New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Marin

  • People v. Marin, 187 A.D.2d 410 (1992): People Must Produce Grand Jury Minutes Within a Reasonable Time After Defendant’s Motion

    187 A.D.2d 410 (1992)

    When the People do not object to a defendant’s motion for inspection of Grand Jury minutes, they must produce the minutes within a reasonable time from the date the motion is made; failure to do so results in that time being charged to the prosecution for speedy trial purposes.

    Summary

    Marin was indicted for assault. He moved to inspect the Grand Jury minutes and dismiss the indictment. The People delayed responding to the motion for 64 days and did not provide the minutes. Marin then moved to dismiss based on CPL 30.30 (speedy trial). The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the delay in providing the minutes violated Marin’s speedy trial rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when the People do not object to inspection, they must produce the minutes within a reasonable time after the motion, and that a delay of 36 days was unreasonable in this case.

    Facts

    Defendant allegedly struck James Jones with a garbage can during a street fight, causing serious injuries. Defendant was arrested and charged with assault and criminal possession of a weapon.
    Defendant was indicted on November 13, 1990, and arraigned on November 27, 1990, at which time the People declared readiness for trial.
    On January 23, 1991, Defendant filed an omnibus motion seeking, among other things, inspection of the Grand Jury minutes and dismissal of the indictment pursuant to CPL 210.30.
    The People did not respond to the omnibus motion until March 28, 1991, 64 days after the request, and did not provide the Grand Jury minutes.

    Procedural History

    Defendant filed an omnibus motion on January 23, 1991, seeking inspection of Grand Jury minutes and dismissal of the indictment.
    On April 18, 1991, Defendant moved to dismiss under CPL 30.30.
    On May 2, 1991, Defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree.
    On May 29, 1991, the trial court denied Defendant’s CPL 30.30 motion.
    The Appellate Division reversed the conviction.
    The Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People may delay producing Grand Jury minutes in response to a defendant’s CPL 210.30 motion until the court specifically orders them to do so, or whether they have an obligation to produce the minutes within a reasonable time of the motion.

    Holding

    No, the People must produce the Grand Jury minutes within a reasonable time of the defendant’s CPL 210.30 motion because CPL 210.30(3) places the burden on the People to show good cause why the motion should not be granted; the People’s inaction resulted in a delay in the court’s disposition of the motion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 30.30 addresses delays caused by prosecutorial inaction. The People argued that they weren’t obligated to produce the minutes until the court ruled on the motion to inspect. The Court rejected this, stating that since the People did not oppose the motion to inspect, they should have produced the minutes within a reasonable time. The Court stated that “where the People make no objection to the branch of the CPL 210.30 motion seeking inspection of the Grand Jury minutes, the People’s obligation to produce the Grand Jury minutes within a reasonable time begins to run from the date the defendant’s CPL 210.30 motion (to inspect the Grand Jury minutes and to dismiss the indictment) is made.” The Court cited People v. McKenna, where a similar delay was charged to the People. The court also noted that CPL 210.30 was amended to eliminate the need for a threshold showing by the defendant, making a favorable ruling on the motion to inspect almost automatic unless the prosecution shows good cause for denial. The court considered the 36-day limit imposed by the Appellate Division to be reasonable.

  • People v. Marin, 51 N.Y.2d 750 (1980): Criminal Contempt for Evasive Grand Jury Testimony

    People v. Marin, 51 N.Y.2d 750 (1980)

    A witness commits criminal contempt when, during grand jury testimony, they offer general denials followed by professions of an inability to recall events which would have left an impression, amounting to an evasive refusal to answer.

    Summary

    Marin, Superintendent of a State Department of Correctional Services facility, was convicted of criminal contempt for evasive testimony before a grand jury investigating the misuse of state employees. The grand jury questioned Marin about allegations that he used state employees to repair his roof during work hours, using state materials. Although Marin gave some seemingly direct answers, his testimony, taken as a whole, was evasive and demonstrated an inability to recall significant events. The New York Court of Appeals held that Marin’s testimony amounted to a refusal to answer, thus upholding the contempt conviction.

    Facts

    The Queens County Grand Jury investigated misconduct allegations against employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services’ Centralized Services Facility. Marin, the Superintendent, testified under a waiver of immunity regarding claims he used state employees to repair his home roof during work hours in 1977, with state materials. Marin initially stated he had not seen any men on his roof during the work week. However, his subsequent testimony revealed uncertainty and a professed inability to recall specific events, despite acknowledging the significance of the allegations.

    Procedural History

    Marin was charged with contempt, perjury, rewarding official misconduct, and conspiracy. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of two counts of contempt and acquitted of perjury. He pleaded guilty to rewarding official misconduct. The Appellate Division reversed the contempt convictions and vacated the plea. The People appealed, conceding insufficient evidence for the second contempt count but seeking reinstatement of the first.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Marin’s grand jury testimony, characterized by general denials and professed inability to recall significant events, constituted a refusal to answer legal and proper interrogatories, thereby supporting a conviction for criminal contempt in the first degree.

    Holding

    Yes, because Marin’s testimony, when viewed in its totality, was evasive and demonstrated a calculated inability to recall events that he would have remembered, which is equivalent to a refusal to answer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between explicit, credible testimony and evasive responses. While a straightforward denial might not constitute contempt, “the false and evasive profession of an inability to recall events or details which were significant and therefore memorable is punishable as criminal contempt.” The court emphasized that Marin’s initial denial was undermined by his subsequent hedging and professed lack of memory. The court highlighted Marin’s concern about the legality of using state workers and his testimony that he would have remembered them working on his house during work hours. The court noted: “[A] general denial followed by professions of an inability to recall particular events which would have left an impression on the defendant had they occurred is the equivalent of a failure to answer.” The court found Marin’s testimony was “equivocal, couched as they were in terms of his inability to remember the events and details which were the subject of the Grand Jury’s questions.” Because Marin’s testimony was evasive and demonstrated an unwillingness to provide clear answers about memorable events, the court found sufficient evidence to support the criminal contempt conviction.

  • People v. Marin, 48 N.Y.2d 537 (1979): Appealability of Order to Investigate Electronic Surveillance

    People v. Marin, 48 N.Y.2d 537 (1979)

    An order directing a prosecutor to inquire into potential electronic surveillance of a grand jury witness is not appealable because no statute authorizes such an appeal in criminal proceedings.

    Summary

    Marin, a grand jury witness, sought an order compelling the Special State Prosecutor to investigate whether federal authorities had conducted electronic surveillance on him and whether grand jury questions stemmed from such surveillance. The trial court denied the application, but the Appellate Division reversed and ordered the inquiry. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Appellate Division had the authority to review the trial court’s order. The Court of Appeals held that no statute authorized the appeal, thus the Appellate Division lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The appeal was dismissed.

    Facts

    Marin was a witness before a Grand Jury. He applied for a court order to compel the Special State Prosecutor to inquire with Federal authorities regarding potential electronic surveillance of himself. He also sought a statement from the prosecutor as to whether the questions asked to him before the grand jury were the product of any such surveillance. The Extraordinary Special and Trial Term of the Supreme Court denied Marin’s application.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Marin’s application. Marin appealed to the Appellate Division, which reversed the lower court’s decision and directed the prosecutor to make the requested inquiry. The Special State Prosecutor then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an order compelling a prosecutor to inquire into potential electronic surveillance of a grand jury witness is appealable.

    Holding

    1. No, because the right to appeal in criminal cases is determined exclusively by statute, and no statute authorizes an appeal from such an order.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the right to appeal in criminal cases is governed exclusively by statute. Since Marin could not identify any statute authorizing an appeal from the trial court’s order, the Appellate Division lacked the authority to review the decision. The court cited CPL 1.10 and 1.20, noting that criminal proceedings and appeals are exclusively governed by the Criminal Procedure Law and that the proceedings before the Grand Jury involved a criminal investigation. The court distinguished cases involving motions to quash subpoenas, noting that those motions are limited in scope and must be made promptly, whereas Marin’s application had the potential to delay the Grand Jury investigation significantly. The court stated, “That the Legislature has not authorized an appeal from an order in a criminal proceeding is conclusive; and ‘any arguments for a change in the practice, however persuasive, must be addressed to the legislature’.” The court also pointed out that appellate review could be obtained if Marin refused to answer questions and was held in contempt. Permitting appeals like Marin’s could “paralyze[ ]” investigations due to a proliferation of appeals. The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed and the matter remitted to the Appellate Division with instructions to dismiss the appeal taken to that court.