New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Levan

  • People v. Levan, 62 N.Y.2d 139 (1984): Warrantless Home Arrests Violate the Fourth Amendment

    62 N.Y.2d 139 (1984)

    Absent exigent circumstances or consent, police may not enter a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest; evidence seized incident to such an arrest is inadmissible.

    Summary

    Levan was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon after police entered his apartment without a warrant, arrested him, and discovered a gun during a search incident to the arrest. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the warrantless entry into Levan’s home violated the Fourth Amendment. The court emphasized that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed, citing Payton v. New York. Because no exigent circumstances or consent existed to justify the warrantless entry, the gun seized was inadmissible as evidence, and Levan’s subsequent testimony admitting possession of the weapon was tainted by the illegality of the search.

    Facts

    Following a shooting, an eyewitness identified Levan as the perpetrator. Police visited Levan’s apartment several times over the next week but did not find him. On May 9, 1979, police received a call informing them Levan was home. Six officers proceeded to Levan’s apartment without obtaining a warrant, despite having probable cause and ample time to do so. Two officers hid in the hallway. They watched a neighbor knock on Levan’s door. When Levan opened the door, the officers, with guns drawn, entered the apartment and arrested him. A search incident to the arrest revealed a gun hidden in a shoe in Levan’s closet, which was later stipulated to be the gun used in the shooting. Ammunition was also discovered in a kitchen drawer during a broader search.

    Procedural History

    Levan was indicted for murder and criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the gun. He was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. After the Supreme Court decided Payton v. New York, invalidating warrantless home arrests absent exigent circumstances, Levan moved for reconsideration of the suppression motion. The trial court denied this motion, deeming the admission of the gun harmless error because Levan testified to possessing the gun. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that Levan had no expectation of privacy because he was visible in the hallway when he opened the door. Levan appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless arrest of Levan inside his apartment violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby rendering the gun inadmissible as evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because absent exigent circumstances or consent, police may not enter a suspect’s home to make a warrantless arrest, and evidence seized as a result of such an unlawful entry is inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Payton v. New York, which established that the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to a home, prohibiting warrantless entry absent exigent circumstances or consent. The court rejected the Appellate Division’s reliance on United States v. Santana, distinguishing that case by noting that Santana concerned an arrest that began in a public place. The court stated, “[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Here, the police initiated the arrest inside Levan’s apartment without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. The court also found that the admission of the gun was not harmless error, even though Levan testified to possessing it, as his testimony was likely a direct response to the illegally seized evidence. The court reasoned that “it is reasonable to conclude that defendant did so in order to overcome the impact of the illegally seized evidence, and therefore that testimony is tainted by the same illegality that rendered the evidence itself inadmissible.”

  • People v. Levan, 40 N.Y.2d 746 (1976): Admissibility of Motive Evidence and Challenging Prior Convictions

    People v. Levan, 40 N.Y.2d 746 (1976)

    Evidence of a lack of motive is admissible to establish that the defendant did not commit the charged act or lacked the required intent, but only when the commission of an intentional act is at issue.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury to consider the lack of motive in determining the defendant’s guilt because the commission of the intentional act was not in question due to the defendant’s testimony and self-defense plea. The Court also held that the defendant’s constitutional challenge to prior convictions at the persistent felony offender hearing was correctly denied because the defendant only alleged a violation of People v. Montgomery, which does not invalidate prior convictions for persistent felony offender status.

    Facts

    The defendant, Levan, was convicted of a crime. At trial, he testified and pleaded self-defense, thereby acknowledging the commission of the act. During the trial, the defendant requested the court to charge the jury that they could consider the lack of motive in determining defendant’s guilt. At the persistent felony offender hearing, the defendant challenged his prior convictions, claiming his rights under People v. Montgomery were violated during earlier proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The trial court refused to charge the jury regarding lack of motive and also refused to entertain the defendant’s constitutional challenge to his prior convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that it could consider lack of motive in determining the defendant’s guilt.

    2. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to entertain the defendant’s constitutional challenge to his prior convictions at the persistent felony offender hearing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the commission of an intentional act was not in issue due to the defendant’s testimony and self-defense plea.

    2. No, because the defendant did not allege that the prior convictions were “unconstitutionally obtained” within the meaning of CPL 400.20, but rather alleged a Montgomery violation, which does not invalidate prior convictions for persistent felony offender status.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the motive, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that evidence of absence of motive may be admissible to establish that the defendant did not commit the act charged or lacked the requisite intent, citing People v. Sangamino and People v. Guadagnino. However, the Court distinguished the case, noting that the commission of an intentional act was not in issue here, due to the defendant’s own testimony and self-defense plea, citing People v. Johnson. The court stated, “here the commission of an intentional act was not in issue due to defendant’s own testimony and self-defense plea.”

    Regarding the challenge to prior convictions, the Court agreed that CPL 400.20 authorizes a constitutional challenge. However, the Court noted that the defendant did not allege that the prior convictions were “unconstitutionally obtained” within the meaning of that section. The Court reasoned that even if a Montgomery violation were proven, the prior convictions would not be rendered invalid for determining persistent felony offender status. The Court stated, “At most, a Montgomery violation, if proven, would entitle defendant to an extension of time for taking an appeal.” The court cited People v. Corso in support of that proposition.