New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Hawkins

  • People v. Hawkins, 68 N.Y.2d 157 (1986): Jail Time Credit Limited to Actual Custody

    People v. Hawkins, 68 N.Y.2d 157 (1986)

    Penal Law § 70.30(3) provides jail time credit only for time spent in actual custody awaiting disposition of a charge, not for time spent on parole, and the dismissal of a charge envisioned by the statute refers to pre-sentence dismissals, not dismissals resulting from a successful appeal after conviction.

    Summary

    Hawkins was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 2 ½ to 7 ½ years. After serving 3 ½ years, he was paroled. While on parole, he was arrested for sodomy and sentenced as a second felony offender based on the robbery conviction. The robbery conviction was later overturned as unconstitutional. Hawkins sought credit for the 3 ½ years served on the robbery conviction against his sodomy sentence. The New York Court of Appeals held that Penal Law § 70.30(3) does not authorize credit for time served on an invalid conviction when the defendant was on parole when the second charge was lodged and the dismissal occurred after the original sentence was imposed.

    Facts

    Hawkins was convicted of first-degree robbery in 1975 and sentenced to 5 to 15 years, later reduced to 2 ½ to 7 ½ years. He was paroled in 1978 after serving 3 ½ years. In 1980, while on parole, he was arrested for sodomy. In 1981, he pleaded guilty to sodomy and was sentenced as a second felony offender based on the 1975 robbery conviction. Later in 1981, a federal court determined the robbery conviction was unconstitutional. The state court then vacated the robbery conviction and resentenced Hawkins on the sodomy conviction as a first felony offender to 4 to 12 years.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court initially denied Hawkins’ habeas corpus petition for failure to exhaust state remedies, but the Second Circuit reversed. After the District Court again denied the petition, the Second Circuit reversed and directed the District Court to issue the writ unless the state resentenced Hawkins on the sodomy conviction as a first felony offender. The state court vacated the robbery conviction and resentenced Hawkins on the sodomy conviction. Hawkins then sought credit for time served on the robbery conviction, which was denied. The Supreme Court denied Hawkins’s Article 78 petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, overruling its prior decision in Henderson v Reid. The appeal reached the Court of Appeals as of right due to a dissent on a question of law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Penal Law § 70.30(3) authorizes credit against a sentence for time served on a prior conviction that was later determined to be unconstitutionally obtained when (1) the defendant was on parole when the second charge was lodged and (2) the dismissal of the first charge occurred after a successful appeal from the original conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the term “custody” in Penal Law § 70.30(3) refers to actual confinement or detention, not constructive custody such as parole, and the “dismissal” envisioned by the statute contemplates a dismissal before sentencing on the initial charge, not a dismissal resulting from a successful appeal after conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative history of Penal Law § 70.30 indicates that “custody” was intended to mean confinement or detention under guard, not release on parole. The Court noted that the Commission Staff Notes indicated the statute’s purpose was to give credit for time spent in custody awaiting disposition of a charge. The Court emphasized, quoting Matter of Kalamis v Smith, 42 NY2d 191, 197, that the purpose was to give credit to a person who has spent time in custody “prior to the formal commencement of his sentence.” The Court also pointed to the Commission Staff Notes illustration of the statute’s intent: granting jail time credit “where a defendant is arrested for crime A and while he is under detention for that crime a warrant or commitment is lodged for crime B.” The Court further reasoned that the “dismissal or acquittal” contemplated by the statute refers to the dismissal of a charge before a sentence has been imposed, as indicated by the language providing credit for time spent in custody “prior to the commencement of such sentence.” The Court distinguished the case from situations where parole is considered custody for other purposes, such as parole revocation proceedings, stating those contexts are different from the specific intent of Penal Law § 70.30(3). The court affirmed the order denying the petitioner’s request for jail time credit.

  • People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474 (1982): Right to Counsel at Pre-Accusatory Lineups

    People v. Hawkins, 55 N.Y.2d 474 (1982)

    Under the New York State Constitution, a suspect does not have the right to counsel at an investigatory lineup conducted before the commencement of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that suspects do not have a right to counsel at investigatory lineups under the state constitution, provided the lineup occurs before formal adversarial proceedings begin. The court reasoned that the benefits of counsel at this stage are outweighed by the policy considerations favoring prompt identification, such as preserving witness memory and quickly exonerating innocent suspects. This decision clarifies the scope of New York’s right to counsel, distinguishing it from the right during custodial interrogations.

    Facts

    Four separate cases were consolidated on appeal, each involving a defendant who participated in a pre-accusatory lineup without counsel:
    1. Laffosse: Convicted of robbery after being identified in a lineup. He requested an attorney during questioning but proceeded with the lineup after failing to secure one.
    2. Johnson: Convicted of murder; he requested counsel just before the lineup, but it proceeded without an attorney.
    3. Hawkins: Convicted of rape, sodomy, robbery, and burglary after being identified in a lineup. He consented to the lineup without requesting counsel, despite having a pending drug charge.
    4. Diaz: Convicted of sodomy and assault after being identified in a lineup; police were aware of unrelated charges against him but did not contact his attorney.

    Procedural History

    In all four cases, the defendants moved to suppress the lineup identifications based on a denial of the right to counsel. The trial courts denied the motions, and the defendants were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York State Constitution provides a suspect with the right to counsel at an investigatory lineup conducted before the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings.

    Holding

    No, because the benefits of requiring counsel at investigatory lineups are outweighed by policy considerations favoring prompt identification procedures, and the New York Constitution does not mandate counsel at this stage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois established that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings. The court then examined whether the New York State Constitution should be interpreted to provide greater protection. While New York has expanded the right to counsel in the context of custodial interrogations, the court found that the role of counsel at a lineup is more limited than during an interrogation. The court emphasized that, unlike interrogations where counsel actively advises the suspect, counsel at a lineup serves primarily as an observer. The court stated, “the need for and right to a lawyer at an identification lineup is insignificant compared to the need in an ensuing interrogation.” People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485.

    The court also emphasized the importance of prompt lineups to preserve witness memory, benefit the suspect by diminishing mistaken identification, and aid police investigations. Requiring counsel at this stage could cause unreasonable delays, undermining these advantages. Although a suspect’s attorney may attend the lineup if they are already represented, police are not required to notify counsel or delay the lineup significantly to accommodate counsel’s arrival. The court found no basis in the State Constitution to mandate counsel at investigatory lineups. The court noted, “The Constitution does not expressly or even impliedly require it.”