New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Knapp

  • People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982): Right to Counsel and Admissibility of Evidence After Assertion of Right

    57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)

    Once a suspect in custody informs police that they have an attorney, any statements made or evidence obtained as a result of questioning or searches conducted without the attorney present must be suppressed, even if the violation of the right to counsel wasn’t initially raised at the suppression hearing.

    Summary

    Knapp, arrested in South Carolina based on a New York warrant for grand larceny (check kiting), informed a New York detective that he had a South Carolina attorney. Subsequently, Knapp made statements about his car and its contents, which led to a search of the car. The New York Court of Appeals held that the search was illegal and the evidence obtained inadmissible because Knapp’s right to counsel had been violated. However, the court allowed for a renewed hearing regarding a looseleaf notebook turned over by Knapp, as the circumstances of that turnover were unclear.

    Facts

    Defendant Knapp was arrested in South Carolina on a New York warrant for grand larceny related to check kiting.
    Detective McLeese of the New York police spoke to Knapp via telephone while Knapp was in custody.
    Knapp told McLeese he had a South Carolina attorney.
    McLeese asked Knapp about transporting his car back to New York, and Knapp requested the police drive him back in it.
    Based on Knapp’s statements, the police searched the car and found incriminating evidence.
    Knapp’s South Carolina attorney gave him a looseleaf notebook in the presence of the detectives, which Knapp then handed to them.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Knapp’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the car search and the notebook.
    Knapp was convicted of grand larceny.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the motion to suppress regarding the car search, and ordered a new trial, subject to a renewed hearing regarding the looseleaf notebook.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by a suspect in custody, after informing police he has an attorney, are admissible if made without the attorney present.
    Whether a car can be seized as evidence of a crime (grand larceny via check kiting) simply because funds criminally obtained were used to purchase the car.
    Whether the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies when a car is located in a private garage and there is ample time to obtain a warrant.

    Holding

    No, because any statements made or evidence obtained after a suspect informs police they have an attorney must be suppressed if obtained without the attorney being present, even if this violation of right to counsel wasn’t raised at the suppression hearing.
    No, because using criminally obtained funds to purchase the car does not, on its own, establish a sufficient nexus between the car and the larceny to justify seizure.
    No, because the automobile exception does not apply when the car is in a private garage, and there is sufficient time to obtain a warrant. Exigency cannot be based on inadmissible evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the established principle that once a suspect in custody states they have an attorney, any questioning must cease. Evidence obtained as a result of violating this right to counsel is inadmissible.
    The Court found no spontaneous request from Knapp that would justify questioning him about the car without his attorney present. Detective McLeese initiated the conversation about the car.
    The Court stated the connection between the check kiting and the car was too attenuated to justify seizing the car as evidence. Citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, the court emphasized the need for a nexus between the item seized and the crime.
    The Court determined that the automobile exception did not apply because the car was not in a public place, but in a private garage. Furthermore, there was no legitimate exigency preventing the police from obtaining a warrant. The information about Knapp’s wife bringing money was obtained in violation of his right to counsel and couldn’t be used to justify exigency. As the court noted, “there was ample time between the arrival of the New York detectives in South Carolina and the time the car was to be ready to be moved for a warrant to be obtained.”
    The Court distinguished the situation with the looseleaf notebook, as the circumstances of its handover were unclear. Therefore, the People were entitled to a renewed hearing on the suppression of the notebook and its contents.

  • People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982): Right to Counsel and Police Interrogation Through Informants

    People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)

    Once a suspect is represented by counsel, the police violate the suspect’s state constitutional right to counsel when they use an informant to elicit incriminating statements, even if the suspect is not in custody.

    Summary

    Knapp was convicted of reckless murder. The key evidence included statements he made to a police informant, a signed confession, and physical evidence from his car. Prior to these events, Knapp had retained counsel who instructed the police to cease questioning him. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the police violated Knapp’s right to counsel by using an informant to circumvent the attorney’s instructions. The court suppressed the confession and physical evidence derived from the illegally obtained statements, finding that their admission was not harmless error and warranted a new trial.

    Facts

    Linda Velzy disappeared on December 9, 1977. Knapp was questioned during the missing person investigation and agreed to a polygraph test. He was already under indictment for unrelated charges and represented by counsel, John Owen. Owen advised Knapp not to take the polygraph. Despite this, police continued questioning him until Owen explicitly directed them to cease the harassment. Subsequently, the police, through an agreement with an informant (Hitt, who had pending felony charges), recorded conversations with Knapp where Knapp requested an alibi. Eventually, Knapp confessed to Hitt that he had killed Velzy. Hitt alerted the police, who then set up a stakeout and arrested Knapp as he was moving Velzy’s body.

    Procedural History

    The Otsego County Grand Jury indicted Knapp on two counts of second-degree murder. The trial court denied Knapp’s motion to suppress his statements to Hitt, his signed confession, and evidence from his car. At trial, Hitt testified about Knapp’s confession. Knapp was convicted of reckless murder. The Appellate Division agreed that the signed confession was obtained in violation of Knapp’s right to counsel but affirmed the conviction, deeming the error harmless. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated Knapp’s State constitutional right to counsel by using a paid informant to elicit incriminating statements after Knapp had retained counsel and his attorney had instructed the police to cease questioning him?

    Whether physical evidence obtained as a result of those illegally obtained statements should have been suppressed?

    Holding

    Yes, because the police knowingly circumvented Knapp’s right to counsel by using Hitt as their agent to obtain incriminating statements, violating Knapp’s State constitutional right to counsel.

    Yes, because the physical evidence was derived directly from the illegally obtained statements and is therefore inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that once an attorney has entered a proceeding, the police cannot use an informant to circumvent the suspect’s right to counsel. The court emphasized that Hitt was acting as an agent of the police when he elicited the incriminating statements from Knapp. Because the statements were obtained in violation of Knapp’s right to counsel, they were inadmissible. Citing Wong Sun v. United States, the court extended this exclusion to the physical evidence obtained as a result of the illegally obtained statements, applying the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. The court rejected the argument that the error was harmless, stating that the illegally obtained evidence formed the core of the prosecution’s case. The court also declined to consider a “missing-person-emergency exception” to the right to counsel, as it was not raised in the lower courts. The Court stated, “In employing Hitt as their agent to obtain incriminating statements from defendant who was represented by counsel, the police violated defendant’s State constitutional right to counsel.”

  • People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689 (1981): Warrantless Home Searches and the “Exigent Circumstances” Exception

    People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689 (1981)

    A warrantless search of a home is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception, and the burden of proving such an exception rests on the government; the “exigent circumstances” exception requires a showing of urgent events making it impossible to obtain a warrant in time to preserve evidence, and this exception is strictly limited by the necessities of the situation.

    Summary

    Warren Knapp was convicted of drug possession and sale. The police, using an informant, arranged a controlled buy at Knapp’s home. After arresting Knapp, the police conducted a warrantless search of his bedroom and basement, seizing additional drugs and lab equipment. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial seizure in the kitchen was lawful as a search incident to arrest. However, the subsequent searches of the bedroom and basement were unconstitutional because they were not justified by exigent circumstances, plain view, inevitable discovery, or harmless error. The Court emphasized the heightened protection afforded to homes under the Fourth Amendment and the necessity of obtaining a warrant absent a true emergency.

    Facts

    Frederick Botway, a police informant, assisted Warren Knapp in manufacturing methaqualone in Knapp’s basement. Knapp planned to sell the drugs. Botway informed Detective Sievers, who arranged a controlled buy. Sievers and Botway arrived at Knapp’s home, where Knapp showed them two plates of drugs in the kitchen. Knapp mentioned more drugs and capsules were in his bedroom. Sievers signaled other officers, who entered and arrested Knapp. After securing the house, officers searched Knapp’s bedroom and seized additional drugs. A later search of the basement, about an hour after the arrest, revealed a drug lab.

    Procedural History

    Knapp was convicted in County Court after his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his home was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Knapp appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the warrantless searches violated his constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the warrantless search of Knapp’s kitchen was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest?

    2. Whether the warrantless search of Knapp’s bedroom and basement was justified by exigent circumstances, plain view, inevitable discovery, or harmless error?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the kitchen search was a limited search of the area within Knapp’s immediate control during a lawful arrest.

    2. No, because there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless searches of the bedroom and basement, and the plain view, inevitable discovery, and harmless error doctrines do not apply.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the kitchen search was permissible under the search-incident-to-arrest exception, allowing a limited search of the arrestee’s person and the area within their immediate control to prevent resistance or destruction of evidence, citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). However, the Court found the subsequent searches of the bedroom and basement unconstitutional. The Court emphasized the strong protection afforded to homes under the Fourth Amendment, stating that “a warrantless search of an individual’s home is per se unreasonable and hence unconstitutional.”

    The Court rejected the “exigent circumstances” argument because the police had ample time to obtain a warrant before the arrest, and there was no immediate threat of destruction of evidence after Knapp was secured. The Court noted, “before the police here undertook their search of either the bedroom or the basement, it is clear that any urgency was gone.”

    The “plain view” exception was inapplicable because the warrantless entry into the bedroom and basement was not justified. The “inevitable discovery” doctrine also failed because the People did not demonstrate an independent means of obtaining the evidence. The Court stated, “Were the rule otherwise, every warrant-less nonexigent seizure automatically would be legitimatized by assuming the hypothetical alternative that a warrant had been obtained.”

    Finally, the Court concluded that the admission of the illegally seized evidence was not harmless error, as the jury’s initial deadlock suggested that the evidence may have contributed to Knapp’s conviction.

  • People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982): Police Knowledge of Representation Trumps Attorney’s Limited Role

    People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)

    Once the police are aware that a suspect has retained counsel in connection with the charges under investigation, they cannot question the suspect in the absence of counsel, regardless of the specific terms of the attorney-client relationship known to the police.

    Summary

    The defendant, believing he was a suspect in a homicide, retained an attorney who arranged his surrender to the police. The police, aware of the attorney’s involvement, took the defendant into custody and obtained incriminating statements after a Miranda waiver, but without the attorney present. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statements should have been suppressed because the police knew the defendant had retained counsel, and the exact scope of the attorney’s representation was irrelevant to the police conduct, since they had no specific knowledge of its limitations. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding, preventing police from exploiting ambiguities in the attorney-client relationship.

    Facts

    The defendant believed he was wanted by police for a homicide investigation and consulted an attorney.

    The attorney contacted the police, confirmed they were looking for the defendant, and arranged for his surrender.

    The police took the defendant into custody at the attorney’s office.

    At the police station, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, waived them, and made incriminating statements without counsel present.

    The attorney had only agreed to arrange the surrender, but the police were unaware of this limitation.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the statements.

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The Appellate Division modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police could question the defendant in the absence of counsel when they knew the defendant was represented by counsel at the time of arrest, but did not know that the attorney had only agreed to arrange the defendant’s surrender to the police.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police were aware that the defendant had retained counsel, and the scope of the attorney’s representation, as known to the police, did not negate the defendant’s right to have counsel present during questioning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the principle established in People v. Hobson, which protects a defendant’s right to counsel once an attorney has entered the proceeding. The Court stated that it has “attached little significance to the contractual arrangements between the defendant and his attorney in determining whether the defendant’s right to counsel has been violated during custodial interrogation.” It emphasized that the key factor is the police’s awareness of an attorney’s appearance on the defendant’s behalf.

    The Court noted that the police were aware that the defendant had sought and retained counsel, and that the attorney had arranged the surrender. While the attorney’s representation may have technically terminated prior to questioning, the police were not aware of that limited arrangement. The Court reasoned that consulting a lawyer and surrendering with counsel present manifests the defendant’s view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, quoting Michigan v. Mosley: ” ‘his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice’ (Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96, 110, 2 [White, J., concurring]).”

    The Court extended the protection of Hobson to situations where the police are generally aware of representation, even if the exact scope of that representation is unclear, emphasizing that the police should not exploit ambiguities in the attorney-client relationship to justify questioning without counsel present.

  • People v. Knapp, 48 N.Y.2d 256 (1979): Warrantless Arrests at Home and Voluntariness of Statements

    48 N.Y.2d 256 (1979)

    A warrantless arrest in a suspect’s home is permissible if there is probable cause, and statements made following the arrest are admissible if knowingly and voluntarily obtained; severance motions are properly denied if the co-defendant testifies, obviating Bruton concerns.

    Summary

    Knapp was convicted of second-degree murder for the homicide of a service station attendant. Prior to trial, he unsuccessfully sought to suppress statements and physical evidence obtained from his home and car, arguing his warrantless arrest was unlawful and his statements were involuntary. He also sought a severance, which was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the warrantless arrest was proper given probable cause, his statements and consent to search were voluntary, and the co-defendant’s testimony cured any Bruton violation. This case clarifies the permissible scope of warrantless home arrests and the admissibility of subsequent statements.

    Facts

    Anthony Caputo, a service station attendant, was murdered. Knapp and Frederick Cunningham were arrested and charged with the crime. Prior to trial, Knapp moved to suppress statements he made to police and physical evidence seized from his home and car, alleging an unlawful warrantless arrest and involuntary statements. He also sought to sever his trial from Cunningham’s. The suppression motion and severance motion were denied.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Knapp of two counts of second-degree murder. Knapp appealed the conviction, arguing the denial of his suppression and severance motions were erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. Knapp then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a warrantless arrest in the defendant’s home is permissible when police have probable cause.

    2. Whether the defendant’s statements and consent to search were knowingly and voluntarily obtained.

    3. Whether the denial of the defendant’s motion to sever was erroneous in light of Bruton v. United States.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because in the absence of any contention that the police lacked probable cause to arrest, the warrantless arrest at the defendant’s home was proper.

    2. Yes, because the record supports the lower courts’ findings that the statements and consent to search were knowingly and voluntarily obtained.

    3. No, because any objection based on Bruton v. United States was obviated when the co-defendant testified.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. Regarding the warrantless arrest, the court cited People v. Payton, stating that in the absence of a challenge to probable cause, a warrantless home arrest is permissible. The court also found that the record contained sufficient support for the hearing court’s finding, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that Knapp’s statements and consent to search were knowingly and voluntarily obtained, citing People v. Glass. Finally, the court addressed the severance issue, noting that the co-defendant Cunningham’s testimony negated any potential Bruton violation. The court referenced People v. Anthony, stating that the Bruton rule, which prohibits the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant, does not apply when the co-defendant testifies. The court emphasized that the lower courts made factual findings, supported by the record, regarding the voluntariness of Knapp’s statements and consent, and the Court of Appeals deferred to those findings. The court focused on established precedent, emphasizing that its role is not to re-weigh the evidence but to determine if there was sufficient support for the lower courts’ conclusions. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions.

  • People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982): Consent to Search After Request for Counsel

    People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)

    Once a suspect in custody requests counsel, any subsequent consent to a warrantless search obtained in the absence of counsel is invalid, even if the consent appears voluntary.

    Summary

    Knapp was arrested for grand larceny, and after being read his Miranda rights, stated he would get a lawyer. The police ceased questioning about the crime but asked Knapp if they could look around his property. Knapp agreed and signed a consent form. The search revealed stolen materials. The New York Court of Appeals held that Knapp’s consent was invalid because it was obtained after he requested counsel but before he had the opportunity to consult with an attorney. The court reasoned that the right to counsel is just as important when police seek a waiver of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches as when they seek a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. The evidence obtained during the search was therefore suppressed.

    Facts

    Deputy Sheriff Price arrested Knapp for grand larceny based on information about ongoing thefts.

    Price advised Knapp of his Miranda rights, and Knapp indicated he understood them.

    Another officer testified that Knapp stated, “You’re damn right, I’m going to have a lawyer.”

    Sergeant Fikar arrived and, after confirming Knapp was advised of his rights, asked about building materials on the property.

    Knapp stated he wanted to speak to his attorney before making any statement.

    Fikar then asked if Knapp minded if he looked around, and Knapp said “no” and signed a consent to search form after being told he had the right to refuse.

    A search of the property revealed stolen building materials.

    After the initial search, Knapp again requested his attorney and was allowed to call him. The attorney arrived but did not object to the search.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied Knapp’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the consent was voluntary based on People v. Gonzalez.

    Knapp pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the second degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a consent to a warrantless search is valid when obtained after a suspect in custody has requested counsel but before counsel is provided.

    Holding

    No, because once a suspect requests counsel, the police cannot seek a waiver of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures until the suspect has been permitted access to counsel, and any consent obtained before then is legally ineffectual.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no basis to distinguish between obtaining a statement and obtaining consent to a search after a defendant’s request for an attorney. Quoting Miranda v. Arizona, the court emphasized that “If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”

    The court reasoned that the right to counsel is just as important when police seek a relinquishment of the constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures as when they seek a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.

    The court found that the police did not “scrupulously honor” Knapp’s request for counsel. Instead, they merely shifted their focus from obtaining oral statements to eliciting consent to search. Because the defendant had requested counsel twice, the police were constitutionally prohibited from seeking his consent to the search before he had access to counsel.

    The court rejected the argument that the attorney’s later arrival and failure to object validated the search, stating the attorney “could not then undo what had already been accomplished”. The court reasoned that there was no evidence to support the claim that the defendant, on advice of counsel, retroactively validated the earlier unconstitutional search.

    The court cited People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366 and People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33 in support of their holding.