People v. Keeton, 73 N.Y.2d 903 (1989)

A public prosecutor should be removed only to protect a defendant from actual prejudice arising from a demonstrated conflict of interest or a substantial risk of an abuse of confidence; a mere appearance of impropriety is not enough.

Summary

Keith Keeton appealed his assault conviction, arguing that the District Attorney should have been disqualified due to a conflict of interest. Keeton and his brother were involved in a street fight with two other brothers, leading to multiple charges and cross-charges. Keeton argued that because he was a witness to the assault of his brother by one of the opposing brothers, the District Attorney had a conflict prosecuting him. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Keeton failed to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the simultaneous prosecutions.

Facts

Keith Keeton and his brother, Ben, engaged in a street fight with Thomas and James Pearson. All parties sustained injuries, and a bystander died during the altercation. Each side claimed self-defense and accused the other of aggression. The Keetons were charged with the bystander’s murder (of which they were acquitted) and assault on Thomas Pearson. James Pearson was charged with assaulting Ben Keeton. Keith Keeton was convicted of assault.

Procedural History

Before trial, Keith Keeton requested the appointment of a special prosecutor, arguing the District Attorney had a conflict of interest. The trial court denied this request. Keeton was convicted of assault. He appealed, arguing the denial of his request for a special prosecutor was reversible error. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying the defendant’s request for a special prosecutor based on an alleged conflict of interest arising from the District Attorney’s simultaneous prosecution of the defendant and the defendant’s brother’s assailant.

Holding

No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the District Attorney’s simultaneous prosecutions actually prejudiced him; a mere appearance of impropriety is insufficient for disqualification.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 55, stating that courts “should remove a public prosecutor only to protect a defendant from actual prejudice arising from a demonstrated conflict of interest or a substantial risk of an abuse of confidence.” The court emphasized that an appearance of impropriety alone is insufficient for disqualification. The court found that Keeton had not shown actual prejudice stemming from the District Attorney’s handling of the related cases. Specifically, the court noted that Keeton was not a witness in the prosecution of James Pearson, and no abuse of confidence was claimed. The court agreed with the Appellate Division that “there is no danger that the threat of subsequent prosecution exerted pressure on anyone to testify adversely to defendant. Thomas Pearson, who testified against defendant, was not charged in this incident; the target of the subsequent prosecution, James Pearson, did not testify against defendant.” Thus, absent a showing of actual prejudice or abuse of confidence, the District Attorney was not required to be disqualified.