People v. Kress, 29 N.Y.2d 429 (1972)

A defendant’s silence after arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings cannot be used against them at trial as evidence of guilt, nor can the prosecutor comment on their failure to provide an alibi to the police.

Summary

Defendants Kress and Christman were convicted of attempted rape, sodomy, and assault. At trial, neither defendant testified, but both presented alibi defenses. The prosecutor, during summation, highlighted the fact that the defendants didn’t tell the police about their alibis upon arrest. The trial court deemed this “fair comment.” The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the prosecutor’s comments violated the defendants’ right to remain silent. The court also addressed other evidentiary issues that arose during the trial, including the improper admission of a photographic identification and a co-defendant’s statement.

Facts

Kress and Christman were arrested and charged with attempted rape, sodomy, and assault. Kress refused to make any statement to the police except to identify himself. Christman denied the acts but admitted he and Kress were together at the time of the crime. Both defendants presented alibi defenses at trial, but neither testified. The complaining witness identified Kress through a photograph at the police station. A blanket found in Christman’s car was received in evidence but was not connected to the crime.

Procedural History

The defendants were convicted at trial. They appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s comments on their silence after arrest, the admission of the photographic identification, and the co-defendant’s statement were prejudicial errors. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgments and ordered a new trial.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the prosecutor’s comments on the defendants’ failure to provide their alibi to the police after arrest violated their right to remain silent and constituted reversible error.
2. Whether the admission of the complaining witness’s photographic identification of Kress at the police station was improper.
3. Whether the admission of Christman’s statement to the police, implicating Kress, was improper against Kress.

Holding

1. Yes, because defendants are under no obligation to offer an alibi to police after arrest, and it is impermissible for the prosecution to comment on their silence.
2. Yes, because admitting testimony of a photographic identification is improper.
3. Yes, because the statement made by a co-defendant to police is inadmissible against another defendant.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s comments on the defendants’ silence after arrest were a substantial error. The Court reasoned that defendants are under no obligation to say anything or provide an alibi to the police after arrest, citing People v. Travato, 309 N.Y. 382 and Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609. The Court stated that it could have been counted against the defendants that there was no police testimony that appellants told them about alibi witnesses; or, alternatively, that they failed to explain on the trial where they were at the time. The court found this to be prejudicial. Additionally, the court found the photographic identification of Kress by the complaining witness at the police station was improperly admitted, citing People v. Cioffi, 1 N.Y.2d 70, as was Christman’s statement to police that he and Kress were together around the time of the crime. While the seizure and inspection of Christman’s car were deemed improper, the evidence found was not prejudicial. Finally, the Court addressed the imposition of consecutive sentences, holding that separate consecutive sentences for attempted rape and assault with intent to commit rape were impermissible under the circumstances, referencing former Penal Law § 1938.