New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Henson

  • People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.3d 462 (1999): Limits on Cross-Examination Regarding Pending Criminal Charges

    People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.3d 462 (1999)

    Cross-examination of a defendant-witness regarding an unrelated pending criminal charge, solely for the purpose of impeaching credibility, is impermissible because it unduly compromises the defendant’s right to testify in the case on trial and jeopardizes the right not to incriminate oneself as to the pending matter.

    Summary

    Henson, a State Trooper, was convicted of rape and related crimes. Prior to trial, the prosecution indicated they would cross-examine Henson about pending charges related to his attempts to obtain the victim’s DMV records by misrepresenting himself as an active trooper. The trial court ruled this cross-examination permissible, leading Henson not to testify. The Appellate Division reversed, citing that this ruling violated Henson’s right to testify and avoid self-incrimination on the pending charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that cross-examination on pending charges solely for impeachment is impermissible under People v. Betts, and the DMV incident did not sufficiently demonstrate a consciousness of guilt to warrant an exception.

    Facts

    The victim, a college professor, was stopped on the Northway by Henson, a uniformed State Trooper, for alleged erratic driving. During the stop, Henson ordered her into his patrol car and subjected her to a mock sobriety test involving blowing in his face. He then sexually assaulted her. After the assault, Henson allowed the victim to proceed to her destination. She reported the incident to authorities, leading to Henson’s arrest and subsequent suspension from the force.

    Procedural History

    Henson was indicted for rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, coercion, unlawful imprisonment, and official misconduct. While awaiting trial, he was also indicted for official misconduct and criminal impersonation for attempting to obtain the victim’s DMV records. Before the rape trial, the People sought to cross-examine Henson on the pending charges if he testified. The trial court ruled this cross-examination was permissible. Henson did not testify. He was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction due to the erroneous pretrial ruling. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it is permissible to cross-examine a defendant-witness regarding other pending, unrelated criminal charges solely for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s credibility.

    2. Whether the defendant’s attempt to obtain the victim’s driving records constitutes evidence of consciousness of guilt, thereby making cross-examination on the pending charges permissible.

    Holding

    1. No, because allowing such cross-examination unduly compromises the defendant’s right to testify in the case on trial while simultaneously jeopardizing the corresponding right not to incriminate oneself as to the pending matter.

    2. No, because the defendant’s conduct at the DMV did not reach the threshold for admissibility as consciousness of guilt, as there was no evidence that Henson intended to coerce the witness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on People v. Betts, which established that cross-examination on pending criminal charges solely for impeachment is impermissible due to the constitutional protection against self-incrimination. The court emphasized that a defendant does not automatically waive this privilege by taking the stand. The court acknowledged the importance of the Sandoval hearing process to balance probative value against unfair prejudice but stressed that Betts provides a more categorical prohibition in cases involving pending charges.

    Regarding the consciousness of guilt argument, the court stated that while certain post-crime conduct can indicate a guilty mind, the connection between the conduct and guilt must be reasonably inferable. The court found that Henson’s misrepresentations to the DMV clerk, while unlawful, did not directly relate to the rape charges and did not demonstrate an intent to coerce or harass the victim. Therefore, no valid inference of consciousness of guilt could be drawn.

    The court quoted People v. Betts: “Allowing a defendant-witness’ credibility to be assailed through the use of cross-examination concerning an unrelated pending criminal charge unduly compromises the defendant’s right to testify with respect to the case on trial, while simultaneously jeopardizing the correspondingly important right not to incriminate oneself as to the pending matter.” The court also acknowledged that even innocent persons may act in ways that appear incriminating out of fear of wrongful conviction.

    The Court also addressed the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome expert testimony, advising the trial court to determine on retrial whether the expert’s opinion has the requisite scientific foundation, and whether its potential value outweighs the possibility of undue prejudice to defendant or interference with the jury’s province to determine credibility.

  • People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63 (1973): Admissibility of Prior Conduct Evidence in Child Homicide Cases

    People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63 (1973)

    In cases of alleged child abuse or homicide, evidence of a defendant’s prior conduct toward the child is admissible to negate claims of accident or mistake, particularly when the crime occurred in the privacy of the home and the facts are not easily unraveled.

    Summary

    Charles and Marlene Henson were convicted of criminally negligent homicide and endangering the welfare of their four-year-old son, Kip, who died from acute bronchial pneumonia exacerbated by numerous untreated injuries. The prosecution presented evidence that the Hensons failed to seek timely medical care and had previously abused Kip. The Hensons claimed Kip’s injuries were accidental, but the prosecution introduced evidence of prior injuries and neglect. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that evidence of prior conduct was admissible to refute the accident defense and that the mention of the “battered child syndrome” did not prejudice the jury.

    Facts

    Kip Henson died on August 23, 1970. He was four years old. First responders found Kip unresponsive with signs of prior injuries. An autopsy revealed acute bronchial pneumonia and numerous bruises. Marlene Henson exclaimed, “Oh God, what will they do to us now.” The Hensons admitted awareness of Kip’s illness but left him with a babysitter after tying him to his bed. They did not seek medical attention until shortly before his death. The mother admitted to disciplining Kip with physical force, including slapping and hitting him with objects.

    Procedural History

    The Hensons were indicted on charges including manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, endangering the welfare of a child, and assault. A jury convicted them of criminally negligent homicide and endangering the welfare of a child; Marlene Henson was also convicted of assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to prove criminally negligent homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.
    2. Whether the admission of evidence regarding the defendants’ prior conduct toward Kip constituted reversible error.
    3. Whether the mere mention of the ‘battered child syndrome’ prejudiced the jury against the defendants.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence demonstrated the defendants’ failure to provide prompt medical care for their son reflected “a culpable failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk” of death.
    2. No, because the evidence of prior conduct was admissible to refute the defense of accident and to demonstrate a pattern of abuse.
    3. No, because the questions regarding the battered child syndrome were not answered and, even if they had been, the testimony would have been admissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found overwhelming evidence of the Hensons’ guilt. The court referenced Penal Law § 125.10, which defines criminally negligent homicide as causing the death of another person with criminal negligence, which is defined in Penal Law § 15.05(4) as failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe. The court highlighted the testimony of the babysitter, Dolores Klochaney, who described Kip’s severe condition and the parents’ indifference. The Court reasoned that the prior injuries were admissible under the exception to the rule excluding evidence of collateral conduct. The Court stated, “It is a well-recognized exception to the general rule, excluding evidence of collateral conduct, that such evidence is admissible if, among other things, it tends to negative the defense of ‘accident’ or mistake.” The court further noted that the credibility of the accident explanation diminishes as the instances of similar alleged “accidental” injury increase. Regarding the battered child syndrome, the court emphasized that the trial court prevented the expert from answering the questions, and even if answered, the testimony would have been relevant to show the injuries were not accidental, stating “A finding * * * of the ‘battered child syndrome’…simply indicates that a child of tender years found with a certain type of injury…has not suffered those injuries by accidental means.”