New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Hendricks

  • People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969): Establishing Probable Cause Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969)

    An affidavit in support of a search warrant relying on information from a confidential informant must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause for a search warrant when relying on information from a confidential informant. The Court of Appeals held that an affidavit must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of their knowledge. The affidavit in this case was deemed insufficient because it only established the informant’s past reliability but failed to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about the defendant possessing a weapon and stolen property. Consequently, the evidence seized and the defendant’s subsequent admissions were suppressed.

    Facts

    Detective Mugan obtained a search warrant for John Hendricks and his residence based on an affidavit stating that a reliable informant told him Hendricks possessed an illegal revolver and stolen property. Upon executing the warrant, officers found a loaded gun and airline tickets in Hendricks’s briefcase and more weapons in his home. After being confronted with the evidence, Hendricks admitted ownership of the weapons.

    Procedural History

    Hendricks was indicted on weapons and forgery charges. The trial court suppressed the airline tickets but not the weapons. After a hearing, the court upheld the warrant’s validity. Hendricks pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor weapons charge. The Appellate Division affirmed. Hendricks appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause based on the informant’s information.
    2. Whether the defendant’s admissions should be suppressed as fruits of an illegal search and seizure.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit only established the informant’s reliability but failed to show how the informant obtained the information about Hendricks’s possession of the weapon and stolen property.
    2. Yes, because the admissions were directly linked to the illegal search and seizure, and the taint of the illegality had not been attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the two-pronged test from Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States, requiring the affidavit to demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge. While Detective Mugan’s affidavit established the informant’s reliability by citing past instances where the informant provided information leading to arrests and convictions, it failed to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about Hendricks’s possession of the weapon and stolen property. The court stated, “There must be more than an ultimate conclusion of probable cause or the affiant’s mere assertion that the information received was reliable.”

    The court distinguished this case from situations where the informant provides detailed information, suggesting firsthand knowledge, or where police independently corroborate the information. Here, the informant’s assertion was a mere conclusion, similar to the insufficient affidavits in Aguilar and Spinelli.

    The court rejected the argument that it should presume the informant saw the weapon, stating it would be impermissible, as it was in Giordenello v. United States, to presume that the informant had firsthand knowledge. A remand for a further hearing to establish the basis of the informant’s knowledge was also rejected, because “it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant to now allow the People to offer proof that the informer told the officer he saw the defendant in possession of the gun.”

    The court further held that the defendant’s admissions made after being confronted with the illegally seized items should also be suppressed. The court explained that these admissions were “tainted by the primary illegality” of the search and seizure because the link between them was “straight but short and immediate” and the taint was not attenuated.

  • People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 219 (1969): Motion to Suppress Evidence Must Be Made in Trial Court

    People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 219 (1969)

    A motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained via an illegal search and seizure must be made in the court where the indictment will be tried, not before a magistrate who issued the warrant.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested for arson and related crimes after police found them emerging from a burning house believed to contain a stolen safe. After obtaining a search warrant (later conceded to be invalid), police seized the safe and other items. The defendants moved before the Justice of the Peace to suppress the evidence obtained via the warrant. The Justice of the Peace granted the motion. The County Court reversed, directing the Justice to determine if the motion was to “controvert” the warrant (in which case relief could be granted) or to “suppress” the evidence (which the Justice lacked jurisdiction to decide). The New York Court of Appeals held that the Justice of the Peace had the authority to vacate the warrant, but not to suppress the evidence. The Court reasoned that motions to suppress must be made in the court where the indictment is to be tried, allowing the People an opportunity to prove the search was incident to a lawful arrest.

    Facts

    Bob’s Super Market was burglarized, and a safe was stolen. Police investigation led them to a residence on Herr Road. Upon arriving, officers heard movement inside and, after a period of surveillance, observed the house on fire. The defendants emerged from the house and were arrested for arson. Police entered the house and found the stolen safe. Later, an officer obtained a search warrant and seized the safe and other property.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved before the Justice of the Peace for an order suppressing the search warrant and all evidence produced thereby. The Justice of the Peace granted the motion to suppress the evidence. The County Court reversed and remanded, directing the Justice to determine the nature of the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order, remitting the case with directions to vacate the search warrant and deny the motion to suppress the evidence, holding that only the trial court could hear the suppression motion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Justice of the Peace has the authority to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant he issued, when the warrant is later conceded to be invalid, or whether such a motion must be made in the court where the defendant will be tried.

    Holding

    No, because the Code of Criminal Procedure dictates that a motion to suppress evidence must be made in the court where the indictment will be tried, allowing the People an opportunity to show that the search and seizure were incident to a lawful arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Justice of the Peace had the power to vacate the invalid search warrant, he did not have the authority to suppress the evidence obtained through it. The court relied on Sections 813-c through 813-e of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specify that a motion to suppress evidence must be made in the court where the defendant is to be tried. Specifically, Section 813-e provides that if an indictment has been returned, the motion “shall be made in the court having trial jurisdiction of such indictment.” The court stated, “In the present case, it is manifest that the application could not have been properly decided by the justice of the peace.” The court emphasized that when the defendants make a motion to suppress in the trial court, “the People will have an opportunity to show (if they can) that the search and seizure which produced the evidence in question were incident to a lawful arrest.” The court cited People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 88-89, 91, in support of the principle that evidence obtained incident to a lawful arrest is admissible. The court also noted that vacating the warrant would not entitle the defendant to restoration of the property, since the seized items were allegedly stolen or used in the commission of the crime, citing Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710.