12 N.Y.3d 46 (2009)
A mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee, mandated by Penal Law § 60.35(1), are not part of a ‘sentence’ requiring a judge to pronounce them in the defendant’s presence during sentencing, as per CPL §§ 380.20 and 380.40.
Summary
Defendant Guerrero pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 19 years to life. While the judge stated the agreed-upon sentence at the hearing, he did not mention the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee, though they were listed on sentencing documents. The New York Court of Appeals held that these assessments are not a part of the ‘sentence’ as defined by the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). Therefore, the judge wasn’t required to pronounce them aloud during sentencing. The court reasoned the statute imposing these assessments describes them as distinct from any sentence, reinforcing their non-punitive, revenue-raising nature.
Facts
Felix Soriano Guerrero pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder. At his sentencing hearing, the judge confirmed the agreed-upon sentence of 19 years to life. However, the judge did not verbally mention the mandatory surcharge of $150 and a crime victim assistance fee of $2. These fees were included on the written sentencing documents signed by the clerk and the judge.
Procedural History
Guerrero appealed, arguing the surcharge and fee should have been pronounced in open court. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction and sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to review the claim, ultimately affirming the Appellate Division’s order.
Issue(s)
Whether the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee mandated by Penal Law § 60.35(1) are part of a ‘sentence’ that must be pronounced by a judge in the defendant’s presence under CPL §§ 380.20 and 380.40.
Holding
No, because the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee are not considered part of the sentence itself, but rather are additional assessments levied at sentencing.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Sparber, where post-release supervision (PRS) was deemed an element of the sentence because the statute explicitly stated it was ‘a part thereof.’ Here, Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a) states the surcharge and fee are levied ‘in addition to any sentence required or permitted by law,’ indicating they are separate from the sentence itself. The Court also cited People v. Nieves, noting that orders of protection were not considered part of the sentence because the statute didn’t characterize them as such. The court reasoned that the legislative history of § 60.35 supports the view that the surcharge and fee were intended to raise revenue, not to be an additional punishment component. The court emphasized that the statute refers to a ‘surcharge’ or ‘fee,’ not a ‘penalty.’ Originally, the statute was titled ‘Mandatory penalty assessment,’ but the legislature changed it to ‘mandatory surcharge,’ eliminating the implication that it was punitive. The court quoted the legislative memo stating the change aimed to correct problems raised by attorneys and judges, clarifying implementation and minimizing confusion. In essence, the Court focused on the explicit language of the statute and its legislative intent to determine whether the surcharge and fee were integral to the sentence or merely ancillary financial obligations. They stated, “there shall be levied at sentencing a mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee and a crime victim assistance fee in addition to any sentence required or permitted by law (emphasis added), rather than as ‘a part’ of the sentence itself”.