New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Lomax

  • People v. Lomax, 16 N.Y.3d 182 (2011): Applying Speedy Trial Exclusions to Later Indictments

    People v. Lomax, 16 N.Y.3d 182 (2011)

    When a subsequent indictment is related back to the commencement of the initial proceeding for speedy trial purposes, the excludable time from the initial proceeding also applies to the subsequent indictment.

    Summary

    Defendant was initially charged with assault via a desk appearance ticket. Over a year later, the People filed an indictment including theft-related charges stemming from the same incident. Defendant argued the theft charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds. The Court of Appeals held that because the subsequent indictment related back to the initial appearance for speedy trial commencement, the excludable time from the initial charges also applied to the theft charges. This prevents selective application of CPL 30.30 and ensures the speedy trial statute is applied as an integrated whole. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the theft-related counts.

    Facts

    The complainant was photographing a construction site when the defendant approached him, punched him, and stole his camera on August 18, 2005.

    The police issued the defendant a desk appearance ticket for assault in the third degree.

    The defendant appeared in Criminal Court on September 26, 2005, in response to the ticket.

    About a month later, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint charging the defendant with assault, menacing, and harassment.

    On November 8, 2006, the People filed an indictment charging the defendant with robbery, petit larceny, assault, grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and menacing.

    The People filed a statement of readiness on the same day as the indictment.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the theft-related counts based on CPL 30.30 speedy trial grounds.

    The Supreme Court denied the motion concerning the assault counts but granted it for the theft counts.

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order and reinstated the theft-related counts, finding the excludable time and the People’s statement of readiness applied to all charges since they arose from the same incident.

    The Court of Appeals granted the defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the theft-related charges in the indictment, filed over a year after the initial accusatory instrument, are barred by the speedy trial provisions of CPL 30.30, specifically, whether the time excludable from the initial charges applies to the later theft-related charges.

    Holding

    No, because when a subsequent indictment is related back to the initial proceeding for purposes of applying the speedy trial statute, the excludable time is also related back.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236 (1986), stating, “[w]e perceive no logical reason why, when a subsequent indictment is related back to the commencement of the proceeding for purposes of applying the six-month limitation prescribed by CPL 30.30 (1) (a), it should not also be related back for the purpose of computing the time to be excluded from that limitation.”

    The Court reasoned that the provisions of CPL 30.30 should be interpreted as an integrated whole. The court emphasized that because both parties agreed the charges were sufficiently related to require the same commencement date, they are sufficiently related to apply the same excludable time.

    The Court considered the meaning of “directly derived” under CPL 1.20(16)(b), stating that term should be accorded its plain meaning—specifically, whether the indictment can be traced to or originates from the prior accusatory instrument. In this case, the indictment appears to satisfy that test because the charges, including the theft-based charges, originate from the prior accusatory instrument, incorporating the same physical injury component.

    The court stated that even if the indictment was not directly derived from the initial accusatory instrument, it would not benefit the defendant, because then the indictment would not relate back for the purpose of any speedy trial calculation, including determination of a commencement date. The speedy trial statute should be applied as a rational, integral whole.

  • People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988): Interpreting Speedy Trial Rules When Felony Complaint is Replaced by Misdemeanor Indictment

    People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988)

    When a criminal action commences with a felony complaint that is later replaced by a misdemeanor indictment, the applicable speedy trial period is determined by the accusatory instrument that initiated the action, not the final charge.

    Summary

    Defendant Lomax was convicted of reckless endangerment in the second degree. The case began with a felony complaint, but the Grand Jury indicted her on a misdemeanor. Lomax argued the People had to be ready for trial within 90 days of the misdemeanor indictment under CPL 30.30. The People contended they had six months, arguing that the initial felony complaint controlled. The Court of Appeals agreed with the People, holding that CPL 30.30(5)(c) doesn’t include misdemeanor indictments when listing accusatory instruments that trigger the shorter 90-day speedy trial period. Therefore, the six-month period applied, and Lomax’s speedy trial rights weren’t violated.

    Facts

    Lomax, a hospital volunteer, disconnected the life support of an AIDS patient, believing prayer had healed him.

    She was initially arraigned on a felony complaint for reckless endangerment in the first degree.

    The Grand Jury subsequently filed a misdemeanor indictment charging her with reckless endangerment in the second degree.

    Procedural History

    The Trial Court held that the six-month speedy trial period applied.

    The Appellate Division affirmed.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under CPL 30.30, when a criminal action commences with a felony complaint that is later replaced by a misdemeanor indictment, the applicable speedy trial period is 90 days from the filing of the misdemeanor indictment or six months from the initial felony complaint.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 30.30(5)(c) does not include misdemeanor indictments in the list of accusatory instruments that trigger the 90-day speedy trial period; thus, the six-month period applies from the initial felony complaint.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the plain language of CPL 30.30(5)(c), which specifies the accusatory instruments that trigger the 90-day speedy trial period when a felony complaint is replaced or converted. Misdemeanor indictments are notably absent from this list.

    The Court rejected Lomax’s argument that the legislature intended a distinction between felonies and lesser offenses for speedy trial purposes, stating that courts must give effect to the statute as written, not as they think it should have been written: “‘must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise’.” (quoting Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ., 60 NY2d 539, 548-549).

    The court applied the principle that the exclusion of a matter from a statute indicates intentional exclusion: “The failure of the Legislature to include a matter within a particular statute is an indication that its exclusion was intended” (citing Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394, 397).

    Because the legislature didn’t include misdemeanor indictments, the court concluded the six-month period applied from the date of the initial felony complaint. This decision emphasizes the importance of strictly interpreting statutes and not adding provisions the legislature omitted. The practical impact is that prosecutors have more time to prepare when a felony complaint is later reduced to a misdemeanor indictment.

  • People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988): Calculating Speedy Trial Time Under CPL 30.30

    People v. Lomax, 72 N.Y.2d 820 (1988)

    When calculating the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, the day the criminal action commenced is excluded from the computation.

    Summary

    This case addresses how to calculate the statutory speedy trial time under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s order, holding that when computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial, the day the criminal action commenced should be excluded. The Court relied on General Construction Law § 20, which provides a general rule for excluding the first day when computing a period of time from a specified event. The decision emphasizes that CPL 30.30 specifies the event that begins the running of the statutory period, triggering the application of General Construction Law § 20.

    Facts

    The specific facts of the underlying criminal case are not detailed in this memorandum opinion. The relevant fact is that the issue arose concerning the proper calculation of the time period under CPL 30.30, specifically whether the first day of the statutory period should be included or excluded.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court, where the defendant likely moved for dismissal based on a violation of CPL 30.30. The Appellate Term reversed, presumably finding no speedy trial violation. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Term’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, the day on which the criminal action commenced should be included or excluded from the computation.

    Holding

    Yes, the day on which the criminal action commenced should be excluded from the computation because the statute specifies an event that begins the running of the statutory period, thus requiring application of General Construction Law § 20.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its reasoning on two main points. First, it cited General Construction Law § 20, which states that “[i]n computing any specified period of time from a specified event, the day upon which the event happens is deemed the day from which the reckoning is made. The day from which any specified period of time is reckoned shall be excluded in making the reckoning.” The Court found this provision directly applicable to CPL 30.30 because CPL 30.30 specifies the event that starts the clock: “commencement of a criminal action.”

    Second, the Court noted that excluding the first day has been the “accepted practice” in previous cases involving CPL 30.30, citing People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529 and People v. Sturgis, 38 N.Y.2d 625 as examples, even though the specific issue of first-day exclusion wasn’t explicitly litigated in those cases.

    The Court distinguished its holding from the companion case, People ex rel. Neufeld v. McMickens, 70 N.Y.2d 763, explaining that the statute at issue in Neufeld (CPL 170.70) referred to “the period of actual custody” rather than measurement from a specified day or event, making the General Construction Law § 20 inapplicable. The court quoted Justice Gibbons’ dissent in Neufeld: “[the statute] does not refer to measurement from a specified day or event; it refers to the period of actual custody” (117 AD2d 243, 250).

    This case underscores the importance of carefully examining the language of the statute in question to determine if it refers to a specific event triggering the application of General Construction Law § 20.

  • People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351 (1980): Calculating Speedy Trial Time Under CPL 30.30

    People v. Lomax, 50 N.Y.2d 351 (1980)

    For speedy trial calculations under CPL 30.30, a criminal action commences with the filing of the first accusatory instrument, and delays caused by the defendant’s pretrial motions are generally excluded from the time the prosecution has to be ready for trial.

    Summary

    James Lomax was arrested and indicted for robbery. After the initial indictment was dismissed, a new indictment was filed. Lomax moved to dismiss the second indictment based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30. The trial court summarily denied the motion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the criminal action commenced with the first accusatory instrument. Although more than six months had passed, Lomax’s motion papers were insufficient because they did not adequately detail excludable periods resulting from his own pretrial motions, thus failing to demonstrate a clear entitlement to dismissal.

    Facts

    James Lomax was arrested on March 23, 1977, and charged with robbery. He was arraigned and subsequently indicted on March 28, 1977. The initial indictment was dismissed on June 14, 1977, following a defense motion. The District Attorney was granted leave to resubmit, and a new indictment was issued on June 23, 1977, encompassing the same charges. Lomax was re-arraigned. Lomax filed a second motion, including a request to inspect the grand jury minutes. A hearing was held in September 1977, but the decision denying the request was not announced until November 2, 1977. Lomax appeared for trial on December 8, 1977, but the trial was adjourned for three weeks to accommodate the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Lomax’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a speedy trial without an evidentiary hearing. The trial ended in a mistrial. Lomax then pleaded guilty to a reduced charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. Lomax appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the denial of his speedy trial motion was improper.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statutory speedy trial period under CPL 30.30 commences with the filing of the initial accusatory instrument or a subsequent indictment for the same charges?
    2. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying Lomax’s speedy trial motion without a hearing, given his allegations of delay?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under CPL 1.20(17), a criminal action commences with the filing of the first accusatory instrument, regardless of subsequent indictments for the same charges.
    2. No, because Lomax’s motion papers were insufficient to establish a clear entitlement to dismissal under CPL 30.30, as they failed to adequately account for excludable periods attributable to his own pretrial motions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that under CPL 1.20(17), a criminal action commences when the first accusatory instrument is filed. The court emphasized that “[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court, and, if more than one accusatory instrument is filed in the course of the action, it commences when the first of such instruments is filed”. Therefore, the speedy trial clock started on March 24, 1977, with the filing of the original felony complaint. However, the court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes certain periods of delay, specifically those resulting from pretrial motions made by the defendant. The Court stated, “[U]nder the clear language of CPL 30.30 (subd 4, par [a]), such periods would generally be excluded from the total time within which the People are required by statute to become ready to proceed to trial.” Lomax’s motion papers acknowledged delays due to his motions but failed to provide specific dates, preventing the trial court from calculating the excludable time. The court reasoned that because Lomax had demonstrated some delay was excusable, he had the burden of showing that the remaining “unexcused” delay exceeded the statutory limit. Because Lomax’s papers were deficient, the trial court acted within its discretion to deny the motion summarily under CPL 210.45(5). The court also rejected Lomax’s general speedy trial claim, finding that the nine-and-a-half-month delay was not excessive, especially considering the seriousness of the charges and the delays caused by Lomax’s motions. The court balanced the factors outlined in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975), and found no violation.