New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Johnson

  • People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000): Obtaining Unequivocal Assurance of Juror Impartiality

    People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000)

    When potential jurors express doubts about their ability to be impartial, trial judges must obtain an unequivocal assurance of their impartiality or excuse them for cause.

    Summary

    This case consolidates appeals concerning jury selection. The central issue is whether a challenge for cause should be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt about their impartiality, absent an unequivocal indication of their ability to set aside predispositions and fairly evaluate evidence. The Court of Appeals held that in such circumstances, the challenge for cause must be granted. The Court reasoned that the right to an impartial jury is fundamental, and when a juror expresses doubt, an explicit assurance of impartiality is required. Failure to obtain such assurance constitutes reversible error.

    Facts

    In People v. Johnson and Sharper, the defendants were tried for robbery. A prospective juror stated he had a friend in the DA’s office, dealt with prisoners and police officers, and had a great deal of trust and respect for police officers. He admitted he would favor police testimony more than civilian testimony. In People v. Reyes, the defendant was tried for selling heroin. A prospective juror expressed concern about drug activity near her son’s park, stating her emotional feelings might color her views and that she might have difficulty being open-minded due to the defendant’s prior convictions.

    Procedural History

    In Johnson and Sharper, the trial court denied the challenge for cause, the defendants used a peremptory challenge, exhausted all challenges, and were convicted. The Appellate Division reversed. In Reyes, the trial court denied challenges for cause and the defendant again used peremptory challenges, exhausted them, and was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a challenge for cause may properly be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt as to their impartiality in the case.
    2. Whether an unequivocal indication of a prospective juror’s ability to set aside any predisposition and fairly appraise the evidence is necessary before denying a challenge for cause.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.
    2. Yes, because in cases of “actual bias,” an unambiguous assurance of impartiality is required before a challenge for cause may be denied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that an accused’s right to trial by an impartial jury is a fundamental constitutional right. When potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must in some form give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence. The Court emphasized that the elimination of the “talismanic expurgatory oath” requirement in the Criminal Procedure Law gave trial judges both “greater flexibility and a greater responsibility” in determining which venirepersons should be excused for cause.

    The Court distinguished People v. Blyden, where a juror’s statement was deemed insufficient, and People v. Williams, where the jurors never expressed doubt that they could serve impartially. The Court quoted People v. Torpey, stating that “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions might influence his verdict.” (People v Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361). The Court held that a bright-line standard exists: “a prospective juror who expresses partiality towards [one side] and cannot unequivocally promise to set aside this bias should be removed for cause.”

    In the cases at bar, the Court found that the potential jurors had openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case. The Court also noted that despite the Trial Judge stating that the jurors had expressed that they could be fair, the record did not support this statement. Therefore, the judges erred in failing to obtain unequivocal assurances, or excusing potential jurors for cause, when they openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case.

  • People v. Johnson, 89 N.Y.2d 905 (1996): Limits on Accepting Guilty Pleas to Unrelated Offenses

    People v. Johnson, 89 N.Y.2d 905 (1996)

    A guilty plea to a crime that is neither charged in the indictment nor a lesser included offense of a charged crime is invalid, undermining the statutory framework governing plea bargains.

    Summary

    Johnson was convicted of attempted aggravated assault under one indictment. Separately, he pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance to satisfy charges of criminal possession of a controlled substance under a second, unrelated indictment. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea to criminal sale because it was not a lesser included offense of criminal possession, and no factual relationship existed between the sale and possession charges. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the statutory limitations on guilty pleas outlined in CPL Article 220 to maintain the integrity of the plea bargaining process.

    Facts

    Johnson was charged under two separate indictments. The first indictment concerned charges for attempted aggravated assault, resulting in a conviction. The second indictment contained charges for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees. Instead of proceeding to trial on the possession charges, Johnson pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, which was intended to satisfy the second indictment entirely. The plea colloquy did not reveal any factual connection between the criminal sale and the criminal possession counts, except that the offenses occurred on the same date and involved cocaine.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed Johnson’s conviction under both indictments. Two justices dissented regarding the second indictment, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea to criminal sale, as it was not a lesser included offense of the possession charges. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted Johnson leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court has jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea to an offense (criminal sale of a controlled substance) that is not charged in the indictment and is not a lesser included offense of the crimes charged (criminal possession of a controlled substance), when there is no apparent factual relationship between the offenses.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL Article 220 strictly governs the acceptance of guilty pleas, and the plea to criminal sale violated these constraints as it was neither a charged offense nor a lesser included offense of the charged possession crimes. The plea colloquy did not establish any factual connection that would justify the acceptance of the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the provisions of CPL Article 220, which govern the acceptance of guilty pleas. The Court emphasized that CPL 220.10 specifies that “[t]he only kinds of pleas which may be entered to an indictment are those specified in this section.” Under CPL 220.10(4), a defendant may only plead guilty to one or more of the offenses charged or to lesser included offenses. Criminal sale is not a lesser included offense of criminal possession under the general statutory definition (CPL 1.20[37]) or under the specific extensions listed in CPL 220.20(1)(i). The court acknowledged two narrow exceptions to these restrictions established in People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150 (1967), but determined that these exceptions were not applicable in this case. Expanding these exceptions, the Court reasoned, would undermine the legislative policy of limiting plea bargains to offenses directly related to the charges. The Court stated, “A different result would undermine the legislative policy of article 220 to place limitations on plea bargains deviating from the crimes charged.”

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 730 (1992): Requiring Wade Hearings for Showup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 730 (1992)

    A Wade hearing is required to determine if a showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive, unless it falls under a recognized exception such as a confirmatory identification.

    Summary

    Following a robbery, the victim identified the defendant in a showup after police apprehended him in a building. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding, without a Wade hearing, that the identification was free from police suggestion. The Court emphasized that even though the victim initiated the pursuit of the suspect, the showup did not automatically qualify as a confirmatory identification. The court remitted the case for a Wade hearing to determine whether the showup was unduly suggestive, highlighting the potential for police influence during the pursuit and waiting period.

    Facts

    A robbery victim and his sister informed nearby police officers that he had been robbed of jewelry, allegedly at gunpoint, in his building’s elevator. The victim accompanied the officers in their marked police car, canvassing the adjacent block. The victim identified a person he believed to be the robber. As the police approached in their vehicle, the suspect, wearing a brown sheepskin jacket and a black baseball hat, fled into an apartment building. An officer pursued the suspect on foot. Backup officers arrived and searched the building. The jacket and hat were found on the third floor. The defendant was apprehended in the stairwell and presented to the victim on the ground floor landing, where the victim identified him. Neither a gun nor the stolen jewelry was recovered.

    Procedural History

    The trial court concluded, without holding a Wade hearing, that the victim’s identification was free of police suggestion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court for a Wade hearing. If the hearing determined police suggestiveness tainted the showup, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial; otherwise, the judgment of conviction and sentence should be amended to reflect the hearing’s result.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Wade hearing is required to determine if a showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive when, after a robbery, the victim identifies the defendant in a showup after police apprehended him in a building, even though the victim initially pointed out the defendant to the police.

    Holding

    Yes, because the showup identification procedure does not automatically fall into the category of confirmatory identifications, and a hearing is necessary to determine if police suggestiveness tainted the procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in determining the identification was free from police suggestion without holding a Wade hearing. The court noted that even though the victim initiated the police chase, the subsequent showup did not automatically qualify as a confirmatory identification, which is a recognized exception to the Wade hearing requirement. The court emphasized the need to examine the circumstances surrounding the identification to determine if it was unduly suggestive. The court stated, “Absent a hearing, it is impossible to discern whether the police had any influence on the victim during the pursuit immediately following the robbery, or to evaluate the effect on the identification procedure of the time the victim spent waiting in the police car outside the building while the police were searching for the perpetrator inside, or to determine the circumstances of the showup itself.” The court further stated, “Therefore, the courts below had no basis to determine that the police-arranged showup was free of taint, and that the victim was impervious to police suggestion.” Because the circumstances surrounding the showup identification were unclear, the Court found that a Wade hearing was necessary to determine if the procedure resulted in an unduly suggestive identification. The court distinguished the case from situations involving confirmatory identifications, where the witness has prior familiarity with the defendant, making a Wade hearing unnecessary.

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 980 (1993): Prohibition Against Providing Statutory Text to Deliberating Jury

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 980 (1993)

    CPL 310.30 prohibits providing copies of statutory text to a deliberating jury without the consent of all parties.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that a trial court commits reversible error when it provides the jury with a written copy of the entire jury charge, including statutory text, over the defendant’s objection. This is a violation of CPL 310.30, which prohibits giving copies of statutory text to a deliberating jury without the consent of all parties. The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon, but the conviction was overturned due to the trial court’s error in providing the full written charge to the jury during deliberations.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree after a jury trial. During jury deliberations, the jury requested a written copy of the court’s entire charge. The trial court, over the defendant’s objections, complied with this request.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that providing the written charge was error, and ordered a new trial. A Justice of the Appellate Division dissented from the reversal. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of the dissenting Justice.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in providing the deliberating jury with a written copy of the entire jury charge, which included statutory text, over the defendant’s objection, in violation of CPL 310.30.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 310.30 prohibits giving copies of statutory text to a deliberating jury without the consent of the parties, and the defendant expressly objected to providing the entire charge in writing, which included statutory material.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 310.30 specifically prohibits providing copies of statutory text to a deliberating jury unless all parties consent. The court emphasized that the statute’s allowance for the jury to request further instruction or information on pertinent matters does not override the specific prohibition against providing statutory text. The Court distinguished between answering specific questions from the jury and providing the entire written charge, which included statutory material that is forbidden. Since the entire written jury instruction included statutory text, the Appellate Division correctly concluded that providing it over the defendant’s objection constituted reversible error.

    The court cited prior cases, including People v Taylor, 76 NY2d 873; People v Nimmons, 72 NY2d 830; and People v Owens, 69 NY2d 585, to support the holding that providing statutory text to the jury without consent is reversible error.

    The Court directly quoted the statute noting CPL 310.30 prohibits giving “copies of the text of any statute” to a deliberating jury without the consent of the parties.

  • People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 831 (1993): Limits on Admissibility of Showup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 831 (1993)

    A showup identification is impermissible if conducted hours after the crime, with both the complainant and the defendant transported to the crime scene; in such circumstances, a properly conducted lineup is required.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that a showup identification conducted hours after the robbery, with both the complainant and the defendant being transported to the crime scene, was improper. The Court emphasized that while prompt showup identifications are permissible when suspects are captured at or near the crime scene, the identification in this case lacked the necessary immediacy. The Court determined that under these circumstances, a properly conducted lineup was required to ensure a fair identification process.

    Facts

    A postman was robbed of a gold chain and pendant in the lobby of an apartment building. The postman chased the perpetrator, who was carrying a knife, but eventually abandoned the pursuit. He reported the incident to a security guard and police. Later that day, police apprehended the defendant near his home, which was close to the crime scene. The police then transported the postman back to the apartment building, informing him that they had a suspect in custody and were taking him back for a positive identification. The postman, seated in a police vehicle, identified the defendant, who was in handcuffs and civilian clothing, as the robber.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the showup identification, arguing it was unduly suggestive. The hearing court denied the motion. The identification was introduced at trial, and the complainant also made an in-court identification. The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and resisting arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a showup identification, conducted hours after the crime and involving the transportation of both the complainant and the defendant to the crime scene, is an impermissible identification procedure.

    Holding

    Yes, because showup identifications are strongly disfavored and are only permissible under exigent circumstances or when suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and viewed immediately. A showup hours after the crime, with both parties transported to the scene, does not meet this standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that showup identifications are inherently suggestive and should only be employed when justified by exigent circumstances or the immediacy of the capture. Citing People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 529, the court reiterated that showups are permissible “if the suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and can be viewed by the witness immediately.” Here, the showup lacked the requisite immediacy, as it occurred hours after the crime and involved the transportation of both the complainant and the defendant. The Court emphasized that the focus should be on the promptness of the identification after the crime, not after the arrest. Given these circumstances, the Court concluded that an appropriately conducted lineup was necessary to ensure a fair identification process. The Court noted that while the limits of an appropriate time period between the alleged crime and a showup identification may vary from case to case, “the emphasis must be upon the prompt and immediate nature of an identification after the crime has been committed, not, as the People argue, after the defendant has been arrested.” The admission of the showup identification at trial was therefore deemed prejudicial, warranting a new trial.

  • People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992): Harmless Error and Lineup Identifications

    People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992)

    When a key eyewitness’s testimony is internally contradictory and inconsistent, and the prosecutor emphasizes an erroneously admitted lineup identification, the error cannot be deemed harmless, even if an independent source for the in-court identification exists.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The defendant was convicted of murder and related crimes based largely on an eyewitness identification. The court agreed that the lineup identification testimony should have been suppressed. However, the court found that the error was not harmless because the eyewitness testimony was inconsistent, and the prosecutor heavily relied on the inadmissible lineup evidence. The existence of an independent source for the in-court identification did not automatically render the error harmless.

    Facts

    The defendant and a co-defendant were convicted of murder in the second degree and related criminal counts after a jury trial. The primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of an eyewitness who identified him in a lineup and in court.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reviewed the case and agreed that the lineup identification testimony should have been suppressed but did not find the error to be harmful. The dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division level argued the error was not harmless. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the erroneous admission of an eyewitness’s lineup identification testimony was harmless error, given that the eyewitness’s testimony was internally contradictory and inconsistent, and the prosecutor emphasized the inadmissible lineup evidence.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction; therefore, it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the eyewitness’s testimony, being the sole evidence directly linking the defendant to the crime, was crucial. Given the witness’s inconsistent statements and the prosecutor’s reliance on the improperly admitted lineup identification during both the opening statement and summation, the court determined the error was prejudicial. The court emphasized that the finding of an independent source for the in-court identification by the suppression court did not, by itself, overcome the prejudice. The court applied the harmless error standard articulated in People v. Crimmins, stating that it must be determined that there was “no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to defendant’s conviction and that it was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court could not conclude that this standard was met in the present case. The court distinguished this case from People v. Harris, decided the same day, suggesting that the nature and impact of the erroneously admitted evidence differed significantly. The court found that other arguments raised by the defendant lacked merit.

  • People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992): Harmless Error Analysis and In-Court Identification

    People v. Johnson, 80 N.Y.2d 798 (1992)

    When an improperly admitted lineup identification occurs, a conviction can still be upheld if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the strength of the independent source for an in-court identification and other surrounding evidentiary inferences and circumstances.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery. The victim’s lineup identification testimony was improperly admitted due to the suggestive nature of the lineup. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, deeming the error harmless due to a strong independent source for the victim’s in-court identification. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing the Appellate Division’s order affirming the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, finding the in-court identification, supported by other evidence, rendered the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, requiring a traditional and thorough harmless error analysis.

    Facts

    The defendant participated in a knife-point robbery of an elderly woman as she approached her home in Brooklyn. At trial, the victim testified about identifying the defendant in a lineup. The lineup was later determined to be suggestive, making the victim’s testimony regarding the lineup inadmissible.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, even with the improperly admitted lineup identification, citing the harmless error doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order affirming the judgment of conviction, finding the improperly admitted evidence harmless.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of the suggestive lineup identification testimony was harmless error, considering the victim’s in-court identification and other evidence presented at trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the victim’s strong, independently-evolved, non-suggestive in-court identification was supported by her sister’s testimony and other evidentiary inferences, establishing that there was no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the defendant’s conviction; thus, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division’s ultimate decision affirming the conviction. While acknowledging the error in admitting the lineup identification, the court emphasized that the strength of the independent source for the in-court identification is crucial in determining harmless error. The court found that the victim’s in-court identification was strong and reliable because it was independently evolved and non-suggestive. This in-court identification was further supported by her sister’s testimony and other surrounding evidentiary inferences and circumstances presented at trial. The Court applied the harmless error standard articulated in People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, concluding that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed to the conviction. The court distinguished this case from others, such as People v. Coates, 74 N.Y.2d 244 and People v. Dodt, 61 N.Y.2d 408, where the errors were deemed not harmless. The court cited People v Owens, 74 NY2d 677 in support of their decision. The Court held that the error in admitting the lineup identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the totality of the evidence, specifically the victim’s independent in-court identification and corroborating testimony.

  • People v. Johnson, 74 N.Y.2d 856 (1989): Admissibility of Out-of-Court Identification When In-Court Identification Fails Due to Fear

    People v. Johnson, 74 N.Y.2d 856 (1989)

    An out-of-court identification is inadmissible when the witness fails to make an in-court identification not due to a lack of present recollection, but due to fear of reprisal.

    Summary

    Johnson was convicted of assault based on shooting a taxi driver. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the trial court erred in admitting the driver’s out-of-court identification because his failure to identify Johnson in court stemmed from fear, not deficient memory. The New York Court of Appeals agreed that under those circumstances, the out-of-court identification was inadmissible, remitting the case for further proceedings.

    Facts

    A taxi driver was shot. The driver identified Johnson out-of-court as the shooter. At trial, the taxi driver failed to identify Johnson. The trial court found that the complainant refused to identify the defendant in court because of fear of reprisal against him and his family. Johnson was convicted of assault in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Johnson. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the out-of-court identification inadmissible. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an out-of-court identification is admissible under CPL 60.25 when the complainant fails to make an in-court identification not due to deficient recollection, but out of fear of reprisal.

    Holding

    No, because the complainant’s failure to identify the defendant in court was not due to deficient recollection; therefore, his out-of-court identification should not have been admitted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Bayron, 66 N.Y.2d 77, which held that CPL 60.25 allows for the admission of prior identification testimony only when a witness cannot make an in-court identification because they no longer recall the defendant. The court distinguished the situation where the witness *can* presently recall the perpetrator, but refuses to identify them in court for some other reason, such as fear. Because the trial court explicitly found the complainant’s failure to identify Johnson in court stemmed from fear, not deficient recollection, the out-of-court identification was inadmissible. The court noted the trial court’s misapprehension that “complainant’s out-of-court identification was admissible even though the complainant refused to identify the defendant at trial because of fear.” The court thus clarified the boundaries of admissible out-of-court identifications under CPL 60.25 and 60.30, reinforcing the principle that a witness’s fear-based refusal to identify the defendant in court renders prior identifications inadmissible. This promotes fairness by preventing convictions based on extrajudicial statements when the witness is unwilling to make a positive identification at trial due to intimidation or other reasons besides memory failure.

  • People v. Johnson, 63 N.Y.2d 888 (1984): Parole Officer Search and Seizure

    People v. Johnson, 63 N.Y.2d 888 (1984)

    A parole officer’s search of a parolee’s apartment, conducted with police assistance after an arrest on a parole warrant, is permissible if it is in furtherance of parole purposes and related to the officer’s duty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, which overturned the defendant’s forgery conviction and upheld the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The court found that the parole officer’s search of the defendant’s apartment after his arrest on a parole violation warrant was justified. The parole officer had sufficient information regarding the defendant’s potential parole violations, including a New Jersey arrest for marijuana possession, a threatening note, FBI investigation into bank robberies, and unauthorized use of a rental car. Given these circumstances, the court determined that the search was conducted in furtherance of parole purposes.

    Facts

    The defendant, Johnson, was on parole. His parole officer discovered several potential parole violations: 1) Johnson had been arrested in New Jersey for marijuana possession and was found with a note threatening a bomb. 2) The FBI was investigating Johnson for recent bank robberies. 3) Johnson was observed driving a rental car. 4) The rental car was not returned. 5) Johnson’s name was not on the rental agreement, and he was residing at an address different from that listed in the agreement.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Johnson of forgery and denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his apartment. Johnson appealed. The Appellate Division overturned the forgery conviction, finding errors related to that charge. The Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion. Both the People and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized by his parole officer from the defendant’s apartment after his arrest on a parole violation warrant.

    Holding

    No, because under the totality of the circumstances, the search of the defendant’s apartment by his parole officer, with police assistance, after his arrest on the parole warrant was in furtherance of parole purposes and related to his duty as a parole officer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals upheld the Appellate Division’s ruling, determining that the parole officer’s search was justified due to the multiple potential parole violations. The court considered the information known to the parole officer, including the New Jersey arrest, the threatening note, the FBI investigation, and the unauthorized use of the rental car. The court reasoned that, based on these circumstances, the search of the defendant’s apartment, conducted with police assistance after his arrest on the parole warrant, fell within the scope of permissible parole supervision. The court cited People v. Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, emphasizing that the search must be “in furtherance of parole purposes and related to his duty as a parole officer.” The court found no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the search met this standard, thus justifying the admission of the seized evidence.

  • People v. Johnson, 59 N.Y.2d 1014 (1983): Preserving Issues for Appeal; Alibi Defense

    People v. Johnson, 59 N.Y.2d 1014 (1983)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must raise the specific argument at trial when the alleged error can be corrected.

    Summary

    Defendant Johnson appealed his conviction, arguing that his suppression motion should have been granted and that the trial court erred in denying his request to charge the jury with respect to an alibi defense. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order. The Court held that the suppression issue was unreviewable because it involved mixed questions of law and fact supported by evidence. Additionally, the alibi defense argument was not preserved because the defendant failed to adequately inform the trial court of the basis for his request or to object to the court’s reasoning at the time of the denial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of an unspecified crime. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress certain evidence, which was denied. At trial, the defendant requested the court to charge the jury with respect to an alibi defense, based on his girlfriend’s statements and his own statement to the police. The trial court denied this request, noting that the girlfriend’s statements related to events after the victim’s death, according to the prosecution’s theory, and that there was no other evidence supporting an alibi defense.

    Procedural History

    The case was tried in a lower court, where the defendant was convicted. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion is reviewable on appeal, given that it involved mixed questions of law and fact supported by evidence.

    2. Whether the defendant preserved his claim that the trial court erred in denying his request to charge the jury with respect to an alibi defense.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court’s determinations involved mixed questions of law and fact which are supported by evidence in the record.

    2. No, because the defendant did not adequately inform the trial court of the basis for his request or object to the court’s reasoning at the time of the denial; thus, the error was not preserved for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the suppression motion issue involved mixed questions of law and fact, and because the trial court’s determinations were supported by evidence in the record, the issue was beyond review. As to the alibi defense, the Court emphasized the importance of preservation of error. The Court stated, “At the time the motion was denied the court noted that the statements of the defendant’s girlfriend did not provide an alibi because they related to events occurring after the time of the victim’s death according to the People’s theory at trial. The defendant did not dispute this conclusion at the trial nor did he object to the court’s further statement that there was no other evidence in the record supporting an alibi defense.” The Court highlighted that the defendant never informed the court of the basis for the request, specifically failing to argue that his statement to the police constituted an alibi. Because the defendant failed to bring this point to the court’s attention when the alleged error could have been corrected, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. The court implicitly underscores the importance of giving the trial court the opportunity to correct its own errors.