New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Kaiser

  • People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967): Retroactivity of Fourth Amendment Protections in Wiretapping

    People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967)

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York, which imposed stricter Fourth Amendment requirements on eavesdropping, is applied prospectively only, and wiretap evidence obtained before Berger in substantial compliance with existing constitutional standards is admissible.

    Summary

    Thomas Kaiser was convicted of coercion, attempted extortion, and conspiracy to commit extortion based on wiretap evidence. He appealed, arguing that the wiretap evidence was inadmissible because the statute authorizing the wiretap, Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Berger should be applied prospectively only and that the wiretap order in Kaiser’s case complied with existing constitutional standards at the time it was issued. The court also addressed the issue of federal preemption under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act, declining to exclude the evidence based on a perceived lack of federal enforcement.

    Facts

    Irving Holzman, an executive, was targeted for extortion. The extortionists demanded $25,000 and 25% of his business. Holzman contacted the Nassau County police, who, with his consent, recorded conversations between Holzman and Salvator Granello. Holzman’s daughter received a threatening call. Based on this, the District Attorney obtained a court order to wiretap Granello and Dino Conte’s phones. Conversations between Conte and Kaiser were recorded, implicating Kaiser in the extortion plot. Kaiser was arrested and indicted.

    Procedural History

    Kaiser was convicted in the trial court. Wiretap evidence was admitted over defense counsel’s objection. Kaiser appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction. Kaiser then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of the Chief Judge.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York, which struck down Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should be applied retroactively to exclude wiretap evidence obtained before the Berger decision.

    2. Whether wiretap evidence obtained in compliance with state law should be excluded under Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.

    Holding

    1. No, because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct, and applying Berger retroactively would not serve this purpose. The admission of the wiretap evidence did not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process.

    2. No, because the Supreme Court has held that the states are not required to exclude such evidence, and Congress did not intend to thwart state rules of evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York, which found Section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional on its face due to its broad scope and lack of procedural safeguards. However, the court determined that Berger should be applied prospectively only, relying on the standards set out in Stovall v. Denno for determining the retroactivity of constitutional rulings. These standards consider the purpose of the new rule, the reliance of law enforcement on the old standards, and the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application. The court emphasized that the wiretap order in Kaiser’s case complied with existing constitutional standards at the time it was issued, including a showing of probable cause. The court stated: “The purpose of the exclusionary rule, to which Berger made eavesdropping evidence subject, is deterrence of future police conduct. Applying Berger retroactively will not, therefore, undo the violation of the defendant’s rights which may have already taken place.”

    Regarding the Federal Communications Act, the court cited Benanti v. United States and Schwartz v. Texas, stating that due regard for federal-state relations precluded the conclusion that Congress intended to thwart a state rule of evidence. The court also noted the lack of federal enforcement of Section 605 against state officials, suggesting a policy of nullification by federal officials. It stated: “Under these circumstances we decline to hold that wiretap evidence obtained in substantial compliance with the strictest provisions of the Constitution of the United States and of this State must be excluded in criminal prosecutions in this State.”

    The court further clarified the proper procedure for obtaining wiretap orders post-Berger, requiring particularity in describing the conversations sought, provisions for a return, strict time limitations, termination as soon as the conversations are seized, and allegations of exigent circumstances justifying the waiver of notice. The court concluded by emphasizing the need for regulated intrusion to combat organized criminal activity.

  • People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967): Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception

    People v. Kaiser, 21 N.Y.2d 86 (1967)

    Evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping, even when conducted under a statute later deemed unconstitutional, is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule, including any evidence derived from it, regardless of the good faith of law enforcement officers acting under the then-valid statute.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping conducted under a New York statute that was later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York. Kaiser and others were indicted for conspiracy to commit murder and for possession of revolvers. The conversations that led to the indictment were obtained via electronic devices installed under a court order pursuant to the eavesdropping statute. The New York Court of Appeals held that, despite the police acting in good faith under a seemingly valid statute, the evidence and its fruits (the revolvers) were inadmissible, mandating suppression and dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    Defendants were indicted for conspiracy to commit murder and for possession of revolvers.
    The indictment was based on recorded conversations obtained through electronic devices installed by the police as part of a larceny investigation.
    The conversations revealed a plot to murder witnesses in the larceny investigation, involving the acquisition of deadly weapons.
    The electronic devices were installed pursuant to a court order under a New York statute that had been considered valid for many years.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motions to suppress the evidence (recorded conversations and revolvers) and dismissed the indictment.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, reinstating the indictment.
    The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence obtained through electronic eavesdropping, conducted under a statute later declared unconstitutional, is admissible in court, considering the law enforcement officers’ good faith reliance on the statute at the time of the eavesdropping.

    Holding

    No, because the subsequent invalidation of the statute renders the eavesdropping illegal from its inception, and the exclusionary rule applies to illegally obtained evidence regardless of the officers’ good faith.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the police acted in good faith under a statute they reasonably believed to be valid.
    However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. New York rendered the eavesdropping statute unconstitutional, effectively nullifying the legal basis for the police action.
    The court relied on Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the exclusionary rule to state court proceedings. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal trials.
    The court stated that “it is as if there had never been any valid authority for the police to act as they did.”
    The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct by removing the incentive to violate constitutional rights.
    Despite recognizing that the deterrence rationale is less applicable when police act in good faith, the court felt constrained to apply the exclusionary rule broadly.
    Consequently, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the motion to suppress the evidence, and dismissed the indictment.