New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Jackson

  • People v. Jackson, No. 22 (N.Y. 2017): Preservation of Sandoval Challenges and Waiver of Antommarchi Rights

    People v. Jackson, No. 22 (N.Y. March 28, 2017)

    To preserve a challenge to a trial court’s Sandoval ruling, a party must make a specific and timely objection at the time of the ruling or when the court has an opportunity to change it, unless the court expressly decides the issue raised on appeal in response to a protest. A defendant can waive their right to be present at sidebar conferences.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two primary issues in People v. Jackson: (1) whether the defendant preserved for appellate review a challenge to the trial court’s Sandoval ruling, which permitted the prosecution to introduce the fact of a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication, and (2) whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences during jury selection. The Court held that the defendant’s challenge to the Sandoval ruling was unpreserved because he failed to make a specific objection. The Court further held that the defendant had validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division order.

    Facts

    The defendant was prosecuted on charges arising from unrelated sexual attacks on two female acquaintances. Prior to trial, the prosecution sought permission to question the defendant, if he testified, about prior convictions and bad acts. During a Sandoval/Molineux hearing, the defendant opposed the prosecution’s request, arguing that the prior offenses were juvenile offenses. The court ruled that the prosecution could elicit that the defendant had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and received probation, but not the facts underlying the adjudication. The defendant did not object. Later, during a People v. Antommarchi hearing, the court informed the defendant of his right to be present during sidebar conversations, but he could waive the right to avoid being seen in custody by the jury. The defendant signed a written waiver of his right to be present.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of predatory sexual assault and criminal sexual act in the first degree. The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life on the predatory sexual assault conviction and 25 years on the criminal sexual act conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, concluding that the Sandoval ruling was harmless error and the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant preserved for appellate review his challenge to the trial court’s Sandoval ruling.
    2. Whether the defendant validly waived his right to be present at sidebar conferences.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to make a specific and timely objection to the Sandoval ruling.
    2. Yes, because the record showed that the defendant was informed of his rights, consulted with his attorney, and signed a written waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals explained that a challenge based on a Sandoval error must be preserved for appellate review by a specific and timely objection. To preserve an issue, counsel must register an objection and apprise the court of the grounds for the objection. The Court found that the defendant’s challenge to the Sandoval ruling was unpreserved because the defendant did not argue at the hearing that it would be legal error to permit the prosecution to elicit that he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. The defendant merely argued that the actions should not be judged based on a young offender’s undeveloped mind. Since the defendant did not object, the trial court had no opportunity to change its ruling and avoid the alleged error. The Court also held that the trial court did not expressly decide the issue of whether it was erroneous to allow the prosecution to introduce the fact of the juvenile adjudication because the objection wasn’t based on the legal prohibition.

    Regarding the waiver of the right to be present at sidebar conferences, the Court cited People v. Antommarchi and noted that a defendant has the right to be present. However, a defendant may waive this right. The Court found that the defendant validly waived his rights because he was informed of his right to be present, consulted with his attorney, and signed a written waiver.

    Practical Implications

    This case emphasizes the importance of making specific and timely objections to preserve issues for appellate review. Attorneys must clearly articulate the legal basis for their objections to provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct any errors. If counsel fails to object, the issue is not preserved, and will be unable to raise the issue on appeal. Moreover, the case confirms that a defendant can waive their right to be present at sidebar conferences if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Legal practitioners should ensure that any waivers are properly documented, with the defendant fully informed of their rights and the consequences of waiving them. If the objection is not specific, it can result in the defendant being unable to appeal a potential error made by the trial court.

  • People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d 738 (2012): Defines ‘Public Place’ for Marijuana Possession

    People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.3d 738 (2012)

    A person is in a “public place” for the purposes of criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 221.10[1]) when they are located on a highway, even if they are inside a private vehicle.

    Summary

    Samuel Jackson was arrested for marijuana possession after a traffic stop. He pleaded guilty but appealed, arguing the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally deficient because it didn’t adequately allege he was in a “public place” or that the marijuana was “open to public view,” elements of the crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that a person is in a public place when on a highway, regardless of being in a vehicle. The Court also found the allegation that the marijuana was “open to public view” was sufficiently pled. The Court reasoned that a highway is explicitly defined as a public place and that the “open to public view” element was satisfied by the officer’s observation of the defendant holding a bag of marijuana in his hand.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Jackson commit a traffic infraction while driving in Brooklyn. During the traffic stop, the officer smelled marijuana and saw Jackson holding a ziplock bag of marijuana in his hand. Further search revealed more bags of marijuana. Jackson was charged with criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, among other offenses, and pleaded guilty to the fifth-degree possession charge.

    Procedural History

    Jackson appealed his conviction to the Appellate Term, arguing the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally deficient. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a person is in a “public place” within the meaning of Penal Law § 221.10(1) when they are inside a vehicle on a public street (highway)?

    2. Whether the allegation that the marijuana was “open to public view” was sufficiently pled in the accusatory instrument?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Penal Law § 240.00(1) defines a “public place” as a place to which the public has access, including highways, and the location of the vehicle on a highway qualifies as a public place regardless of whether the individual is inside the vehicle.

    2. Yes, because the accusatory instrument alleged that the officer saw the defendant holding a bag of marijuana in his hand, which supports a reasonable inference that the marijuana was unconcealed and visible to the public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 240.00(1) defines a “public place” as “a place to which the public or a substantial group of persons has access, and includes, but is not limited to, highways.” The Court stated that the legislature made possession in a “public place” an element of criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree and incorporated a preexisting definition of the phrase from article 240. Jackson was on a highway, which is a location the legislature specifically designated as a public place. The fact that Jackson was in a car does not alter that he was on a highway and thus in a public place.

    The Court rejected the argument that personal automobiles should be excluded from the definition of “public place.” A person driving in a personal automobile will be in a public place only when the vehicle is in a location that qualifies under the statute as a public place.

    Regarding the “open to public view” element, the Court reasoned that the requirement ensures that a person carrying a small amount of concealed marijuana is not subject to misdemeanor prosecution. The Court stated that although not a model of specificity, the allegations were jurisdictionally sufficient to provide reasonable cause to believe that the marijuana was open to public view. The Court found that because the officer was standing outside the vehicle when she saw the substance in the ziplock bag, these allegations support the inference that any other member of the public could also have seen the marijuana from the same vantage point.

  • People v. Jackson, 98 N.Y.2d 555 (2002): Effect of Lost Lineup Photo on Appeal

    People v. Jackson, 98 N.Y.2d 555 (2002)

    When a lineup photograph is lost after a Wade hearing, the appellate court must determine if the exhibit is of substantial importance and whether the information it contains is otherwise available in the record; if the information is available, the loss of the exhibit does not prevent proper appellate review.

    Summary

    Ronald Jackson was convicted of robbery, assault, and weapons charges stemming from an armed robbery. The key issue on appeal was the effect of the post-Wade hearing loss of a lineup photograph on the defendant’s challenge to the hearing court’s determination that the lineup was not unduly suggestive. The Court of Appeals held that the loss of the photograph did not automatically require reversal, as long as the information contained in the photograph was otherwise available in the record for appellate review. Because a photocopy of the lineup was available and used at trial, the loss of the original photograph did not prevent meaningful appellate review.

    Facts

    Jackson and a co-defendant robbed two men at gunpoint. Police, responding to the scene, traced the getaway car to the co-defendant’s mother. They found Jackson near the car. The shooting victim described the assailant to police. A detective, noting Jackson’s age, height, and weight, arranged a lineup with four fillers of similar size and skin tone. Jackson chose his position. The detective photographed the lineup and noted the fillers’ ages. The victim identified Jackson in the lineup. Before trial, Jackson moved to suppress the identification testimony, arguing that the fillers were much older. The trial court denied the motion after examining the photograph.

    Procedural History

    The defendant and co-defendant were indicted on multiple counts of robbery and assault. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the identification testimony from a lineup. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, a detective testified the original lineup photo was misplaced; a photocopy was admitted without objection. The jury convicted Jackson on robbery, assault, and weapons counts but acquitted him of attempted murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the loss of a lineup photograph after a Wade hearing automatically requires reversal of a conviction when the defendant argues the lineup was unduly suggestive.

    2. Whether an age discrepancy between a defendant and the fillers in a lineup, without more, is sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification.

    Holding

    1. No, because an appellate court must determine if the exhibit is of ‘substantial importance’ and if the information it contains is accurately reflected in the record. If the information is reflected in the record and its accuracy is not disputed, the loss of the exhibit itself would not prevent proper appellate review.

    2. No, because an age discrepancy alone is not enough to make a lineup unduly suggestive, absent a showing of other factors that would make the defendant stand out.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that the loss of the lineup photograph did not preclude meaningful appellate review. The Court cited People v. Yavru-Sakuk, 98 N.Y.2d 56 (2002), for the principle that when a trial exhibit is lost, an appellate court must determine if the exhibit is of “substantial importance” to the issues in the case. If so, the court must then determine whether the information contained in the exhibit is accurately reflected elsewhere in the record. Here, the Court found that a photocopy of the lineup photograph, admitted into evidence at trial without objection and used by defense counsel, provided sufficient information for appellate review. The Court emphasized that “an age discrepancy between a defendant and the fillers in a lineup, without more, is not ‘sufficient to create a substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification’ (Chipp, 75 NY2d at 336).” The Court also noted that the victim never mentioned the perpetrator’s age in the description provided to police. The Court cautioned that the original lineup photograph is preferable and that counsel and trial courts should take great care in preserving exhibits that play a key role in a defendant’s case.

  • People v. Jackson, 86 N.Y.2d 784 (1995): Consequences of Failing to Act on Indictment Reduction

    86 N.Y.2d 784 (1995)

    When a trial court reduces an indictment for insufficient evidence, the prosecution can proceed on the reduced charge even if they fail to act within the 30-day stay period, but resubmitting the higher charge after 30 days requires court permission based on a showing of good cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the procedural consequences when the People fail to act within 30 days after a trial court reduces an indictment due to insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals held that failure to act within 30 days does not require dismissal of the reduced count; prosecution on that count can proceed. However, resubmitting the original, higher charge after the 30-day period requires permission from the court, granted only upon a showing of good cause. Since the People failed to resubmit the higher charge within 30 days or demonstrate good cause for the delay, and the defendant had already served a sentence exceeding the maximum for the reduced charge, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted for third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court reduced the charge to fourth-degree possession, finding insufficient evidence that the location of the weapon was not the defendant’s home or business. The court directed the People to proceed under CPL 210.20(6) and adjourned the case.

    Procedural History

    The trial court reduced the indictment. More than 30 days later, the People took no action. They then resubmitted the case to a grand jury and obtained a new indictment for attempted third-degree possession. Defendant pleaded guilty to the new indictment but later moved to withdraw the plea, arguing the re-presentment was untimely. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that re-presentment after 30 days required court permission. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People’s failure to act within the 30-day stay period following a reduction of an indictment requires dismissal of all charges.
    2. Whether the People are precluded from resubmitting the higher count after 30 days without first seeking permission from the court upon a showing of good cause.

    Holding

    1. No, because neither the language nor structure of CPL 210.20 contemplates dismissal of the reduced count as a result of the District Attorney’s failure to act within 30 days.
    2. Yes, because the statute requires the People either to resubmit the higher count within 30 days of the reduction order or, upon a showing of good cause, to seek leave of court for an extension of time in which to do so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a “stay” is a temporary suspension, not a statutory limitation. The legislature’s failure to specify dismissal as a remedy for inaction is significant, and courts should be wary of imposing such a harsh remedy absent explicit statutory direction, citing People v. Nuccio, 78 N.Y.2d 102 (1991). The purpose of the 30-day stay is to give the People time to decide how to proceed. Permitting the People to “waive” their statutory right to the stay anytime after the entry of the reduction order and before the end of the 30-day period simply by filing the reduced indictment.

    Regarding the second issue, the Court found that CPL 210.20(6)(b) is unambiguous: the People must resubmit within 30 days or obtain an extension for good cause. The People cannot rely on a common-law right to freely represent matters to a Grand Jury because the Legislature has limited this right through various provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law. “[R]esubmit the subject count or counts to the same or a different grand jury within thirty days of the entry of the order or such additional time as the court may permit upon a showing of good cause” (CPL 210.20 [6] [b]).

    The Court rejected the People’s argument that CPL 200.80 gives them an absolute right to seek a superseding indictment without court authorization, holding that the general language in CPL 200.80 cannot override the specific provisions in CPL 210.20.

  • People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638 (1991): Prejudice Requirement for Rosario Violations in Collateral Review

    People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638 (1991)

    A defendant seeking to vacate a conviction via a CPL 440.10 motion based on a Rosario violation (failure to disclose a witness’s prior statement) after exhausting direct appeals must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict.

    Summary

    Erick Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson. After his direct appeal failed, he moved to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10, alleging a Rosario violation. The prosecution had failed to disclose a memorandum containing a synopsis of an interview with a prosecution witness. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the per se error rule for Rosario violations, typically applied on direct appeal, extends to collateral review via CPL 440.10 motions. The Court held that it does not; a defendant must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the Rosario violation when seeking relief under CPL 440.10 after exhausting direct appeals, requiring a showing that the non-disclosure reasonably could have contributed to the verdict.

    Facts

    Erick Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson in connection with a fire at a supermarket that killed six firefighters.

    After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Jackson filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction.

    The motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and a Brady violation. The trial court also considered a Rosario claim.

    The People conceded that a memorandum summarizing an interview with a fire marshal, who later testified, was not provided to the defense, and that it was not a duplicative equivalent of other disclosed materials.

    Procedural History

    Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson; his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.

    Jackson then filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction, which was granted by the trial court based on a Rosario violation, applying the per se error rule.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, also applying the per se error rule.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the per se error rule applicable to Rosario violations on direct appeal extends to motions to vacate a conviction under CPL 440.10 after direct appeal has been exhausted, or whether the defendant must demonstrate prejudice.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant who has exhausted direct appeal and seeks to raise a Rosario claim via a CPL 440.10 motion must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between direct appeals and collateral attacks via CPL 440.10 motions.

    CPL 440.10(1)(f), relating to “improper and prejudicial conduct,” is the appropriate avenue for Rosario claims raised in a CPL 440.10 motion.

    CPL 440.10(1)(f) requires a showing of prejudice; the improper conduct must have affected the trial and prejudiced the defendant. “To prevail under CPL 440.10 (1) (f), however, a defendant must do more than demonstrate that the conduct at issue was improper. The statute by its very terms affords a remedy only if the defendant’s trial was affected by conduct that was both improper and prejudicial.”

    The per se error rule developed in Rosario cases on direct appeal was a policy decision, balancing defendant’s rights against society’s. However, CPL 440.10 requires a showing of prejudice, reflecting society’s interest in the finality of judgments.

    The Court adopted a “reasonable possibility” standard for prejudice, requiring the defendant to show that the failure to disclose the Rosario material “contributed to the verdict.” This aligns with the standard in Rosario itself and with Brady claims where a specific request was made.

    The Court emphasized that the per se error rule continues to apply to Rosario claims on direct appeal and when a Rosario claim is raised concurrently on direct appeal and in a CPL 440.10 motion (per People v. Novoa).

    The Court rejected the dissent’s view that the procedural distinction was arbitrary, emphasizing that it was an effort to balance the rights of the defendant against the interests of society, particularly the interest in the finality of judgments, given the lack of a time limit on CPL 440.10 motions.

  • People v. Jackson, 76 N.Y.2d 908 (1990): Preserving Objections on Jury Instructions for Appellate Review

    76 N.Y.2d 908 (1990)

    To preserve an objection to a jury instruction for appellate review, the objection must be specific enough to alert the trial court to the alleged error and allow for corrective action.

    Summary

    In People v. Jackson, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the defendant adequately preserved his objection to the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt. The trial court had defined reasonable doubt as a doubt for which jurors could give a reason. On appeal, the defendant argued that this instruction diluted the prosecution’s burden of proof. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s objection at trial was insufficient to preserve the specific argument he raised on appeal, because the original objection was not based on the same grounds raised on appeal.

    Facts

    During the trial, the judge instructed the jury on the concept of reasonable doubt, stating twice that a reasonable doubt was a doubt for which the jurors would be able to give a reason. The judge further illustrated this point by using the jurors’ names in an example.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the conviction was affirmed. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s objection to the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review, specifically regarding his claim that the instruction diluted the People’s burden of proof.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s objection at trial did not specifically argue that the instruction diluted the People’s burden of proof by conveying a requirement that the doubting juror must give reasons supported by evidence. The argument made on appeal was different than the grounds for objection raised at the trial level.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a specific objection at trial. The objection must be sufficiently detailed to alert the trial court to the perceived error and provide an opportunity for correction. The Court found that the defendant’s objection at trial, which focused on the instruction unfairly punishing less articulate jurors, was distinct from his appellate argument that the instruction diluted the People’s burden of proof. Because the defendant’s initial objection did not fairly apprise the court of the argument he later raised on appeal, the issue was not preserved for review. The court essentially held that an objection must be based on the same legal grounds at trial as it is on appeal.

  • People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 1036 (1979): Consecutive Sentencing After Guilty Plea to Manslaughter

    People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 1036 (1979)

    A defendant who pleads guilty to a lesser charge to avoid a greater charge cannot later challenge the sentence by arguing as if he had been convicted of the greater charge.

    Summary

    Defendant Jackson was indicted for felony murder. After a hung jury in the first trial, he pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter. He was sentenced to consecutive terms for burglary and manslaughter. He then appealed, arguing that the sentences should run concurrently because the burglary was a material element of felony murder, and thus, under Penal Law § 70.25(2), the sentences must be concurrent. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, not felony murder, he could not claim the benefit of the concurrent sentencing rule that would apply to a felony murder conviction. He bargained for a lesser sentence and could not later argue that the sentence was illegal as if he had been convicted of the greater charge.

    Facts

    Defendant was indicted for felony murder. The first trial ended with a hung jury on the felony murder charge. Prior to a second trial, the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree in satisfaction of the felony murder indictment. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive terms for his burglary conviction and the manslaughter plea.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed the sentence, arguing that consecutive sentences were illegal under Penal Law § 70.25(2). The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether consecutive sentences for burglary and manslaughter are illegal when the defendant pleads guilty to manslaughter in satisfaction of a felony murder indictment, where burglary would have been a material element of felony murder.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, not felony murder, he cannot claim the benefit of the concurrent sentencing rule applicable to felony murder. The Court reasoned that the plea bargain waived the right to argue the sentence as if he had been convicted of felony murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, thereby avoiding the risk of a felony murder conviction. The court reasoned that although the burglary would be a material element of felony murder, it is not a material element of manslaughter. Therefore, Penal Law § 70.25(2), which requires concurrent sentences when one act constitutes two offenses or is a material element of another, does not apply because the defendant was not convicted of felony murder.

    The court stated: “Defendant bargained for the benefits he thought would flow from pleading guilty to manslaughter, a crime which mandates a lesser sentence than felony murder. He cannot now seek to benefit from the statutory protection he arguably would have received pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 70.25 of the Penal Law if he had risked conviction or entered a plea on the felony murder charge.”

    Furthermore, the court cited People v. Clairborne, 29 N.Y.2d 950, 951, stating the bargained plea “makes unnecessary a factual basis for the particular crime.” The court also relied on People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 154, stating that even if a plea is theoretically inconsistent with the crime charged, “such a plea should be sustained on the ground that it was sought by defendant and freely taken as part of a bargain which was struck for the defendant’s benefit.”

    The court emphasized that a defendant cannot accept the benefits of a plea bargain (a lesser charge and sentence) and then attempt to invalidate the sentence by arguing as if he had been convicted of the greater charge he avoided.

  • People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171 (1978): Search of Probationer Based on Anonymous Tip

    People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171 (1978)

    A probationer is constitutionally entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a search based solely on an anonymous tip, without any prior indication of unreliability, is unreasonable in the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a warrantless search of a probationer’s person, locker, and car, based solely on an anonymous tip, violated the probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court emphasized that while probationers have diminished expectations of privacy, they are still entitled to protection against unreasonable searches. The court found the search unreasonable because the probationer had not previously demonstrated unreliability, the source of the information was unknown, and the probation officers had ample time to obtain a warrant. The court also noted that state law required a court order for such a search unless incident to taking the probationer into custody.

    Facts

    Defendant Jackson was sentenced to five years of probation after pleading guilty to a weapon charge. About a year and a half later, Sergeant McBurney received an anonymous tip that Jackson, an employee at Xerox, possessed a weapon and was dealing drugs. The informant described Jackson’s car and license plate number. McBurney verified the car’s registration and Jackson’s probation status. McBurney informed Jackson’s probation officer, Petrovick. Petrovick and his supervisor decided to search Jackson at his workplace. They arrived at Xerox with McBurney, searched Jackson’s person, locker, and car, and found a handgun in the car.

    Procedural History

    A probation revocation proceeding was initiated, and Jackson was indicted for possessing a dangerous weapon. At the probation revocation hearing, Jackson challenged the legality of the search. The trial court upheld the search, revoked Jackson’s probation, and sentenced him to imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed. Jackson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a probation officer’s search of a probationer, his locker, and his car, based solely on an anonymous tip and without a warrant or exigent circumstances, violates the probationer’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    Yes, because the search was unreasonable in light of the probationer’s constitutional rights, the lack of prior unreliability, the anonymous source of the tip, and the failure to obtain a warrant as required by state law when no exigent circumstances existed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that probationers, like parolees, are entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, although their status is relevant in determining the reasonableness of a search. The court cited CPL 410.50, which requires reasonable cause to believe a defendant violated a condition of the sentence before a search is authorized. The court distinguished this case from People v. Huntley, where the parole officer had personal knowledge of the defendant’s parole violations. In this case, there was no indication Jackson had been unreliable. The court noted the probation officer’s investigation, which began with “a wholesale search of the defendant, his locker and his automobile” was extreme, especially given the lack of urgency and the availability of other investigative methods. The court held that to uphold the search would undermine the probationer’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court pointed out the probation officers failed to obtain a court order before the search despite having ample time to do so, violating the procedure outlined in CPL 410.50. As the court stated, “The CPL does not provide for a search of a probationer or his property without a court order except as incident to taking the probationer into custody”. Because Jackson was not taken into custody, and no exigency justified bypassing the warrant requirement, the search was deemed unlawful. The court emphasized that the probation officers were in their office, which was one floor above the court where the defendant was sentenced, meaning “Under the circumstances there was more than enough time to submit the matter to the court as required by the statute.”

  • People v. Jackson, 39 N.Y.2d 64 (1976): Admissibility of Uncharged Crimes to Show Concert of Action

    People v. Jackson, 39 N.Y.2d 64 (1976)

    Evidence of prior uncharged criminal conduct is admissible to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish a common scheme or plan, including demonstrating that defendants were acting in concert.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of testimony regarding prior uncharged narcotics sales to prove that the defendant and another individual were acting in concert. Police officers observed the defendant and an accomplice engaging in what appeared to be drug sales, with the defendant handling money and signaling to the accomplice, who then provided drugs to the buyers. The court held that testimony regarding the uncharged sales was admissible to demonstrate the connection between the defendant and the accomplice, and that its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Facts

    Police officers, from an observation post, surveilled the sidewalk in front of 305 and 307 West 127th Street. Officer Hart observed Kelly Jackson (the appellant) arrive with Stephanie Watson. Watson sat on a stoop while Jackson stood nearby. Hart witnessed an unidentified man approach Jackson, give him money, and Jackson then pointed two fingers at Watson. The man received glassine envelopes from Watson. This occurred twice. Later, Kenneth Williams approached Jackson and gave him money. Hart observed Jackson signal Watson (though his testimony was inconsistent regarding which hand he used). Williams then received a glassine envelope from Watson and was later arrested with the envelope in his possession. Jackson and Watson were also arrested.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of drug-related offenses. He appealed, arguing that the testimony regarding prior uncharged narcotics sales was improperly admitted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding prior uncharged narcotics sales to demonstrate that the defendant and Stephanie Watson were acting in concert.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence was relevant to show a common scheme or plan between the defendant and his accomplice, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the general rule that evidence of unconnected, uncharged criminal conduct is inadmissible to establish a predisposition to commit the crime charged. However, the Court emphasized that such evidence is admissible if offered for a relevant purpose other than to establish criminal propensity. The Court cited People v. Molineux, stating that evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish: “(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.” Although “acting in concert” is not explicitly one of the Molineux exceptions, the court noted that those categories are merely illustrative, not exclusive. The court reasoned that the testimony regarding the uncharged sales was relevant to demonstrate the connection between Jackson and Watson, as Jackson handled the cash and Watson delivered the drugs upon a signal from Jackson. The court concluded that the probative value of this testimony outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant. The court also rejected the defendant’s other objections, including the introduction of photographs and the denial of a jury view of the scene, finding no reversible error.

  • People v. Jackson, 25 N.Y.2d 83 (1969): Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony and Change of Venue

    People v. Jackson, 25 N.Y.2d 83 (1969)

    A motion for change of venue based on pretrial publicity is properly denied where the publicity is largely objective, the jury selection process demonstrates a lack of pervasive prejudice, and the defense expresses satisfaction with the selected jury. Additionally, psychiatric expert testimony is admissible, even if based on hospital records not presented to the jury, provided the expert is thoroughly cross-examined, and incriminating statements made during a court-ordered psychiatric examination are admissible if the defendant raises an insanity defense.

    Summary

    The defendant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed, arguing that pretrial publicity and the denial of a change of venue deprived him of a fair trial, and that errors were committed in the admission and exclusion of evidence regarding his sanity. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the pretrial publicity was not so prejudicial as to warrant a change of venue, especially since the defense expressed satisfaction with the selected jury. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of psychiatric testimony or statements made by the defendant during a court-ordered examination, given that the defense raised the issue of insanity and the statements were not directly incriminating.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of murdering Noreen Jones, after having harassed her for three years due to her lack of romantic interest in him. Prior to the murder, the defendant assaulted Jones and her father, leading to an assault charge and probation. On the day of the shooting, the defendant threatened Jones before following her to the police station and shooting her multiple times in front of witnesses. He made incriminating statements shortly after his arrest. The defense pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed to Marcy State Hospital for a mental examination. The defendant’s motion for a change of venue was denied by the Appellate Division. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of first-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial by reason of the publicity attending it and by denial of his motion for a change of venue.

    2. Whether the court erred in admitting certain evidence regarding the defendant’s mental condition, and in excluding other evidence bearing thereon from the jury.

    Holding

    1. No, because the pretrial publicity was not so sensational as to excite local popular passion and prejudice, and the defense expressed satisfaction with the selected jury.

    2. No, because the strict rules regarding expert psychiatric testimony had been satisfied, the psychiatric report was not improperly admitted, and the defendant waived his rights against self-incrimination and to counsel by requesting the mental examination and raising the insanity defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the change of venue, the Court of Appeals emphasized that it must be shown that the defendant could not obtain a fair trial in the original county. Newspaper comment alone, even if extensive, is insufficient. The court highlighted the objective nature of the pretrial publicity, the thorough jury selection process where jurors asserted their impartiality, and the defense’s failure to use all peremptory challenges, indicating satisfaction with the jury. The court cited People v. Bonier, 189 N.Y. 108, 110-111, for the principle that a defendant cannot complain about the denial of a change of venue if satisfied with the jury.

    Regarding the defendant’s sanity, the court addressed the admissibility of psychiatric expert testimony. Although prior precedent required the presentation of hospital records upon which experts relied, the court noted that CPLR 4515 modified this rule, allowing experts to state opinions and reasons without first specifying the data, subject to cross-examination. The court noted that the tests served simply to rule out organic brain damage. The court also rejected the argument that the psychiatrists’ report was admitted “by indirection,” finding no evidence of this. The court found no violation of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination or right to counsel because the defendant requested the mental exam and introduced the issue of his sanity, and the statements ultimately admitted were not incriminating. The court stated, “It would violate judicial common sense to permit a defendant to invoke the defense of insanity and foreclose the Government from the benefit of a mental examination to meet this issue.”