New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Haff

  • People v. Haff, 56 N.Y.2d 1031 (1982): Limiting Political Activity in Government Buildings

    People v. Haff, 56 N.Y.2d 1031 (1982)

    A state statute prohibiting the solicitation of political contributions by a public officer from subordinates within a government building is a valid, reasonable restriction on partisan political conduct and is not unconstitutionally vague.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision, holding that Civil Service Law § 107(3) is a valid regulation of partisan political conduct. The statute prohibits a public officer from giving notice within a government building to subordinates that they are to collect political contributions. The court reasoned that the law’s restriction is limited to the place where the solicitation occurs and is therefore reasonable. It further held that the statute is not void for vagueness due to the commonly understood meaning of the words used. The court also found sufficient evidence to convict the defendant, even without coercive language, because there was non-accomplice testimony linking him to the crime.

    Facts

    The defendant, a public officer, was accused of violating Civil Service Law § 107(3) by soliciting political contributions from his subordinates within a government building. The specific facts surrounding the solicitation, such as the exact words used or the context of the solicitation, are not detailed in this memorandum opinion.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals after a decision by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, thereby upholding the conviction of the defendant.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Civil Service Law § 107(3) is a valid regulation of partisan political conduct, or whether it violates free speech rights.
    2. Whether Civil Service Law § 107(3) is unconstitutionally vague.
    3. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant under Civil Service Law § 107(3).

    Holding

    1. Yes, Civil Service Law § 107(3) is a valid regulation of partisan political conduct because it is limited to the place where the solicitation occurs and is therefore a reasonable restriction on speech.
    2. No, Civil Service Law § 107(3) is not void for vagueness because the words used have a commonly understood meaning.
    3. Yes, there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant because the statute does not require coercive language and there was non-accomplice testimony connecting the defendant to the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Civil Service Law § 107(3) is a valid regulation of speech because its restriction is limited to the place where the solicitation occurs – within a government building. Citing Civil Serv. Comm. v Letter Carriers, 413 US 548, Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, and Ex Parte Curtis, 106 US 371, the court emphasized that restrictions on speech are permissible when they are reasonable and narrowly tailored. The court found the statute reasonable because it only prohibits solicitation within a specific location. The court also rejected the argument that the statute was void for vagueness, citing Broadrick v Oklahoma, stating that the words used in the statute have a commonly understood meaning. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court clarified that the statute does not require proof of coercive language, relying on its prior decision in People v Haff, 47 NY2d 695. The court also noted that there was non-accomplice testimony that fairly tended to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, citing People v Glasper, 52 NY2d 970. The court concluded that the defendant’s remaining contentions were without merit.

  • People v. Haff, 47 N.Y.2d 695 (1979): Prohibiting Notice of Political Assessments in Government Buildings

    People v. Haff, 47 N.Y.2d 695 (1979)

    Subdivision 3 of Section 107 of the Civil Service Law prohibits public officers from giving notice of political assessments to subordinates in government buildings, even if the notice is about the subordinates collecting the assessments themselves.

    Summary

    Defendants, former public officers in the Town of Hempstead, were convicted of violating Civil Service Law §107(3) for using their authority to induce political contributions from other public employees. The Appellate Term reversed, arguing the indictments failed to state a crime because merely “advising” subordinates about collecting political assessments was not prohibited. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that giving notice of political assessments within a government building, even if related to the subordinates’ collection duties, violates the statute. The case was remitted for review of other factual and legal questions.

    Facts

    Defendants Phears, Haff, and Landman were Commissioners of Water, Highways, and Sanitation in the Town of Hempstead, respectively.

    The defendants gave notice to their subordinates, who were subject to the Civil Service Law, that political assessments, subscriptions, and contributions were to be received and collected by such subordinates on behalf of a political organization. This occurred within a building occupied for a governmental purpose.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted and convicted of violating subdivision 3 of section 107 of the Civil Service Law.

    The Appellate Term reversed the convictions and dismissed the indictments, finding that the indictments did not state a crime under the statute.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether subdivision 3 of section 107 of the Civil Service Law prohibits public officers from informing their subordinates within a government building that the subordinates are to collect political assessments on behalf of a political organization.

    Holding

    Yes, because giving such notice constitutes “giving notice of a political assessment” within the meaning of the statute, regardless of whether the notice targets the ultimate payer of the assessment or those collecting it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that an indictment must charge all legally material elements of a crime as prescribed by statute.

    The Court interpreted the words of the statute, which prohibits anyone in a government building from giving notice of, demanding, collecting, or receiving any political assessment, subscription or contribution.

    The Court reasoned that by “advising” their subordinates that they would be receiving and collecting political assessments, the defendants gave notice of a political assessment within the meaning of the section.

    The Court rejected the Appellate Term’s narrow interpretation, stating that nothing in subdivision 3 of section 107 limits its prohibition to the giving of notice of a political assessment to the ultimate target of the assessment.

    The concurring opinion argued that the statute’s purpose is to protect public employees from coercion. The concurrence noted that the indictment lacked any claim of coercion and that the defendants were charged solely with mentioning political contributions in a public building. They cautioned against reading criminal statutes with “all literalness” and emphasized the importance of considering the statute’s overall purpose. They noted that there were no prior reported cases where similar remarks constituted a violation.