New York Law Review

Tag: People v. LeGrand

  • People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007)

    Where a case hinges on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications with little corroborating evidence, excluding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability, if relevant, generally accepted, and beyond the ken of the average juror, is an abuse of discretion.

    Summary

    Joaquin Liriano was murdered in 1991. The case stalled until 1998 when the defendant, LeGrand, was identified as a suspect based on a composite sketch made shortly after the crime. The People’s case rested solely on eyewitness identifications made nearly seven years after the crime. LeGrand sought to introduce expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness reliability, which the trial court precluded after a Frye hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion given the lack of corroborating evidence and the centrality of eyewitness identification.

    Facts

    Joaquin Liriano was stabbed to death in Manhattan in June 1991, and his assailant fled. Four people witnessed the attack and created a composite sketch. Two years later, LeGrand was identified as a possible suspect because he resembled the sketch. The case remained dormant until 1998, when LeGrand was arrested for burglary. The authorities then located the witnesses; one identified LeGrand as the killer, two tentatively identified him, and two could not identify him. There was no forensic or physical evidence connecting LeGrand to the stabbing.

    Procedural History

    LeGrand was charged with second-degree murder in 1999. His first trial in 2001 ended in a mistrial. Prior to his second trial, LeGrand moved to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification. The trial court conducted a Frye hearing and precluded the testimony. The jury found LeGrand guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications after determining that the proposed testimony was based on novel scientific principles not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, where the case turned on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there was little or no corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because where the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the witness’s identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized an emerging trend of admitting expert psychological testimony on eyewitness identification, noting that such testimony can provide much-needed guidance to juries. The Court emphasized the trial court’s discretion in determining whether jurors would benefit from the specialized knowledge of an expert witness, considering the centrality of the identification issue and the existence of corroborating evidence.

    The Court referenced Frye v. United States, emphasizing that the thing from which a deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. The Court distinguished its prior holdings in People v. Lee and People v. Young, emphasizing that, unlike those cases, there was no corroborating evidence connecting LeGrand to the crime. The Court found that the expert’s testimony regarding the correlation between confidence and accuracy, the effect of post-event information, and confidence malleability met the Frye standard, while the effect of weapon focus did not. The Court emphasized, “Once a scientific procedure has been proved reliable, a Frye inquiry need not be conducted each time such evidence is offered [and courts] may take judicial notice of reliability of the general procedure.”

    Ultimately, the Court concluded that the exclusion of the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion, warranting a new trial. However, it reiterated that the admissibility of such evidence also depends upon the existence of sufficient corroborating evidence to link the defendant to the crime. In the event sufficient corroborating evidence is found to exist, an exercise of discretion excluding eyewitness expert testimony would not be fatal to a jury verdict convicting defendant.

  • People v. Legrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007): Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

    8 N.Y.3d 449 (2007)

    The admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, after considering the specific facts of the case.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of expert testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification. The Court of Appeals held that such testimony is not per se inadmissible, and the decision to admit it rests within the trial court’s discretion. The trial court must weigh factors like the centrality of the identification issue and the presence of corroborating evidence. In Legrand, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the expert testimony, given the circumstances of the case, including corroborating evidence beyond the eyewitness identification.

    Facts

    Michael Perani’s car was stolen at gunpoint in a well-lit area. He was only a few feet from the defendant during the robbery. Two months later, defendant was arrested driving Perani’s stolen vehicle. More than six months after the arrest, Perani identified the defendant in a photographic array and later in a lineup.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree. Before trial, the hearing court summarily denied defendant’s motion to introduce expert testimony on eyewitness identification reliability. At trial, the trial court denied a renewed request. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to introduce expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification.
    2. Whether the photographic array presented to the victim was unduly suggestive.

    Holding

    1. No, because given the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
    2. No, because subtle differences in the photographs were not “sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the admissibility and limits of expert testimony are primarily within the trial court’s discretion. It is up to the trial court to decide when jurors can draw conclusions based on their own experience versus when they would benefit from expert knowledge. The court recognized that while jurors may have personal experience with factors affecting eyewitness reliability, psychological studies on identification accuracy are not within the ken of the typical juror. The court acknowledged that the hearing court failed to exercise its discretion in summarily rejecting the motion. However, the trial court did consider the renewed request, weighing it against the centrality of the identification and the existence of corroborating evidence (the defendant being arrested in the stolen car). This corroborating evidence justified the denial of the expert testimony. The Court also found that the photo array was not unduly suggestive.