New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Lee

  • People v. Lee, 21 N.Y.3d 175 (2013): Discretion in Appointing Court Interpreters

    21 N.Y.3d 175 (2013)

    A trial court has discretion to determine whether a court interpreter should be removed for bias, and that discretion is not abused when the court adequately questions the interpreter and finds no bias.

    Summary

    Thomas Lee was convicted of burglary and grand larceny. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not replacing the court-appointed interpreter after defense counsel raised concerns about the interpreter’s acquaintance with the complainants. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion. The court reasoned that the trial court adequately questioned the interpreter regarding potential bias and found no reason to believe the interpreter could not perform his duties impartially, especially since the interpreter was a state employee bound by an oath.

    Facts

    Thomas Lee and a co-defendant were charged with stealing property from the apartment of a husband and wife. At trial, the wife, who spoke Cantonese, required a court interpreter. The court-appointed interpreter informed the court that he was a “friend” of the complainant husband and had met the wife. The interpreter also knew the husband had previously served federal time but denied any discomfort in translating for the wife and claimed no knowledge of the case facts. Defense counsel sought to remove the interpreter due to the relationship and the husband’s alleged “intimidating violent nature.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the request to replace the interpreter, and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing defense counsel’s request to replace a state-employed court interpreter based on the interpreter’s acquaintance with the complainants.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court adequately questioned the interpreter about potential bias and reasonably concluded that the interpreter could perform his duties without prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that trial courts have discretion in determining whether an interpreter is necessary, qualified, and biased. The court emphasized that it is the trial court that is “in the best position to determine whether an interpreter, once appointed, is biased in favor of a party or witness, thereby necessitating removal and replacement.” The court found that the trial court acted appropriately by questioning the interpreter about his relationship with the complainants and his knowledge of the case. The court also considered that the interpreter was a state employee who had taken an oath to faithfully discharge his duties. The court distinguished this case from Matter of James L., where the trial court failed to inquire into the bias and qualifications of an ad hoc interpreter. Here, the interpreter, as a state employee, could be presumed to understand his ethical obligations. The court stated, “As a state employee who had taken an oath to interpret, it can be presumed that the interpreter knew his ethical/professional obligations to translate the testimony verbatim. On the facts of this case, the court could have reasonably found that the danger the interpreter would distort complainant wife’s testimony was remote, particularly because he possessed no knowledge concerning the facts of the case.”

  • People v. Lee, 35 N.Y.2d 826 (1974): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions for Appellate Review

    People v. Lee, 35 N.Y.2d 826 (1974)

    To preserve an objection to a jury instruction for appellate review in New York, the party must make their position known to the court at a time when the court has an opportunity to correct the error.

    Summary

    Defendant Lee appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court’s jury instruction regarding intoxication as a defense was erroneous because it referred to the voluntary use of drugs when he claimed his drug use was involuntary. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant failed to preserve this specific objection at trial. The Court emphasized that the defendant only took a general exception to the charge on intoxication, without specifically objecting to the characterization of drug use as voluntary. Because the defendant did not give the trial court an opportunity to correct the alleged error, the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.

    Facts

    The defendant, Lee, was charged with a crime. At trial, Lee claimed his actions were caused by unknowingly ingesting LSD that had been added to his Coca-Cola. He requested a jury instruction that intoxication is a defense if it prevents the defendant from forming the required criminal intent. The trial judge’s charge included references to the voluntary use of drugs and its impact on the defendant’s capacity to form the necessary criminal intent.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the jury instruction was erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding the error was not preserved for review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review the objection that the trial court incorrectly characterized his drug use as voluntary in its jury instruction on intoxication.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant did not make his position known to the trial court at a time when the court could have corrected the instruction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to preserve the objection regarding the characterization of drug use as voluntary because he only made a general exception to the intoxication charge. The Court relied on CPL 470.05 (subd 2), which requires a party to make “his position with respect to the * * * instruction known to the court” at a “time when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same.” Because the defendant did not specifically object to the voluntary nature of the drug use at trial, the trial court was not given the opportunity to correct the alleged error. The court also addressed the denial of a continuance, determining that the decision was within the trial judge’s discretion.