New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Krom

  • People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187 (1984): “Emergency Exception” to Right to Counsel in Missing Person Cases

    People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187 (1984)

    When police are searching for a missing person, they may question a suspect, even after the suspect has invoked the right to counsel, if the questioning is necessary to locate the missing person and provide emergency assistance.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether statements made by a kidnapping suspect, after he invoked his right to counsel, were admissible under the State Constitution, given that the police were attempting to locate the missing victim. The Court held that the police could question the suspect about the victim’s whereabouts under an “emergency exception” to the right to counsel, but that this exception ended once the victim’s body was found. The improperly admitted confession after the discovery of the body was deemed harmless error because it was cumulative to a later, spontaneous confession. The conviction was affirmed.

    Facts

    Trudy Farber was kidnapped from her home. Her husband, Roger, and father, Harry Resnick, received ransom demands. Roger Farber identified the defendant, Krom, as the caller. Police investigators went to Krom’s home, noting a car matching the description of one seen near the Farber residence. Krom was informed of his Miranda rights but offered information about the victim’s location in exchange for $400,000. At the police station, Krom continued to demand money, implicated the victim’s husband, and admitted to making the ransom calls. He drafted agreements for payment and immunity. Upon being arrested after requesting a lawyer, Krom briefly spoke with an attorney who declined representation. He then stated he would act as his own attorney and eventually led police to the victim’s body after her father agreed to pay his attorney’s fees, bail, and expenses. The victim was found dead in a locked box.

    Procedural History

    Krom was indicted for felony murder, kidnapping, and burglary. He moved to suppress his statements to the police. The trial court denied the motion, finding the questioning “custodial” but justified by the emergency of trying to save the victim’s life. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding an emergency exception to the right to counsel applied but that post-discovery statements should have been suppressed; however, this was harmless error. Krom appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police violated Krom’s State constitutional right to counsel by questioning him about the victim’s whereabouts after he had been arrested and asserted his right to counsel.

    2. Whether the admission of statements made after the victim’s body was discovered, if obtained in violation of the right to counsel, constituted harmless error.

    Holding

    1. No, because under the State Constitution, an “emergency exception” exists that allows police to question a suspect about a missing person’s whereabouts even after the suspect has invoked the right to counsel.

    2. Yes, because the improperly admitted confession was cumulative to a later, spontaneous confession, and other evidence strongly implicated Krom in the kidnapping and murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the State constitutional right to counsel is designed to protect the accused from the coercive power of the State intent on prosecuting him for a criminal offense. However, this protection is not absolute and must be balanced against the police’s duty to provide emergency assistance, especially when a life is at stake. The Court recognized an “emergency exception,” stating: “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”

    The Court emphasized that extending the right to counsel to hinder police emergency duties would be unwarranted, noting that to expect police to refrain from questioning a suspected kidnapper, simply because they asserted their right to counsel, would be unreasonable. However, the emergency exception ends once the victim’s body is found, as subsequent questioning serves only to gather evidence for trial, which is the type of police inquiry that the right to counsel aims to protect against.

    Regarding harmless error, the Court found that the improperly admitted confession was cumulative to Krom’s later, spontaneous confession made en route to jail. The Court also noted evidence, including Krom’s ransom calls and his leading the police to the victim’s body, which established his involvement in the crime. Given this, there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had it not heard the first confession.

    In reaching their holding, the court reasoned that “[s]pontaneous statements made after the right to counsel has indelibly attached are admissible even though they may be said to represent an implicit waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of an attorney”.

  • People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187 (1984): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements After Attachment of Right to Counsel

    People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187 (1984)

    A statement made by a defendant after the right to counsel has attached, but which is genuinely spontaneous and not the product of police inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, is admissible in evidence.

    Summary

    Krom was arrested on a warrant for forging checks. After being informed of his rights, he declined to make a statement. While the arresting officer logged Krom’s arrest alongside those of his accomplices, Krom asked why he was charged with the same offense. The officer explained that anyone involved in the crime was equally guilty. Krom then made an incriminating statement, claiming he knew the checks were forged but didn’t fill them out himself. The New York Court of Appeals held that this statement was admissible because it was spontaneous and not the result of police interrogation or its functional equivalent, even though his right to counsel had attached upon the filing of the accusatory instrument.

    Facts

    The defendant, Krom, was involved in a scheme to pass forged checks at local gas stations. Krom’s friends, King and Reilly, forged the checks, and Krom presented them for payment, after which the proceeds were divided among the three. On March 16, Krom was arrested on a warrant. At the police station, after being read his Miranda rights, Krom declined to make a statement. As the arresting officer entered Krom’s arrest information into a police log, following entries for King and Reilly, Krom inquired why he was being charged with the same offense as his companions. The officer responded that anyone involved in the crime was equally guilty. Krom then stated that he knew the checks were forged after a few had been passed, but he didn’t fill them out or sign them.

    Procedural History

    Krom moved to suppress his statement, arguing it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion, finding the statement was volunteered. A jury convicted Krom of multiple counts of possession of a forged instrument and petit larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the statement was admissible as spontaneous.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statement made by a defendant, after his right to counsel has attached upon the filing of an accusatory instrument and arrest on a warrant, is admissible if the statement was made in response to a brief, impersonal answer from a police officer and is deemed genuinely spontaneous.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s statement was spontaneous and not the product of police inducement or interrogation, despite the attachment of his right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that under the New York Constitution, the defendant’s right to counsel attached upon the filing of the accusatory instrument leading to the arrest warrant. This prevented the police from interrogating him or engaging in its functional equivalent in the absence of counsel. However, the court clarified that the rule “does not require the police to take affirmative steps, by gag or otherwise, to prevent a talkative person in custody from making an incriminating statement.” The court cited People v. Maerling, stating that volunteered statements are admissible if the defendant spoke with genuine spontaneity “and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” The court distinguished this case from scenarios involving police questioning or lengthy informal discussions. Here, the officer’s response was a “brief and impersonal” answer to Krom’s question, and did not constitute an interrogation tactic. The court noted, “The question in such cases is whether the police conduct should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a statement from the defendant…and whether it can be said under the circumstances that the inculpatory statement was ‘made without apparent external cause.’” The court found no evidence that the officer deliberately prompted Krom’s question or that the officer’s answer went beyond the scope of the inquiry. The court likened the case to People v. Lynes, where a similar exchange was deemed spontaneous. Because there was support in the record for the lower court’s finding of spontaneity, the Court of Appeals affirmed.