New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Mateo

  • People v. Mateo, 24 N.Y.3d 491 (2014): Appellate Counsel Withdrawal When Appeal Is Not Wholly Frivolous

    People v. Mateo, 24 N.Y.3d 491 (2014)

    Appellate counsel may not withdraw from representing a defendant if the appeal is not wholly frivolous, meaning there are non-frivolous arguments that could be raised on appeal.

    Summary

    Mateo pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to 23 years’ incarceration, with no mention of post-release supervision (PRS). The Department of Correctional Services later added a five-year PRS term. Mateo, after learning of the PRS, filed a motion claiming her plea was defective because she was never informed about the PRS. The People consented to resentencing without PRS under Penal Law § 70.85. On appeal of the resentence, assigned counsel filed a Crawford motion to withdraw, arguing no non-frivolous issues existed. Mateo argued pro se that her sentence was illegal and that she received ineffective assistance. The Appellate Division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because Mateo’s claims were not wholly frivolous, counsel should not have been allowed to withdraw, and a de novo appeal was warranted.

    Facts

    Mateo pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter for a shooting. She received a determinate sentence of 23 years. Neither during the plea proceedings nor at sentencing was there any mention of post-release supervision (PRS). After incarceration, the Department of Correctional Services added a five-year PRS term to her certificate of commitment. Mateo learned of the PRS period from her attorney, who did not advise her whether she could challenge the PRS term on appeal. Her conviction was initially affirmed.

    Procedural History

    Following People v. Catu, Mateo filed a pro se motion pursuant to CPL 440.10, claiming her plea was defective due to the lack of information regarding PRS. The People consented to resentencing under Penal Law § 70.85 to remove the PRS term. Mateo appealed the resentence. Assigned counsel, after reviewing the file and citing People v. Boyd, filed a Crawford motion to withdraw, arguing there were no non-frivolous issues. Mateo filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing her sentence was illegal and that she was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division granted counsel’s motion and affirmed the resentence. This appeal to the New York Court of Appeals followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in granting appellate counsel’s Crawford motion to withdraw, where the defendant’s claims on appeal (the constitutionality of Penal Law § 70.85 as applied to her case and ineffective assistance of counsel) were not wholly frivolous.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s claims were not wholly frivolous at the time appellate counsel filed his Crawford motion, the Appellate Division should have denied appellate counsel’s motion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that under Crawford, appellate counsel may withdraw only if the appeal is “wholly frivolous,” as a defendant with a frivolous appeal has no right to have an advocate argue their case. The Court found that Mateo’s claims—the unconstitutionality of Penal Law § 70.85 as applied to her, and ineffective assistance of counsel—were not wholly frivolous. The Court emphasized that it was expressing no opinion on the ultimate merits of those claims, but that the claims warranted further review. Because counsel should not have been permitted to withdraw, the Court reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a de novo appeal. The Court cited People v. Stokes, People v. Pignataro, and People v. Catu in support of this remedy. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of ensuring that defendants receive adequate representation on appeal, particularly when there are potentially meritorious issues to be raised, such as the constitutionality of a statute or ineffective assistance of counsel.

  • People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 375 (2004): Admissibility of Prior Bad Acts After Defendant Challenges Truthfulness of Confession

    2 N.Y.3d 375 (2004)

    When a defendant challenges the truthfulness of their confession, evidence of other crimes confessed during the same interrogation may be admissible to provide context and demonstrate the defendant’s motive for confessing, but only if the probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    Angel Mateo was convicted of first-degree murder. The Court of Appeals considered whether Mateo’s confession to other murders should have been admitted as evidence after he challenged the truthfulness of his confession in the current case. The Court held that while the plea provisions of New York’s death penalty statute were unconstitutional under United States v. Jackson, the trial court did not err in admitting Mateo’s confession because his defense strategy opened the door to its admission to rebut his assertions that he falsely confessed. The conviction was upheld, but the death sentence was vacated due to the unconstitutional plea provisions.

    Facts

    Mateo was implicated in four murders and other crimes. He was charged with first-degree murder for intentionally causing the death of Juan Rodriguez-Matos during a kidnapping, or commanding his wife to do so. At trial, evidence showed Mateo was abusive towards his girlfriend, Janette Sanchez. After Sanchez left him, Mateo kidnapped Matos, believing he could lead him to Sanchez. Mateo admitted to police that he either shot Matos himself or ordered his wife, Monica, to do so. Mateo’s wife was tried separately for the same murder and acquitted of the first-degree murder charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially dismissed counts related to a serial killer theory, which the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Before trial, Mateo challenged the plea provisions of New York’s death penalty statute as unconstitutional, which the trial court agreed with. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division. Mateo was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Mateo appealed directly to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Mateo’s death sentence should be overturned because he went to trial under an unconstitutional two-tiered penalty scheme.

    2. Whether the prosecutor’s presentation of inconsistent factual theories at Mateo’s and his wife’s trials violated Mateo’s due process rights.

    3. Whether the jury verdict of guilt of first-degree felony murder is against the weight of the evidence.

    4. Whether certain evidentiary errors, including the admission of Mateo’s statements about three other murders, mandate the reversal of his conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plea provisions of New York’s death penalty statute were unconstitutional under United States v. Jackson.

    2. No, because the prosecutor’s actions did not breach Mateo’s right to a fair trial, as they were based on reasonable views of the evidence.

    3. No, because the weight of the evidence comports with the jury determination that Mateo kidnapped Matos, and in the course of that crime, either intentionally shot and killed him or commanded his wife to do so.

    4. No, because Mateo’s trial strategy opened the door to the admission of his voluntary statements to rebut the assertions that he gave false statements to police exaggerating his role in the Matos murder in order to exculpate his wife.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that since the Appellate Division previously declared the plea provisions constitutional, Mateo could only avoid the death penalty by waiving his right to a jury trial and pleading guilty. This created an unconstitutional burden on his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, as established in United States v. Jackson. However, the Court disagreed that the prosecution presented inconsistent theories because in both trials, Mateo was portrayed as the driving force behind the crime. The court found the command or actual killer instruction proper because a commander is morally equivalent to an actual killer. Lastly, regarding the admission of other homicides, the Court determined that by arguing he falsely confessed to protect his wife, Mateo opened the door to evidence of his full confession, including other murders, to establish his true motive and the context of his statements. The court cited the principle that evidence is relevant if it has any “tendency in reason to prove any material fact” (People v. Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 241 [1987]).

  • People v. Mateo, 93 N.Y.2d 327 (1999): Defining “Similar Fashion” in Serial Murder Statute

    People v. Mateo, 93 N.Y.2d 327 (1999)

    The phrase “committed in a similar fashion” within a serial murder statute requires more than just the use of firearms; the murders must exhibit a notable resemblance in motive, method, and surrounding circumstances to be considered sufficiently similar.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the interpretation of Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi), concerning intentional murder of multiple persons in separate incidents within a 24-month period, committed in a “similar fashion.” The defendant was charged with first-degree murder for four killings. The trial court dismissed these counts, and the Appellate Division affirmed, finding the evidence insufficient to establish the murders were committed in a similar fashion. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the murders lacked sufficient similarity in motive, method, and surrounding circumstances to meet the statutory requirement, even though firearms were used in each.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted on 22 counts, including four intentional murders. The first two victims, Toro and Diaz, were shot at a phone booth. The third victim, Holley, was shot with a sawed-off shotgun after being identified as a thief. The fourth victim, Matos, was kidnapped, interrogated, and executed in defendant’s basement. All murders occurred within a 24-month period.

    Procedural History

    The County Court dismissed counts 11 and 12 of the indictment, charging defendant with first-degree murder under Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi), finding insufficient evidence that the murders were committed in a “similar fashion.” The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was sufficient to establish that the killings were “committed in a similar fashion” pursuant to Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(xi), based on the fact that firearms were used in each murder.

    Holding

    No, because the murders did not adequately resemble each other with respect to motive, method, and surrounding circumstances; therefore, they were not “committed in a similar fashion.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the phrase “committed in a similar fashion” has a well-settled legal meaning derived from People v. Molineux, which concerns the admissibility of uncharged crimes to prove identity. The Court emphasized that the Legislature intended the phrase to apply to serial killings, but it declined to create a rigid set of criteria for defining “similarity.” The Court reasoned that the application of the “similarity” element is inherently contextual. Examining the facts, the Court noted the victims were of different backgrounds and ages, the weapons varied (handguns and a shotgun), the motives differed (revenge, eliminating a snitch), and the locations varied (public sidewalk, street, basement). The Court concluded that the common denominator – the use of firearms – was insufficient to establish the murders were committed in a “similar fashion.” The Court stated, “By any standard, the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish the ‘committed in a similar fashion’ element of the statute.”