People v. Horman, 22 N.Y.2d 378 (1968)

The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures applies only to governmental action; evidence obtained unlawfully by private citizens is admissible in criminal prosecutions.

Summary

Horman was apprehended by store detectives for shoplifting. A subsequent search by the store’s security manager revealed a loaded pistol. Horman was acquitted of shoplifting but convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon, after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the pistol. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches conducted by private citizens, and therefore, the evidence was admissible, even if the search was unlawful. The court emphasized that earlier Supreme Court rulings had not extended the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by private actors.

Facts

Two store detectives apprehended Horman outside a department store for alleged shoplifting.
Horman was taken to the store’s security office.
The security manager requested Horman to empty his pockets, which he did.
The security manager then “frisked” Horman, discovering a loaded semi-automatic pistol, which was forcibly taken from him.

Procedural History

Horman was indicted for felonious possession of a loaded firearm.
The trial court denied Horman’s motion to suppress the pistol.
Horman was convicted of criminal possession of a firearm as a misdemeanor in Nassau County Court.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

Issue(s)

Whether the Fourth Amendment requires the exclusion of evidence in criminal prosecutions when that evidence was wrongfully obtained by private individuals?

Holding

No, because the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unlawful searches and seizures are intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment and its associated exclusionary rule, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, are designed to regulate the conduct of government officials, not private individuals. The court cited Burdeau v. McDowell, which established that the Fourth Amendment was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.
The court acknowledged that the defendant argued that Burdeau had been overruled by Elkins v. United States and Mapp v. Ohio. However, the court distinguished these cases, explaining that they addressed the admissibility of evidence seized by state officials, not private actors.
The court stated that, prior to Elkins, evidence seized by state officials was treated differently in federal prosecutions than evidence procured by private individuals. Elkins addressed the admissibility in federal court of evidence illegally seized by state officials, while Mapp extended the exclusionary rule to state courts for evidence seized in violation of the Federal Constitution. Neither case overruled the principle that the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe private conduct.
The court noted that New York precedent also supported the admissibility of evidence obtained by private individuals, even if unlawfully obtained. “It has long been settled that our State’s prohibitions against unlawful searches and seizures (N. Y. Const., art. I, § 12; Civil Rights Law, § 8) do not require exclusion of evidence because a private individual has gathered it by unlawful means.”
The court concluded that because the evidence in this case was seized without the participation or knowledge of any governmental official, it was admissible in a criminal prosecution. The actions of the store detectives were considered private action, not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.