People v. Kates, 53 N.Y.2d 591 (1981)

A blood alcohol test administered to an unconscious or incapacitated driver is admissible as evidence without express consent, and this does not violate equal protection rights.

Summary

The case concerns the admissibility of a blood alcohol test taken from an unconscious driver. Kates was involved in a fatal car accident and, while receiving treatment, police detected signs of intoxication but he was too disoriented to consent to a blood test. A test was administered without consent, revealing a high blood alcohol content. Kates sought to suppress the evidence, arguing it violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and his constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals held that the test was admissible, finding that the statute doesn’t require express consent for incapacitated drivers and that this distinction doesn’t violate equal protection, as there is a rational basis for treating conscious and unconscious drivers differently. The prosecutor’s certification of the necessity of the evidence for conviction was also upheld.

Facts

On March 3, 1979, Defendant Kates was involved in a car accident that resulted in a fatality. Police, arriving at the scene, found Kates and his passengers injured and transported to nearby hospitals. At the hospital, officers observed signs of intoxication in Kates, including the smell of alcohol and bloodshot eyes. However, Kates was so disoriented due to his injuries that he was incapable of giving or refusing consent to a blood alcohol test. Police requested a physician to draw a blood sample, which revealed a blood alcohol content of .18%. Kates was subsequently indicted for criminally negligent homicide and driving while intoxicated.

Procedural History

Kates moved to suppress the blood test results, arguing a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and his constitutional rights. The trial court granted the motion. The People appealed, certifying that the remaining evidence was insufficient to obtain a conviction. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no statutory or constitutional bar to the admissibility of the blood test results. Kates then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 requires express consent for a blood alcohol test to be administered to an unconscious or incapacitated driver.
2. Whether admitting blood alcohol test results from an unconscious or incapacitated driver without express consent violates the driver’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Whether the prosecutor properly certified that the suppressed evidence was essential to the case, allowing for an appeal of the suppression order.

Holding

1. No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 does not explicitly require express consent and implies consent for all drivers using state roads.
2. No, because there is a rational basis for distinguishing between conscious and unconscious drivers in the context of blood alcohol tests.
3. Yes, because the prosecutor’s certification is sufficient under CPL 450.50, subd 1, par [b], and does not require further appellate review.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law does not explicitly mandate express consent for blood alcohol tests. The statute implies consent for all drivers operating vehicles in the state. The exception in subdivision 2 applies only when a driver refuses to consent, which was not the case here, as Kates was incapable of consenting or refusing. The court cited the legislative history, noting the legislature’s intent to allow chemical tests for unconscious individuals, deeming them to have given consent by using the highway. The court rejected the equal protection argument, stating that the distinction between conscious and unconscious drivers is rational. The legislature reasonably sought to avoid violent confrontations by requiring consent from conscious drivers while dispensing with this requirement for incapacitated drivers who pose no threat. “Indeed there is a rational basis for distinguishing between the driver who is capable of making a choice and the driver who is unable to do so. Thus, denying the unconscious driver the right to refuse a blood test does not violate his right to equal protection.” The court also upheld the prosecutor’s right to appeal the suppression order based on their certification that the remaining evidence was insufficient for conviction, emphasizing that this assessment is best made by the prosecutor. The court stated, “the prosecutor may appeal not only where the remaining proof is legally insufficient but also where he certifies that it is ‘so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of prosecuting such charge to a conviction has been effectively destroyed’ (CPL 450.50, subd 1, par [b]).”