New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Herring

  • People v. Herring, 17 N.Y.3d 1084 (2011): Inquiry Into Juror Competency During Deliberations

    People v. Herring, 17 N.Y.3d 1084 (2011)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion when, after a report that a juror was sleeping during deliberations, the court questions the juror, receives assurances of attentiveness and willingness to serve, and declines to further investigate the specifics of jury participation.

    Summary

    Carlos Herring was convicted of murder, assault, and weapons possession. During deliberations, another juror reported that one juror was sleeping. The trial judge questioned the allegedly sleeping juror, who denied sleeping and affirmed her willingness to serve. The judge declined to investigate further into the jury’s deliberation process and denied a motion for mistrial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that the juror was fit to serve, given the juror’s assurances and the potential for intrusion into the jury’s private deliberations.

    Facts

    Carlos Herring shot and killed one man and wounded another in a crowded parking lot outside a nightclub. He was charged with murder, assault, weapon possession, and menacing. At trial, Herring argued he acted in self-defense. During the trial, the jury acquitted him of menacing, but convicted him of the other crimes.

    Procedural History

    Herring was convicted in Rockland County and sentenced to an aggregate term of 32 years to life in prison, plus five years of post-release supervision. On appeal to the Appellate Division, Herring argued that the trial judge mishandled a report that a juror was sleeping during deliberations. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to discharge a juror or for a mistrial based on the alleged inattentiveness of that juror, after making an inquiry of that juror.

    Holding

    No, because the trial judge appropriately inquired into the juror’s attentiveness and received assurances of her willingness and ability to serve, and further investigation could have improperly intruded into the jury’s deliberation process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge acted within her discretion. When juror 7 reported that juror 11 was sleeping, the judge first repeated the deliberation charge to the entire jury. Before deliberations resumed, the judge questioned juror 11 directly, who denied sleeping and affirmed her willingness and ability to perform her duties. The judge noted that juror 7 indicated the concerning conduct was not continuing. The court reasoned it would not further inquire into the specifics of jury participation, stating that it would “invade[] the privacy and the province of that jury.”

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the trial judge’s opportunity to observe juror 11’s demeanor and assess her credibility. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a juror’s behavior definitively renders them “grossly unqualified.” The court affirmed the principle that a trial judge must balance the need to ensure juror competence with the need to protect the confidentiality of jury deliberations. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court acted reasonably in determining that Juror 11 was fit to serve based on her responses and the limited inquiry conducted, and that the judge had “recharged [the jury] on deliberations and how to conduct themselves during deliberations.”

  • People v. Herring, 83 N.Y.2d 781 (1994): Agency Defense Requires Evidence of Relationship with Buyer

    People v. Herring, 83 N.Y.2d 781 (1994)

    A defendant is entitled to an agency charge in a drug sale case only when there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support the theory that the defendant was acting solely on behalf of the buyer; mere ambiguity regarding the defendant’s connection to the seller is insufficient.

    Summary

    Herring was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. He requested an agency charge, arguing he acted solely as the buyer’s agent. The trial court denied this request, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the evidence did not support an agency charge because there was no reasonable view of the evidence suggesting Herring acted solely on behalf of the buyer. The Court emphasized the necessity of demonstrating a relationship with the buyer, not simply ambiguities in the defendant’s connection to the seller, to warrant an agency charge.

    Facts

    An undercover police officer asked Herring, a stranger, if he had drugs for sale. Herring led the officer to a storefront, took money from him, and entered the building. Inside, Herring obtained four vials of cocaine from a codefendant and gave them to the officer. Herring then left the area and was later arrested. He was subsequently charged with criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Procedural History

    At trial, Herring requested the court to instruct the jury on the agency defense, arguing that he was acting solely as an agent of the buyer. The trial court denied the request. The Appellate Division reversed, finding there was a factual issue regarding agency because Herring did not solicit customers and received nothing for his participation. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division, remitting the case for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to warrant an agency charge to the jury.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support the theory that Herring was acting solely on behalf of the buyer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an agency charge is only warranted when the evidence indicates a relationship with the buyer, not merely ambiguities about the defendant’s connection to the seller. The Court found that Herring’s actions, including immediately understanding the officer’s request and leading him to a nearby drug operation, were inconsistent with acting solely as the buyer’s agent. The Court noted that even if Herring received no compensation and did not solicit the sale, this did not automatically establish agency. The Court stated, “Before an agency charge is warranted, the evidence must be indicative of a relationship with the buyer not merely raise ambiguities about the defendant’s connection to the seller.” The Court emphasized that the jury could not reasonably conclude from the evidence that Herring was acting solely as an extension of the buyer. The Court also noted that Herring was convicted on an acting-in-concert theory, and the jury’s finding of guilt on that theory necessarily precluded the possibility of agency.