, or inefficiency and the crime of grand larceny, explaining that the former does not constitute the latter. The court stated that “Surmise, suspicion or speculation is no substitute for evidence.” While the defendant’s attempt to destroy evidence might suggest consciousness of guilt, such evidence “may be used to strengthen ‘other and more tangible evidence’ of guilt, it is not alone sufficient to sustain a conviction.” The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to overcome this presumption and warrant an indictment for grand larceny.