New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Legister

  • People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990): Improper Juror Experimentation Requires New Trial

    People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990)

    A jury verdict must be overturned when a juror conducts a private experiment related to a critical issue in the case, and the experiment is revealed with sufficient guarantees of reliability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction and ordered a new trial because a juror conducted an unauthorized experiment during deliberations. The juror, seeking to assess the victim’s ability to identify her attacker in a dimly lit room, recreated similar conditions in her hotel room. She then shared her findings with other jurors before they reached a guilty verdict. The court found that this “conscious, contrived experimentation” was directly material to a critical point in the trial, and the risk of prejudice to the defendant was apparent, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    During the trial, a key issue was the victim’s ability to identify her attacker in a darkened bedroom.

    After two days of deliberation, the jury had not reached a verdict.

    One juror, during overnight sequestration, adjusted the lighting and opened the curtains in her hotel room to simulate the crime scene conditions based on the victim’s testimony.

    The juror then had another juror walk in and out of the room wearing clothing of a similar color to the attacker’s, to assess whether the victim could have made a reliable identification.

    The juror discussed the experiment with some fellow jurors the next morning, and the jury soon returned a guilty verdict.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a new trial is required when a juror conducts an experiment related to a critical issue in the case outside of the courtroom and shares the results with other jurors.

    Holding

    Yes, because the juror’s conduct was conscious, contrived experimentation, directly material to a critical point at issue in the trial, and the risk of prejudice to defendant is apparent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388 (1979), stating the juror’s conduct was “conscious, contrived experimentation, directly material to a critical point at issue in the trial.”

    The court emphasized that the victim’s identification was crucial to the prosecution’s case, and the juror’s experiment bolstered the identification with non-record evidence, meaning evidence not subject to challenge by the defendant.

    The court noted “the risk of prejudice to defendant is apparent. The victim’s identification of the defendant was crucial to the prosecution’s case and the juror’s experiment bolstered the identification with nonrecord evidence not subject to challenge by the defendant.”

    The Court found sufficient guarantees that the report of the juror’s conduct was genuine because she discussed the experiment with some fellow jurors just before the final vote and recounted the story almost immediately after the verdict in a conversation that included both defense counsel and the prosecutor.

  • People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990): Juror’s Independent Investigation and Prejudice

    People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990)

    A jury verdict should be set aside when a juror conducts an independent investigation into a fact in issue and shares the results with other jurors, creating a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction due to juror misconduct. During deliberations in a robbery case involving the issue of visibility from a vehicle, a juror conducted an independent investigation by observing the scene from her own car and shared her findings with the other jurors. The court held that this unauthorized investigation and communication of its results created a substantial risk of prejudice, thus warranting a new trial. The concurring opinion emphasized the importance of jurors using their background experience but distinguished it from actively seeking new evidence outside the trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. A key issue at trial was whether a witness could have clearly seen the events from a certain vantage point inside a vehicle. During jury deliberations, one of the jurors, without authorization, drove her own vehicle to the location in question to assess the visibility. She then reported her observations to the other jurors.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no prejudice resulting from the juror’s actions. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juror’s unauthorized independent investigation into a material fact and communication of the findings to other jurors warrants setting aside the jury verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because the juror’s independent investigation and communication of her findings created a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the juror’s conduct constituted improper and prejudicial behavior. The court emphasized that jurors must base their verdicts solely on the evidence presented at trial. An independent investigation by a juror introduces evidence that the defendant has no opportunity to confront or cross-examine. The court reasoned that “[t]o allow a jury to consider evidence which was not introduced at trial is a violation of a defendant’s fundamental right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.” The court found that the juror’s experiment, which involved specific observations about visibility from a car, was directly related to a central issue in the case. Because the juror shared her findings with the other jurors, the court concluded that there was a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant. The concurring opinion argued that jurors inevitably draw upon their own experiences, but distinguished that from actively seeking new evidence related to the specific facts of the case. Judge Fuchsberg stated, “In persuading one another to their respective viewpoints, and indeed in resolving their own doubts, jurors, like other people, employ the products of their education and experience…That is essentially all that happened in this case.” However, the majority found the juror’s actions exceeded the permissible use of background experience and created a prejudicial situation requiring a new trial.