New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Harper

  • People v. Harper, 75 N.Y.2d 314 (1990): Sufficiency of Evidence for Bribe Receiving by a Witness

    People v. Harper, 75 N.Y.2d 314 (1990)

    An agreement to “drop charges” is not equivalent to an agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing at a proceeding, and thus, is legally insufficient to establish bribe receiving by a witness under Penal Law § 215.05 without further evidence.

    Summary

    Montey Harper was convicted of bribe receiving by a witness for agreeing to “drop” assault charges against Rick James in exchange for money. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the agreement to drop charges, without evidence of an explicit agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing in court, was insufficient to support the conviction. The court reasoned that agreeing to drop charges does not necessarily imply an intent to influence testimony or absent oneself from the proceedings. This case highlights the importance of clearly establishing the intent to influence testimony or prevent a witness from appearing to secure a conviction for bribe receiving by a witness.

    Facts

    Montey Harper was allegedly assaulted by Rick James and Carmen Johnson. Harper filed assault charges against them. Harper approached Betty Gladden (James’s mother) and threatened a civil suit and criminal charges unless she paid him $10,000. Gladden paid Harper, who signed a release agreeing to “drop charges” against James and Johnson in exchange for $5,000 plus an additional $5,000 payment schedule for medical expenses. After receiving the initial payment, Harper went to court to drop the charges, but the Assistant District Attorney refused due to lack of access to the case file. The charges were later dismissed due to facial insufficiency. Harper refiled the charges when Gladden failed to make scheduled payments. Gladden then reported the matter to the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    Harper was charged with bribe receiving by a witness (Penal Law § 215.05) and convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment, finding the evidence legally insufficient. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an unlawful agreement to alter testimony or avoid appearing at an action or proceeding may be inferred from a “release” agreement in which one party agrees to “drop” criminal and civil charges in exchange for money and other valuable consideration, thus satisfying the requirements for bribe receiving by a witness under Penal Law § 215.05.

    Holding

    No, because an agreement to “drop charges” is not the same as an agreement to alter testimony or absent oneself from a proceeding; therefore, it cannot alone support a conviction for bribe receiving by a witness without further evidence of such an agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the crime of bribe receiving by a witness requires an “agreement or understanding” that a witness will either influence their testimony or avoid appearing at the proceeding. The court found that the agreement to “drop charges” does not explicitly state or implicitly suggest that Harper would alter his testimony or absent himself from the criminal proceedings. The court noted, “agreeing to ‘drop’ charges is certainly not the same as agreeing to alter testimony or absent oneself entirely from a proceeding. Consequently, evidence that someone has agreed to do the former cannot alone be used as a basis to infer the existence of an agreement to do the latter.” The court reasoned that interpreting “drop the charges” as a promise to halt the proceedings or hinder the prosecution was an overextension of the statute’s intent. The court stated that penal statutes should be interpreted according to the fair import of their terms, and penal responsibility should not be extended beyond the fair scope of the statutory mandate. Further, the court found no evidence that Harper attempted to influence his testimony or avoid appearing. The court noted that Harper made himself available to the prosecution after Gladden failed to make the agreed-upon payments. Therefore, the court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order reversing Harper’s conviction.

  • People v. Harper, 37 N.Y.2d 96 (1975): Strict Compliance Required for Amending Accusatory Instruments

    People v. Harper, 37 N.Y.2d 96 (1975)

    Amendment of an accusatory instrument, such as an information, requires strict compliance with the procedures outlined in CPL 100.45(3), including pre-trial application, notice to the defendant, and an opportunity to be heard; a post-trial stipulation is insufficient.

    Summary

    Harper was charged with reckless endangerment, menacing, harassment, and weapons possession. The reckless endangerment charge was reduced, and the weapons charge was to be tried as a misdemeanor. Prior to trial, the District Attorney withdrew the reckless endangerment and weapon possession charges. After testimony, the trial judge believed two additional menacing counts involving police officers were also at issue based on an off-the-record stipulation. Harper was convicted of menacing the officers. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the information was not properly amended because CPL 100.45(3) requires specific procedures be followed for amending an accusatory instrument, which were not.

    Facts

    Harper was originally charged with: (1) reckless endangerment for allegedly pointing a pistol at police officers Goveia and Cresswell, (2) menacing Joyce Gordon, (3) harassment of Joyce Gordon, and (4) possession of a weapon.

    Prior to trial, the prosecution reduced the reckless endangerment charge and moved to try the weapons charge as a misdemeanor, then withdrew both charges, leaving only the charges related to Joyce Gordon.

    After the close of evidence, the trial court believed there were also two additional menacing counts against the police officers, based on an earlier off-the-record discussion and a later stipulation.

    Harper was convicted of the two menacing counts against the police officers but acquitted of the other charges.

    Procedural History

    The case was tried in a lower court where Harper was convicted of menacing the police officers.

    The Appellate Term upheld the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order, vacated the conviction, and dismissed the information.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an accusatory instrument, specifically an information, can be effectively amended to include additional charges after the commencement of a trial through a stipulation of counsel, when the statutory requirements for amendment under CPL 100.45(3) have not been met.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 100.45(3) provides the exclusive means for amending an accusatory instrument by adding a count, and that requires an application before trial, notice to the defendant, and an opportunity to be heard, none of which occurred here.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a valid accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite for a criminal prosecution. Citing People v. McGuire, 5 NY2d 523, 527 and People v. Scott, 3 NY2d 148, 152.

    The Court interpreted CPL 100.45(3), which dictates how an information can be amended: “At any time before the entry of a plea of guilty to or the commencement of a trial of an information, the court may, upon application of the people and with notice to the defendant and opportunity to be heard, order the amendment of the accusatory part of such information by addition of a count charging an offense supported by the allegations of the factual part of such information and/or any supporting depositions which may accompany it. In such case, the defendant must be accorded any reasonable adjournment necessitated by the amendment.”

    The Court held that compliance with CPL 100.45(3) is mandatory for an effective amendment. A stipulation of counsel after the trial has commenced, even if it references a prior off-the-record discussion, does not satisfy the statute’s requirements. The Court stated, “We hold that amendment of an accusatory instrument within the scope of CPL 100.45 (subd 3) can be effectively accomplished only by compliance with the requirements of that subdivision.”

    Because the procedural requirements of CPL 100.45(3) were not followed, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the menacing charges against the police officers. The conviction was therefore invalid.