New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Hicks

  • People v. Williams, 2010 NY Slip Op 08951: Investigatory Detention & Exceeding Hicks

    2010 NY Slip Op 08951

    An investigatory detention, even if supported by reasonable suspicion, exceeds permissible bounds when the detention’s purpose is solely to facilitate a potential arrest if further investigation yields probable cause, rather than serving a special law enforcement need that requires the suspect’s immediate presence.

    Summary

    Williams was a suspect in an early morning carjacking. Based on descriptions, police asked him to sit in a patrol car; he was then locked inside and told he’d be informed of the reason later. He was moved to another locked car, photographed to create a photo array, and told a witness was viewing the array. Approximately 13 minutes elapsed before a witness identified him and he was arrested. The Court of Appeals held that even assuming reasonable suspicion existed, the detention exceeded the scope permitted by People v. Hicks because Williams’ presence was not required for administering the photo array and the detention was primarily for facilitating a potential arrest, rendering the photographs inadmissible.

    Facts

    An early morning carjacking occurred. Five hours later, based on descriptions from the victim and another witness, police approached Williams, whom they had encountered previously. Police asked Williams to sit in a marked patrol car, which he did willingly. Police then locked him in the car, stating that a second officer involved in the carjacking investigation would explain the detention. When the second officer arrived, Williams was moved to another locked police vehicle, photographed with his hands behind his back, and informed that he was a suspect in the carjacking. He was told a witness was viewing a photo array prepared an hour after the carjacking. The victim had previously viewed the array, failing to identify Williams and instead identifying another individual. The prospect of Williams’ release was never mentioned during his 13-minute detention.

    Procedural History

    Following a positive photo array identification, Williams was arrested and transported to the Public Safety Building. He waived his Miranda rights, confessed to the carjacking, provided details of the car’s location, and signed a written confession. The lower courts did not address the People’s argument that the confession was attenuated from the illegal detention. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court to determine attenuation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an investigatory detention, assuming reasonable suspicion, exceeded the permissible scope outlined in People v. Hicks when the detention was primarily to facilitate a potential arrest pending further investigation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the detention’s primary purpose was to facilitate a potential arrest, and Williams’ presence was not required for the photo array administration, thus exceeding the scope permitted by Hicks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that Hicks permits limited intrusions extending beyond traditional stop and frisks when justified by special law enforcement interests. However, the Court distinguished the present case from Hicks, where a prompt showup procedure required the simultaneous presence of the defendant and witnesses. Here, the administration of the photo array did not require Williams’ presence. The Court inferred that the detention was simply to make it convenient for the police to arrest Williams if a positive identification occurred, stating, “What the police did here, as a practical matter, was to place defendant under arrest in order to obtain sufficient evidence to arrest him.” Therefore, the photographs obtained during the detention were deemed inadmissible. The court remanded the case to determine whether the confession was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention to be admissible, directing the lower court to consider “the relevant attenuation factors.” The court noted that the People did not meet their burden of proving the voluntariness of Williams’ purported consent to be photographed while handcuffed.

  • People v. Hicks, 69 N.Y.2d 969 (1987): Invocation of Right to Counsel Must Be Unequivocal

    People v. Hicks, 69 N.Y.2d 969 (1987)

    An individual’s inquiry about whether they should speak to a lawyer is not an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, and therefore does not require police to cease questioning.

    Summary

    Hicks voluntarily went to the police station with his brother. He was gratuitously given Miranda warnings. He then asked police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?” The police asked if he thought he was in trouble; Hicks said no and gave a statement. Hicks was told he wasn’t under arrest and could leave. Hicks moved to suppress the statement, arguing his question invoked his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the inquiry was not an unequivocal request for counsel, and therefore, the police were not required to stop questioning him.

    Facts

    Defendant Hicks and his brother voluntarily went to the police station.

    The police gave Hicks Miranda warnings, even though he was not in custody.

    Hicks asked the police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?”

    The police responded by asking Hicks if he thought he was in trouble.

    Hicks replied, “No,” and then gave a statement to the police.

    Hicks was advised that he was not under arrest and was free to leave.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Hicks’s motion to suppress the statement he made to the police.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect’s question to police, “Should I speak to a lawyer?” constitutes an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, thereby requiring the police to cease questioning.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s inquiry did not unequivocally inform the police of his intention to retain counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a suspect must unequivocally inform the police of their intention to retain counsel to trigger the right to counsel. A simple inquiry, such as asking whether one should speak to a lawyer, does not meet this standard. The court relied on prior case law, including People v. Rowell and People v. Johnson, which established the requirement of an unequivocal request for counsel. The court distinguished the case from People v. Esposito, where the invocation of the right to counsel was deemed unequivocal. The suppression court found that Hicks was not in custody and a reasonable person would not have believed their freedom was impaired. Because the defendant’s inquiry was not an unequivocal request for counsel, his right to counsel did not attach. The court found the remaining arguments to be either unpreserved, unreviewable, or without merit.

  • People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234 (1986): Permissibility of Detaining and Transporting Suspects for Identification

    People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234 (1986)

    When police have reasonable suspicion to stop an individual, they may detain and transport the suspect a short distance to a crime scene for prompt identification by eyewitnesses if the detention is brief, the crime scene is nearby, and there are no less intrusive means available.

    Summary

    Police officers stopped two men suspected of robbery based on a radio report describing the perpetrators and their car. The men gave a suspicious explanation for their whereabouts. The officers transported the men, without handcuffs, to the robbery scene less than a minute away, where they were identified by victims. The New York Court of Appeals held that the brief detention and transportation to the crime scene for immediate identification did not constitute an unlawful arrest because the police action was a reasonable and minimally intrusive means of investigation under the circumstances to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicion. The Court emphasized the short duration of the detention, proximity of the crime scene, and the presence of eyewitnesses.

    Facts

    Around 4:00 a.m., police officers heard a radio report of a robbery involving two black men, about 5’5″ tall, in a green Pontiac with black trim. Minutes later, near the crime scene, they saw two black men in a grey and black Buick sedan appearing to be the described height. The men claimed to be coming from work at American Brass, which the officer knew was far away in the opposite direction. The officers told the men they matched the description and were being taken to the factory for identification, and would be released if not identified.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery. He challenged the stop, detention, transportation, showup identification, and vehicle search. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, limiting the issue to the legality of the stop, detention, and transportation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in the absence of probable cause, it is permissible for the police, having made a lawful stop based on reasonable suspicion, to detain the suspect and transport him to the crime scene for possible identification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the detention and transportation were a permissible incident of a lawful stop under the specific circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court determined the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion based on the radio report description, the suspects’ proximity to the crime scene, and their suspicious explanation. The Court clarified that the police action did not constitute an arrest because the defendant was not handcuffed, there was no show of force, he was allowed to park his car, the detention was brief, and he was informed of its limited purpose. The Court then reasoned that the transportation to the crime scene was a reasonable and minimally intrusive means of investigation to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion. Key factors supporting the reasonableness of the detention were that a crime had actually been committed; the detention was less than 10 minutes; the crime scene was very close; eyewitnesses were present; and there were no significantly less intrusive means available. The Court emphasized the importance of on-the-scene identifications, stating, “A speedy on-the-scene viewing thus was of value both to law enforcement authorities and to defendant, and was appropriate here.” The Court rejected using a “totality of the circumstances” test, and instead emphasized that the findings of reasonable suspicion and reasonable detention must rest on articulable facts, credible objective evidence, and the rational inferences that flow therefrom.

  • People v. Hicks, 61 N.Y.2d 732 (1984): Sufficiency of Evidentiary Facts in a Misdemeanor Information

    People v. Hicks, 61 N.Y.2d 732 (1984)

    A misdemeanor information is sufficient if it states the offense, each element thereof, that the defendant committed it, and sets forth sufficient evidentiary facts to support the charges, allowing the defendant to prepare for trial and avoid double jeopardy.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s order, holding that the misdemeanor information charging the defendant with issuing a bad check was jurisdictionally sufficient. The information adequately stated the offense, each element of the offense, and that the defendant committed it. Furthermore, the information provided sufficient evidentiary facts by alleging that the defendant knew of insufficient funds and intended or believed payment would be refused. This provided the defendant with adequate notice and protection against being tried again for the same offense, leaving the People’s specific proof for trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with issuing a bad check, a misdemeanor, in violation of New York Penal Law § 190.05(1).

    The defendant argued that the information was jurisdictionally defective because it lacked a statement alleging evidentiary facts supporting the charges that he knew he had insufficient funds and believed or intended that payment would be refused when he issued the check.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court where the defendant was charged via a misdemeanor information.

    The defendant appealed to the County Court, Steuben County, challenging the sufficiency of the information.

    The County Court’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the misdemeanor information charging the defendant with issuing a bad check was jurisdictionally defective because it lacked a sufficient statement of evidentiary facts supporting the charge that the defendant knew he had insufficient funds and believed or intended that payment would be refused.

    Holding

    No, because the information stated the offense, each element of the offense, and that the defendant committed it, and it set forth sufficient evidentiary facts alleging that the defendant knew of his insufficient funds and intended or believed payment would be refused.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the information stated the nonwaivable jurisdictional predicate to a valid criminal prosecution, namely, the offense with which the defendant was charged, each element thereof, and that the defendant committed it. The court found that the information also set forth sufficient evidentiary facts by alleging the defendant knew of insufficient funds and intended or believed payment would be refused. This fulfilled the twofold purpose of an information: (1) to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge and the acts constituting it so he may prepare for trial, and (2) to protect him from being tried again for the same offense.

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Shapiro, stating that Shapiro involved an information with a mere five-word factual allegation that omitted an essential element of the offense. In this case, the information adequately alleged the necessary elements and supporting facts. The Court emphasized that the People’s specific proof on the issues of knowledge and intent was properly left for trial, with the information providing adequate notice to the defendant.

    The court emphasized, “It is undisputed that the information states the nonwaivable jurisdictional predicate to a valid criminal prosecution, i.e., the offense with which defendant is charged, each element thereof and that defendant committed it.”

  • People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90 (1975): Probable Cause Based on Identified Citizen Informant Testimony

    People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90 (1975)

    A search warrant may be issued based on the sworn statement of an identified citizen informant who provides firsthand information regarding criminal activity, without requiring independent corroboration of the informant’s reliability.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search warrant was validly issued based on the sworn affidavit of a named citizen informant who detailed firsthand observations of the defendant’s criminal activity. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving confidential informants, where the informant’s reliability must be independently established. The court reasoned that citizen informants, who report crime out of civic duty, are inherently more reliable than underworld informants and their sworn statements can directly establish probable cause without requiring corroboration. This decision upholds the importance of citizen involvement in law enforcement and provides a practical framework for assessing probable cause based on identified informant testimony.

    Facts

    Kenneth Leone, an 18-year-old, provided a sworn affidavit to police detailing his observations at Douglas Hicks’ residence. Leone stated that he was in Hicks’ bedroom, where Hicks admitted to stealing a safe during a burglary. Hicks opened the safe, revealing marijuana and fireworks. Hicks also claimed that stereo equipment in the room and a new engine/bucket seats for his car were stolen. Leone’s affidavit included his name, address, and telephone number.

    Procedural History

    Based on Leone’s affidavit, a search warrant was issued for Hicks’ residence. Evidence found during the search led to Hicks being indicted for burglary and grand larceny. Hicks’ motion to controvert the search warrant was denied. He pleaded guilty to petit larceny charges, satisfying all indictment charges and a separate charge in District Court. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether probable cause existed to support the issuance of the search warrant based solely on the sworn affidavit of an identified citizen informant, without independent corroboration of the informant’s reliability.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit was a sworn statement of an identified member of the community attesting to facts directly and personally observed, which sufficiently supports the issuance of a search warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the traditional two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test (requiring a showing of the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge) does not apply when the affidavit is based on the direct observations of a named citizen informant. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving confidential informants, where the police officer is repeating a story told to him by a “reliable” informant; instead, the information furnished the court came directly from the informer’s sworn statement. The court stated, “Unlike Aguilar and Spinelli, the affiant in this case is not a police officer repeating a story told to him by a ‘reliable’ informant; instead, the information furnished the court came directly from the informer’s sworn statement, without the benefit of filtering by the police.” The court emphasized that citizen informants are inherently more reliable than underworld informants because they act out of civic duty and without expectation of personal gain. The court also noted the safeguards against false information, including the risk of prosecution for false statements and civil liability for malicious prosecution. The court concluded that requiring independent corroboration of a citizen informant’s sworn statement would be absurd and would denigrate the character of public-spirited citizens. The court emphasized that such civic-mindedness should be encouraged and applauded.

  • People v. Hicks, 287 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 1972): Establishing Intent for Felony Murder

    People v. Hicks, 287 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 1972)

    For a conviction of felony murder to stand, the intent to commit the underlying felony must precede or be concurrent with the killing; the felony cannot be merely an afterthought.

    Summary

    The case of People v. Hicks concerns the critical element of intent in a felony murder charge. Hicks was convicted of felony murder for killing Albert Hicks during a robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the jury instructions allowed for a conviction even if the intent to rob arose after the killing. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, adequately conveyed that the intent to commit the robbery must have existed before or during the killing for a felony murder conviction to be valid. The court emphasized that the act of robbery must be connected to the act of killing to constitute felony murder.

    Facts

    The defendant, Hicks, while in the company of friends, stated he needed money and might have to kill someone to get it. Shortly after, Hicks encountered Albert Hicks. The two entered a building together. Upon exiting, Hicks attacked Albert Hicks, stabbing him fatally. Hicks then took change from the victim’s pocket. Police found the victim’s body with a pocket turned inside out.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Hicks of felony murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict even if the intent to rob arose after the killing. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be convicted of felony murder where the intent to commit the underlying felony (robbery) arose after the killing.

    Holding

    No, because a person can only be convicted of felony murder if the killing occurs during the attempted execution of the underlying felony, and the intent to commit that felony must exist before or during the killing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the original conviction. The court emphasized that the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that the injury resulting in death must have been inflicted “during the commission of a robbery, or an attempted robbery, and while the killer was engaged in committing such act.” The court highlighted the importance of the connection between the act of killing and the intent to commit the robbery, stating, “To constitute felony murder the injury which resulted in death must have been inflicted during the commission of a robbery, or an attempted robbery, and while the killer was engaged in committing such act.” The court acknowledged the Appellate Division’s concern regarding the trial judge’s response to a jury question about whether robbery could be committed on a dead person. However, the court concluded that the judge’s overall instructions made it clear that the killing had to be perpetrated “for the purpose” or “in the course” of a robbery. In essence, the jury had to find that Hicks intended to rob Albert Hicks at the time he stabbed and killed him to convict him of felony murder. The court found the instructions as a whole were sufficient to inform the jury of this requirement. The court thus reinforced the principle that the intent to commit the underlying felony must precede or be concurrent with the killing for a felony murder conviction to stand.