New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Hernandez

  • People v. Hernandez, 2025 NY Slip Op 00904: Presentence Incarceration and the Calculation of Persistent Violent Felony Offender Status

    2025 NY Slip Op 00904

    Under New York Penal Law § 70.04, the period of presentence incarceration for a prior violent felony conviction extends the ten-year lookback period used to determine persistent violent felony offender status, even when that incarceration occurred before sentencing on the prior crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether time spent in presentence incarceration on a prior violent felony conviction should be included in the calculation to determine a defendant’s status as a persistent violent felony offender. The court held that, according to Penal Law § 70.04, presentence incarceration does extend the ten-year lookback period. The defendant, who had a history of violent felonies, argued that time served before the prior felony sentencing should not extend the period, thus preventing his classification as a persistent violent felony offender. The court disagreed, finding that the statute’s plain language mandates that the lookback period be extended by the full period of incarceration related to the prior felony, regardless of whether that incarceration occurred before or after the prior felony conviction’s sentencing.

    Facts

    In 2015, Mitchell Hernandez committed a robbery. The People filed a predicate felony statement citing two prior violent felony convictions: (1) a 1990 second-degree robbery conviction with a sentence in October 1991, and (2) first-degree robbery and first-degree burglary convictions in April 1997, with sentencing in May 1997. The People argued that because of the periods of incarceration between the commission and sentencing of the crimes, the 1990 conviction qualified as a predicate violent felony. Hernandez did not dispute his criminal history or the length of incarceration but argued that pre-sentence incarceration from his 1990 robbery conviction should not extend the ten-year lookback period. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the pre-sentence incarceration time did extend the lookback period and sentenced Hernandez as a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    After being convicted of robbery in 2017, the People filed a predicate felony statement. The Supreme Court, after considering the evidence, sentenced Hernandez as a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal, ultimately affirming the lower courts’ decisions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether presentence incarceration time on a previous violent felony conviction extends the ten-year lookback period for determining persistent violent felony offender status under Penal Law § 70.04.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Penal Law § 70.04, any period of incarceration, including time spent in presentence detention, related to a prior violent felony, extends the ten-year lookback period used to determine a defendant’s persistent violent felony offender status.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the plain language of Penal Law § 70.04, which states that the ten-year lookback period is extended by any period of incarceration between the commission of the previous felony and the commission of the present felony. The court held that the statute is unambiguous in this regard, explicitly requiring the inclusion of pre-sentence incarceration in calculating the extended period. The Court referenced the statutory language, specifically Penal Law § 70.04 (1) (b) (v), stating, “In calculating the ten year period under subparagraph (iv), any period of time during which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony shall be excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration.” The court rejected Hernandez’s argument, asserting that this interpretation aligns with the statute’s intent to deter recidivism by enhancing punishments for repeat violent offenders.

    Practical Implications

    This decision provides clear guidance on how courts should calculate the ten-year lookback period for persistent violent felony offender status. Legal practitioners must now consider both pre- and post-sentence incarceration when determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense. This holding makes it more difficult to argue against persistent offender status, even if a significant portion of the prior incarceration occurred before sentencing. The ruling emphasizes that the Legislature intended to encompass all incarceration periods related to a previous violent felony to evaluate whether a defendant’s criminal history warrants more severe penalties. The ruling also underscores the importance of meticulously documenting periods of incarceration in predicate felony statements.

  • People v. Hernandez, 22 N.Y.3d 894 (2013): Clarifying Ambiguous Sentences and Double Jeopardy

    People v. Hernandez, 22 N.Y.3d 894 (2013)

    A court has the inherent power to correct its records to reflect the true intention behind a sentence, especially when the initial sentence is ambiguous, and such correction does not violate double jeopardy principles if the defendant has not fully served the intended sentence and thus has no legitimate expectation of finality.

    Summary

    Hernandez was initially convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to probation and 60 days in jail. After violating probation, the court intended to sentence him to an additional 60 days. However, the sentencing pronouncement was ambiguous. He was briefly incarcerated but released due to a clerical error. The court then resentenced him to 120 days, clarifying that it was an additional 60 days. The New York Court of Appeals held that the resentencing did not violate CPL § 430.10 or the Double Jeopardy Clause because the initial sentence was ambiguous, and Hernandez had not completed the intended sentence, precluding a reasonable expectation of finality.

    Facts

    Hernandez was convicted of driving while intoxicated. As part of his sentence, he received three years of probation and a 60-day jail term.
    He violated a condition of his probation. The District Court stated its intention to impose an additional 60 days of incarceration.
    At the resentencing hearing, the court sentenced him to “60 days in jail” without explicitly stating it was an *additional* 60 days. Hernandez was briefly taken into custody but released the same day due to an error crediting him with time already served.
    Upon discovering the error, the District Court resentenced Hernandez to “120 days in jail which is an additional 60 days to the 60 days sentence that he already served.”

    Procedural History

    The District Court resentenced Hernandez after he was mistakenly released.
    Hernandez appealed, arguing that the resentencing violated CPL § 430.10 and the Double Jeopardy Clause.
    The Appellate Term’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the resentencing of Hernandez violated Criminal Procedure Law § 430.10, which generally prohibits changing a sentence of imprisonment once its term has commenced.
    Whether the resentencing of Hernandez violated his constitutional right against double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because the court has inherent power to correct clerical errors and clarify ambiguities in sentencing, particularly when the correction aligns with the court’s original intent.

    No, because under the specific facts of this case the resentencing did not violate double jeopardy principles because Hernandez’s initial sentence was ambiguous and he had not served the full, intended sentence, and therefore had no reasonable expectation of finality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the well-established principle that courts have the inherent power to correct their records to reflect the truth, especially regarding clerical errors or mistakes made during sentencing. Quoting People v. Minaya, the court noted the power to correct errors “in order to conform the record to the truth.” The court found the initial sentence ambiguous because it did not explicitly state that the 60 days was *in addition* to the previously served time.

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Williams, where resentencing to include post-release supervision (PRS) after the defendants had fully served their original sentences was deemed a double jeopardy violation. In Williams, the original sentences were unambiguous and fully served, creating a legitimate expectation of finality. Here, the ambiguity of the sentence and Hernandez’s failure to complete the intended term of imprisonment prevented such an expectation from arising. The court stated, “Under these circumstances, no reasonable expectation of finality could have attached to the ambiguous sentence so that the court would be precluded, under principles of double jeopardy, from correcting its ambiguity and resentencing defendant in accordance with its stated intent”.

    The decision emphasizes that the key factor is whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence. Because the sentence was ambiguous and the defendant was released in error, no such expectation could have arisen.

  • People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002): Establishing Causation in Homicide Cases Involving Police Pursuits

    People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002)

    A defendant can be held criminally responsible for a homicide if their actions set in motion the events that led to the victim’s death, even if the defendant’s conduct is not the sole cause, provided the ultimate harm was reasonably foreseeable.

    Summary

    Hernandez, a fugitive, was chased by police after being spotted in Buffalo. During the pursuit, Hernandez scaled a fence and ran across a highway. An officer attempting to follow fell from the fence and was fatally injured. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Hernandez’s manslaughter conviction, holding that his flight was a sufficiently direct cause of the officer’s death because it was reasonably foreseeable that the officer would attempt to cross the highway in pursuit and risk injury in doing so. The court distinguished corporate liability cases and emphasized the foreseeability of harm in police pursuits.

    Facts

    Hernandez was wanted on an arrest warrant for violating probation related to a felony drug conviction in Maryland. Bail bondsmen located him in Buffalo, NY, and alerted local police. When police attempted to apprehend Hernandez, he fled. During the foot chase, Hernandez ran across a six-lane highway, scaling a chain-link fence in the median. Officer McLellan, in pursuit, fell from the fence into oncoming traffic and died from his injuries. Hernandez was apprehended nearby.

    Procedural History

    Hernandez was indicted for second-degree manslaughter for recklessly causing Officer McLellan’s death. The trial court denied Hernandez’s motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence of causation. A jury convicted Hernandez, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Hernandez’s actions were a sufficiently direct cause of Officer McLellan’s death to support a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree.

    Holding

    Yes, because Hernandez’s actions in fleeing from police and running across a highway during rush hour set in motion a chain of events that made it reasonably foreseeable that the pursuing officer would be injured while attempting to follow.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent such as People v. Matos and People v. Kern, which established that a defendant can be held criminally responsible if their actions set in motion a chain of events leading to a victim’s death, provided the ultimate harm was reasonably foreseeable. The court reasoned that Hernandez’s flight from the police placed Officer McLellan in a situation where he was compelled to cross a busy highway. “Rather than a tenuous connection between defendant’s conduct and McLellan’s death, it was reasonably foreseeable that leading Officer McLellan onto the Kensington Expressway in the midst of morning rush-hour traffic into downtown Buffalo could result in a collision with a vehicle.” The court distinguished corporate liability cases like People v. Warner-Lambert Co. and People v. Roth, where the causal connection was more attenuated and the harm less foreseeable. The court emphasized that this case fell within the scope of cases involving the foreseeable dangers of police pursuits and actions leading individuals onto major highways. The court also noted that the officer’s actions were a direct consequence of Hernandez’s attempt to evade arrest and hadn’t reached a “place of temporary safety” as described in People v. Gladman when the injury occurred.

  • People v. Hernandez, 8 N.Y.3d 814 (2007): Proof Required for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Based on Failure to Communicate Plea Offer

    People v. Hernandez, 8 N.Y.3d 814 (2007)

    A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to communicate a plea offer must demonstrate that a plea offer was made, that counsel failed to inform them of the offer, and that they would have been willing to accept the offer.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant claimed his attorney did not inform him of a plea offer and that he would have accepted it. The Court of Appeals found the defendant’s self-serving statement insufficient, especially considering he had rejected a similar plea offer shortly before and his attorney believed the charges were likely to be dismissed due to a missing witness. The court emphasized the defendant’s burden to substantiate his claim of willingness to accept the plea offer.

    Facts

    The defendant claimed his attorney failed to inform him of a plea offer. He asserted that he would have accepted the plea offer if it had been communicated to him, even though he maintained his innocence. The defendant had previously rejected a similar plea offer. The defendant’s trial counsel affirmed that, around the time of the alleged uncommunicated plea offer, he believed the charges against the defendant were likely to be dismissed because the prosecution could not locate a necessary witness.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a trial court where the defendant was convicted. The defendant appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the ineffective assistance claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant met his burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel by showing that a plea offer was made, that defense counsel failed to inform him of that offer, and that he would have been willing to accept the offer.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s self-serving statement that he would have accepted the plea offer, without more, was insufficient to warrant a hearing given his prior rejection of a similar offer and his trial counsel’s belief that the charges were likely to be dismissed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to communicate a plea offer, the defendant bears the burden to demonstrate “that a plea offer was made, that defense counsel failed to inform him of that offer, and that he would have been willing to accept the offer” (People v Rogers, 8 AD3d 888, 890-891 [3d Dept 2004]). The court found the defendant’s self-serving statement of willingness to accept the plea offer inadequate, given that he had rejected a similar offer and his attorney believed the charges would be dismissed. The court implicitly reasoned that the defendant’s prior actions and the circumstances surrounding the case undermined the credibility of his claim. This decision highlights the need for more than just the defendant’s assertion to prove prejudice in such claims, particularly when there is evidence suggesting the defendant’s unwillingness to plead guilty or the potential for a favorable outcome at trial. The court emphasized that the defendant’s self-serving statement, ‘without more,’ was insufficient. This implies the need for corroborating evidence or circumstances supporting the claim that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer. The court’s decision reinforces the principle that a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

  • People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002): Duty to Retreat in Multi-Dwelling Buildings

    People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 175 (2002)

    In determining whether a defendant had a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense within a multi-unit dwelling, the critical inquiry is whether the defendant exercised exclusive possession and control over the area in question.

    Summary

    Hernandez, a building superintendent, was convicted of manslaughter after fatally shooting a visitor in the lobby of his apartment building. At trial, Hernandez argued self-defense, claiming the victim attacked him. He requested a jury instruction stating he had no duty to retreat because the incident occurred in his “dwelling.” The trial court denied the request. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that common areas like lobbies and stairwells in multi-unit dwellings are not considered part of a person’s “dwelling” for the purposes of the “no duty to retreat” exception under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i), unless the defendant exercises exclusive control over that area.

    Facts

    Hernandez was the superintendent of a six-story apartment building, residing in a first-floor apartment. He shot and killed James Carter, a guest of a tenant, in the building. Witnesses testified that Hernandez used racial slurs against Carter after Carter complained about needed repairs. An altercation ensued on the stairwell. Hernandez retrieved a sawed-off shotgun from his apartment and shot Carter. Hernandez claimed Carter attacked him in the lobby and that the gun discharged accidentally during the struggle. The building had a history of drug activity, and the front door was often broken.

    Procedural History

    Hernandez was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal use of a firearm in the first degree in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but modified the sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying Hernandez’s request for a jury instruction that he had no duty to retreat because the lobby and stairwell of his apartment building constituted part of his “dwelling” under Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i).

    Holding

    No, because the lobby and stairwell of a multi-unit apartment building, absent evidence of the defendant’s exclusive possession and control over those areas, do not constitute part of the defendant’s “dwelling” for purposes of the “no duty to retreat” exception in Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the term “dwelling” in Penal Law § 35.15(2)(a)(i) refers to a person’s residence, and its definition must consider various living arrangements. The critical factor is the extent to which the defendant exercises exclusive possession and control over the area. The Court distinguished the definition of “dwelling” under Penal Law article 140 (burglary offenses), which includes common areas in multi-unit buildings, noting that § 35.20 explicitly refers to the definitions in article 140, while § 35.15 does not. Quoting from People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240 (1914), the Court acknowledged the traditional rule that a person assailed in their dwelling has no duty to retreat. However, it emphasized that this exception applies only to areas under the defendant’s exclusive control. The Court found that because the lobby and stairwell were used by all tenants and their guests, Hernandez did not have exclusive possession and control over those areas. The court explicitly rejected the Appellate Division’s reasoning that focused on the security of the building, stating that the duty to retreat should not depend on how well-protected the area is, but rather on the extent of exclusive control. The court stated: “the determination of whether a particular location is part of a defendant’s dwelling depends on the extent to which defendant (and persons actually sharing living quarters with defendant) exercises exclusive possession and control over the area in question.”

  • People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 261 (1999): Judge’s Absence During Testimony Readback

    People v. Hernandez, 93 N.Y.2d 261 (1999)

    A trial judge’s brief absence during the ministerial reading back of testimony to the jury, where the judge remains immediately available and no substantive rulings are required, does not constitute a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal of a conviction.

    Summary

    Hernandez was convicted of murder. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of testimony. The trial judge, with consent from both parties, absented himself from the courtroom during the readback, but remained immediately available in chambers. The Appellate Division initially affirmed the conviction, but later reversed it on a coram nobis petition, citing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue of the judge’s absence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the judge’s brief absence during a purely ministerial readback, with the judge remaining available, did not constitute reversible error.

    Facts

    Hernandez was convicted of second-degree murder and related weapons offenses. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of trial testimony. With the consent of both parties, the trial judge absented himself during the reading of the testimony. The judge informed everyone that he would be immediately available in his chambers should any issue arise. The judge himself conducted the requested rereading of the charge to the jury.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division initially affirmed Hernandez’s conviction. Hernandez then petitioned the Appellate Division for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the judge’s absence during readbacks. The Appellate Division granted the petition, vacated its prior affirmance, and reversed Hernandez’s conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial judge’s absence during the readback of testimony to the jury, when the judge remains immediately available and no substantive rulings are required, constitutes a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal.

    Holding

    No, because the readbacks required no further rulings or instructions beyond those previously made by the court, and no delegation of judicial authority occurred.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Ahmed (66 N.Y.2d 307), where the trial judge delegated his duties to his law secretary during deliberations. In Ahmed, the law secretary reread portions of the charge and received jury notes without the judge’s consideration. Here, the judge made all substantive rulings and remained available. Citing People v. Monroe (90 N.Y.2d 982), the Court reasoned that the judge’s absence did not rise to the level of a “mode of proceedings” error requiring reversal. The court emphasized that the readbacks were purely ministerial and required no further rulings beyond those already made. The Court noted, “The absence of Trial Judges from readbacks is disfavored,” but found no reversible error here. The Court distinguished the case from situations where the judge delegates judicial authority or is unavailable to address issues that may arise during the readback. The Court implicitly acknowledged that the parties’ consent played a role in their analysis.

  • People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 275 (2002): Appealability of Sex Offender Certification

    People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 275 (2002)

    A defendant’s certification as a sex offender under New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) is appealable as part of the judgment of conviction, allowing appellate review of potential errors in the certification process.

    Summary

    Hernandez was convicted of attempted rape and sexual abuse. He challenged the denial of a for-cause jury challenge, the jury instruction on “attempt,” and the appealability of his sex offender certification under SORA. The New York Court of Appeals held that the SORA certification is appealable as part of the judgment of conviction. The Court reasoned that since the certification is mandated by statute upon conviction and included in the order of commitment, it is an integral part of the final adjudication and thus subject to appellate review. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of Hernandez’s ex post facto challenge to the SORA certification.

    Facts

    Hernandez accosted a woman, stated his intent to “make love” to her, and threatened her. He choked her when she cried out and dragged her towards a basement, touching her vaginal area through her clothing. The victim escaped and police found Hernandez hiding nearby. He was identified and indicted for attempted rape and sexual abuse.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Hernandez’s challenge for cause of a potential juror. He was convicted after a jury trial. At sentencing, the court certified Hernandez as a sex offender under SORA, which Hernandez challenged. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction but held the SORA certification was not reviewable on direct appeal, citing People v. Stevens. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s certification as a sex offender under Correction Law article 6-C (SORA) is appealable as part of a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the certification is a mandatory part of the court’s final adjudication upon conviction and is included in the order of commitment, making it an integral part of the judgment and therefore appealable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the SORA certification, mandated by Correction Law § 168-d(1) upon conviction, becomes part of the order of commitment, which is directly linked to the judgment. The Court analogized the SORA certification to the imposition of a mandatory surcharge, which is also levied at sentencing and is reviewable on appeal. The Court rejected the argument that SORA certification is merely a “nonsentence consequence,” stating that this would unfairly deprive defendants of appellate review of potential errors in the certification process. The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Stevens, where it held that risk level determinations are not appealable as part of the judgment of conviction. In Stevens, the risk level determination occurred postsentence, whereas here, the certification occurs contemporaneously with the conviction and sentence. The court acknowledged potential inconsistencies that might arise if risk-level determinations are made simultaneously with certification but emphasized the need for legislative clarification. The Court stated, “Unlike the belated risk level determination in Stevens, defendant’s SORA “certification” here was actually and temporally part of the judgment of conviction.” Because the certification is a part of the judgment, it is appealable. The court stated that, “Even assuming that SORA certifications were deemed not a part of the sentence, we are satisfied that they are certainly part of the judgment.”