47 N.Y.2d 1002 (1979)

A defendant may be guilty of criminal conspiracy even if the sole co-conspirator only feigned agreement and did not actually share the defendant’s criminal intent.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a conspiracy conviction could stand when one of the alleged co-conspirators was an undercover officer feigning agreement. The court held that a defendant can be guilty of conspiracy even if the only co-conspirator lacked genuine criminal intent due to feigned agreement. The trial court’s instruction that the jury could not convict one defendant without the other was erroneous. As one defendant’s attorney objected to the charge, his conviction was reversed; the other defendant’s conviction was affirmed because her attorney failed to object to the improper charge.

Facts

Defendant Teeter and an undercover officer, Cantaben, allegedly conspired. The indictment also charged Kropman as a co-conspirator. The underlying facts of the conspiracy are not explicitly detailed in the Court of Appeals decision, but the key fact is that Cantaben was an undercover officer who only feigned agreement with the conspiracy.

Procedural History

The Trial Judge charged the jury that they could not convict one defendant and not the other on the conspiracy charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions of both Teeter and Kropman. Kropman appealed, arguing the jury instruction was erroneous. Teeter also appealed but had not properly preserved the objection to the jury charge. The Court of Appeals addressed the validity of the conspiracy conviction given the feigned agreement of Cantaben, the undercover officer.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy when the only alleged co-conspirator is an undercover officer who feigned agreement and did not share the defendant’s criminal intent.

Holding

Yes, because under Penal Law § 105.30, it is not a defense to conspiracy that a co-conspirator could not be guilty of conspiracy due to factors precluding the required mental state. The improper jury charge, unobjected to by Teeter’s attorney, stood, but Kropman’s conviction was reversed because his attorney properly objected.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on its companion cases, People v. Schwimmer and People v. Villetto, which adopted the reasoning of Justice Samuel Rabin’s opinion in People v. Schwimmer (66 AD2d 91). That reasoning held that a defendant may be guilty of criminal conspiracy even though the only co-conspirator feigned agreement and did not share the defendant’s criminal intent. The court emphasized Penal Law § 105.30, which states that “It is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that, owing to * * * exemption * * * or to other factors precluding the mental state required * * * one or more of the defendant’s co-conspirators could not be guilty of conspiracy”. The court reasoned that, given a proper charge, the jury could have found a conspiracy between Teeter and the undercover officer, Cantaben, to which Kropman was not a party. The court acknowledged the error in the trial court’s charge, stating, “The instruction that the jury could not convict one defendant and not the other on the conspiracy charge was error in light of the present wording of section 105.10 of the Penal Law and the expressed provision in section 105.30”. Because Teeter’s attorney failed to object to the erroneous charge, the court lacked jurisdiction to correct the error in her case. However, Kropman’s attorney preserved the error, and thus his conviction was reversed.