New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Lewis

  • People v. Lewis, 5 N.Y.3d 546 (2005): Clarifying ‘Intent to Commit a Crime Therein’ for Burglary

    5 N.Y.3d 546 (2005)

    The ‘intent to commit a crime therein’ element of burglary is not satisfied solely by a defendant’s intent to violate an order of protection by entering a dwelling that the order of protection declares off-limits; however, the element is satisfied if the defendant intended to engage in other conduct prohibited by the order while inside the premises.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary. The central issue was whether his intent to violate an order of protection by entering a prohibited dwelling alone satisfied the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, but the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit another crime beyond the unlawful entry. The court reasoned that unlawful entry alone cannot elevate every order of protection violation to burglary, but other evidence demonstrated intent to harass or menace the complainant within the dwelling. The Appellate Division’s order affirming the conviction was upheld.

    Facts

    The complainant allowed the defendant to live with her despite having him arrested for damaging her property. An order of protection was issued requiring him to stay away from her and her home. The complainant allowed the defendant to return, but after another incident where defendant struck her, another order of protection was issued. Subsequently, the complainant took her keys and left. Defendant entered her apartment without her knowledge while both orders were in effect, seemingly by tampering with a window and fire escape. Upon her return, the defendant kicked her and swore at her as she tried to call the police. Her belongings were scattered outside the apartment.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree burglary and criminal contempt. At trial, he requested a jury instruction that intent to enter the banned premises alone cannot satisfy the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. The trial court refused. The jury found him guilty of criminal contempt but was hung on the burglary charge initially. After a supplemental instruction, the jury convicted him of burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary can be satisfied solely by the defendant’s intent to violate an order of protection by entering the dwelling prohibited by the order?

    Holding

    No, because unlawful entry, standing alone, cannot be the predicate crime to satisfy the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. However, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit a crime in the apartment other than the trespass itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that if unlawful entry alone sufficed, every violation of a do-not-enter provision in an order of protection would be burglary. However, the Court noted that there was evidence that the defendant intended to commit other crimes within the apartment beyond the unlawful entry, such as harassment, menacing, or intimidation, which were separately prohibited by the order of protection. The court cited People v. Mackey, 49 NY2d 274 (1980), stating that the People need only allege and prove a knowing and unlawful entry coupled with an intent to commit a crime therein. The court emphasized that they do not need to allege or establish what particular crime was intended, citing People v. Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174 (1989). The Court found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant intended to “harass, menace, intimidate, threaten or interfere with complainant in her apartment” in violation of the order of protection. Judge R.S. Smith dissented, arguing that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury and that the defendant did not forfeit his right to appeal this error.

  • People v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.3d 224 (2004): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When Attorney Testifies Against Client

    People v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.3d 224 (2004)

    A criminal defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when their attorney is called to testify against them on a significant issue, thereby transforming the attorney from advocate to adversary.

    Summary

    Lewis was convicted of drug charges. Prior to trial, a witness who had agreed to testify against Lewis received threatening calls and refused to testify. At a Sirois hearing to determine if Lewis was behind the threats (and thus forfeited his right to confront the witness), Lewis’s attorney was called to testify by the prosecution. The attorney confirmed that he had only shared the witness’s statement with Lewis. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Lewis’s conviction, holding that the attorney’s testimony against his client constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, necessitating a new trial.

    Facts

    Lewis was indicted on drug charges based on seized evidence and a witness statement. The prosecution provided the witness statement to the defense shortly before trial. The witness then received threatening phone calls and refused to testify. The prosecution alleged that Lewis, out on bail, was behind the threats and had thus forfeited his right to confrontation. Lewis’s attorney denied Lewis’s involvement, stating he shared the statement with Lewis, who dismissed it as unreliable.

    Procedural History

    The trial court held a Sirois hearing to determine if Lewis was responsible for the witness intimidation. The trial court ruled the witness’s statement admissible, blaming the threats on Lewis. The jury found Lewis guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a criminal defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when their attorney is called to testify against them at a Sirois hearing, thereby undermining the attorney-client relationship and requiring a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defense counsel’s testimony was in conflict with defendant’s position, defendant was denied effective representation. When a lawyer is called to testify against the client’s interest the conflict is obvious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on People v. Berroa, 99 N.Y.2d 134 (2002), where an attorney stipulated to facts that undermined the defendant’s witnesses. Here, Lewis’s attorney testified adversely to Lewis, transforming himself from advocate to adversary. The court emphasized that attorneys should withdraw when called to testify against their client on a significant issue. The Court stated: “when a lawyer is called to testify against the client’s interest the conflict is obvious.” The court found that the attorney’s testimony, even if not “earth-shattering,” was significant enough to rupture the attorney-client relationship for the entire trial. This rupture necessitated a new trial, as Lewis was denied effective assistance of counsel. The dissent argued that the error, at most, warranted a new Sirois hearing but not a new trial, as the attorney’s testimony took place outside the presence of the jury and the attorney presented a competent defense. The dissent also argued that the attorney-client relationship could survive, referencing cases where attorneys disclosed client perjury or prior crimes.

  • People v. Lewis, 80 N.Y.2d 1007 (1992): Discharging Juror After Partial Verdict

    People v. Lewis, 80 N.Y.2d 1007 (1992)

    A juror may be discharged even after deliberations have begun if the court finds the juror is grossly unqualified based on facts unknown during jury selection, but this determination must be based on concrete evidence, not speculation.

    Summary

    Lewis was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery. On the second day of deliberations, a juror expressed fear for her family’s safety after recognizing someone in the courtroom. The court questioned the juror and, learning the jury had reached a verdict on some counts the previous day, took a partial verdict on those counts and discharged the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the juror’s disqualification arose only after the first day of deliberations, making the partial verdict valid. The court emphasized that a juror’s disqualification must be based on concrete evidence, not speculation.

    Facts

    Defendant Lewis was tried with two codefendants and convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree.
    During the second day of jury deliberations, the court learned that at least one juror was experiencing a personal problem. A juror then sent a note expressing concern for her family’s safety because she recognized someone in the courtroom. The juror feared reprisal if the verdict was unfavorable to the defendants. The juror stated that her fear arose after the first day of deliberations ended. The defendant moved for a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, after determining that the jury had reached a verdict on some counts at the end of the first day, took a partial verdict finding Lewis guilty of one count of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. The jury did not reach a verdict on the remaining count of robbery in the first degree. The trial court then discharged the jury and denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in taking a partial verdict and discharging the jury after a juror expressed fear for her family’s safety, claiming she recognized someone in the courtroom, and stating her fear arose after the first day of deliberations.

    Holding

    No, because the juror’s disqualification arose only after the first day of deliberations, making the partial verdict valid, and the trial court properly terminated deliberations after determining the jury could not reach a verdict on all counts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The court cited CPL 270.35, which allows a juror to be discharged even after deliberations have begun if the court finds the juror is grossly unqualified based on facts unknown during jury selection. However, the court emphasized that under People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299, “In concluding that a juror is grossly unqualified, the court may not speculate as to possible partiality of the juror based on her equivocal responses. Instead, it must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict”. The court reasoned that because the juror stated she did not feel unable to continue deliberating until after the jury had been discharged on the first day, she was not grossly unqualified to participate in the first day’s deliberations. Therefore, the partial verdict was reached by a qualified and competent jury. Further, the court noted that having determined that the jury would be unable to reach a verdict on all counts, the trial court properly terminated the deliberations and ordered the jury to render a partial verdict under CPL 310.70 [1] [a].