New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Mancuso

  • People v. Mancuso, 22 N.Y.2d 679 (1968): Timeliness of Objection to Peremptory Challenge

    People v. Mancuso, 22 N.Y.2d 679 (1968)

    An objection to a peremptory challenge during jury selection must be timely, but the specific circumstances of the jury selection process can affect what constitutes a timely objection.

    Summary

    This case addresses the timeliness of an objection to a peremptory challenge during jury selection. The defense argued that the prosecution’s peremptory challenge violated the Code of Criminal Procedure. The dissenting judges argued that the defense’s objection, although not immediately made, was timely because the trial court’s deviations from proper jury selection methods created confusion. The dissent emphasized that the trial court itself considered the motion on its merits, suggesting it viewed the objection as timely within the context of the proceedings. The dissent underscores the importance of adhering to proper jury selection procedures to avoid confusion and potential prejudice.

    Facts

    The specific facts regarding the crime are not detailed in the dissenting memorandum. The focus is solely on a procedural issue during jury selection: the prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge and the defense’s objection to it.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals. The Appellate Division had previously noted the potential for prejudice from deviations in jury selection. The trial court had apparently ruled inconsistently on jury selection procedures. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment, affirming it as modified, based on the dissenting memorandum’s reasoning regarding the timeliness of the objection.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defense’s objection to the prosecution’s peremptory challenge was timely, considering the trial court’s deviation from proper jury selection procedures and its own rulings.

    Holding

    Yes, the objection was timely because the trial court’s departures from proper procedure created confusion, potentially excusing the defense’s delay in objecting, and the trial court considered the motion on its merits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting memorandum reasoned that the Appellate Division correctly identified the risk of confusion when a trial court deviates from established jury selection methods. The memorandum noted that the trial court and the prosecution did not follow section 385 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the trial court’s own previous rulings on procedure. The dissent argued that defense counsel’s failure to immediately recognize the impropriety should be excused because the inconsistent rulings likely caused confusion. The dissent also pointed out that the trial court, which was best positioned to evaluate the impact on justice, addressed the defense’s motion on its merits, suggesting the trial court considered the objection timely. The dissent implied a standard where flexibility in determining timeliness is appropriate when the court’s own actions contribute to the delay in raising the objection. The memorandum also implicitly highlights the importance of preserving the integrity of the jury selection process and ensuring fairness to the defendant. There is no record of the majority’s reasoning in the provided text.

  • People v. Mancuso, 14 N.Y.2d 181 (1964): Constitutionality of Speed Restrictions Based on Reasonableness

    People v. Mancuso, 14 N.Y.2d 181 (1964)

    A statute prohibiting driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, having regard to actual and potential hazards, is constitutional because it incorporates a standard of ordinary negligence that provides sufficient guidance.

    Summary

    Mancuso was convicted of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a) for driving at an unreasonable speed given existing conditions. He challenged the law’s constitutionality, arguing it was too vague. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute was constitutional because it defined unreasonable speed by reference to what a reasonably prudent person would do under similar circumstances. The court distinguished this statute from prior versions deemed unconstitutional and emphasized that repeated instances of dangerous driving under known hazardous conditions supported the conviction.

    Facts

    Mancuso was driving on an icy street. He repeatedly attempted to start his car, causing it to spin and slide off the road into a snowbank on three separate occasions. Mancuso was aware of the slippery conditions of the street.

    Procedural History

    Mancuso was convicted for violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a). He appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a), prohibiting driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions, is unconstitutionally vague.
    2. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to convict Mancuso of violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180(a).

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute incorporates a standard of ordinary negligence, providing sufficient guidance for drivers and courts.
    2. Yes, because the evidence showed that Mancuso repeatedly drove in a manner that was unreasonable and imprudent given the known icy conditions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that § 1180(a) does not require a driver to be aware of unforeseen conditions but rather holds them responsible if they are negligent with respect to speed, considering reasonably anticipated hazards. The court distinguished this statute from the reckless driving statute (§ 1190), which requires intentional or abandoned disregard for safety. The court noted that similar statutes in other states have generally been upheld.

    The court emphasized that the statute is designed for situations where the legislature considered that the maximum speed should be less than the speeds prescribed in miles per hour, in order to limit the operation of motor vehicles under unusual circumstances. The court favorably cited People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, noting that a statute prohibiting conduct that “unreasonably interferes” with the highways would be constitutional because it refers to “the failure to exercise reasonable care, reasonable caution or the reasonable foresight of a reasonably prudent and careful person.”

    Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court acknowledged that skidding alone is not evidence of negligence. However, it found that Mancuso’s repeated actions, with knowledge of the icy conditions, demonstrated that he was driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.

    The court stated, “This was sufficient to convict him of driving at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances in violation of subdivision (a) of section 1180 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.”