New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Green

  • People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Speedy Trial Rights After Appellate Reversal

    People v. Green, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    When a conviction is reversed on appeal and remanded for a new trial, the statutory speedy trial clock starts running from the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final, and the mere passage of time during an adjournment is not automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of assault, but the conviction was reversed on appeal due to an improper jury charge. After the People’s application for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied, the case was adjourned. Due to a clerical error, the case was not calendared, and the prosecution was not present. Over 90 days after the denial of leave to appeal, Green moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Criminal Court granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that the time was not automatically excludable and the People failed to justify the delay.

    Facts

    Defendant Green was convicted of assault in the third degree in October 2006. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction in March 2010 and remanded the case for a new trial due to an improper jury charge. The People sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May 10, 2010, the case was adjourned to June 21, 2010, while the People’s leave application was pending. The Court of Appeals denied leave on May 14, 2010. Due to a clerical error, Green’s case was not calendared for June 21, 2010, and no prosecutor was present. The District Attorney’s office discovered the error in July and scheduled a new date of August 23, 2010. The People had not declared themselves ready for trial before this point.

    Procedural History

    Green was convicted of assault in Criminal Court. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The People’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Criminal Court granted Green’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Appellate Term reversed. The Court of Appeals granted Green leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Term, reinstating the Criminal Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the period between May 10, 2010, and August 23, 2010, was automatically excludable from the speedy trial calculation under CPL 30.30(4)(a) as a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal, when the People did not provide any justification for the delay after their leave to appeal was denied.

    Holding

    No, because the mere lapse of time following the denial of leave to appeal does not automatically constitute a reasonable period of delay resulting from an appeal under CPL 30.30(4)(a), and the People provided no justification for any delay to be added to the 90-day speedy trial period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    CPL 30.30(1)(b) requires the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of a criminal action involving a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of more than three months. CPL 30.30(5)(a) states that when a conviction is reversed and remanded, the action commences on the date the order occasioning the retrial becomes final. The Court noted that CPL 30.30(4)(a) excludes a “reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to…appeals…and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court.” The Court distinguished its holding from the Appellate Division case, People v. Vukel, which held that an adjournment pending leave to appeal was excludable. The Court reasoned that allowing the People to delay retrial for the duration of an adjournment, even after leave to appeal is denied, would be inconsistent with the intent of CPL 30.30, which is to discourage prosecutorial inaction. To the extent that Vukel holds otherwise, the Court stated that “it should not be followed.” The Court agreed with the Criminal Court that the People had not justified any reasonable period of delay under CPL 30.30(4)(a) to be added to the 90-day period under CPL 30.30(1)(b).

  • People v. Green, 5 N.Y.3d 540 (2005): Claim of Right Defense Not Applicable in Robbery Cases

    5 N.Y.3d 540 (2005)

    A defendant in a robbery prosecution is not entitled to a claim-of-right jury instruction, even if they believed in good faith that the property taken was theirs, because the statutory claim-of-right defense is limited to larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and public policy discourages forcible self-help.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of robbery for forcibly taking a disc player from Pabon, believing it was his stolen property. At trial, Green requested a jury instruction on the claim-of-right defense, arguing he lacked the intent to steal. The trial court denied the request, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the claim-of-right defense is unavailable in robbery prosecutions. The Court reasoned that the Legislature limited the defense to larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and allowing it in robbery cases would encourage the use of force to recover property. While a defendant can argue lack of intent, they are not entitled to a specific claim-of-right jury instruction.

    Facts

    Defendant Green forcibly took a disc player from Pabon, believing Pabon was among a group who had previously stolen Green’s own disc player. Green approached Pabon, snatched the disc player, and walked away. Pabon followed, asking for it back, at which point one of Green’s associates punched Pabon. Green testified that he believed Pabon was one of the individuals who had stolen his disc player because Pabon resembled one of them and was holding a similar disc player.

    Procedural History

    Green and an associate were charged with second-degree robbery and criminal possession of stolen property. The trial court denied Green’s request for a jury instruction on the claim-of-right defense. Green was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, prosecuted for robbery of a specific chattel, who in good faith believed that the property was his, is entitled to a “claim-of-right” jury instruction?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Legislature has limited the availability of the statutory claim-of-right defense to prosecutions for larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and public policy considerations militate against encouraging the use of forcible self-help to recover property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 155.15(1) provides a claim-of-right defense only for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement. While a good-faith claim of right negates larcenous intent, this does not automatically extend the defense to robbery cases. The Court acknowledged that robbery is essentially larceny accomplished through force, but the Legislature’s explicit limitation of the claim-of-right defense to specific larceny offenses indicates a deliberate choice not to extend it to crimes involving force. Citing People v. Reid, 69 N.Y.2d 469 (1987), the Court emphasized that if the Legislature intended to excuse forcible taking, it would have explicitly stated so. The court highlighted the policy concerns associated with encouraging self-help through force. A specific jury instruction on claim-of-right defense would give the defendant an unfair advantage by emphasizing one aspect of the proof. The court noted that a defendant can still argue lack of intent based on a claim of right, but is not entitled to a special jury instruction on the defense: “However, simply because a jury might be convinced by a claim-of-right argument, it does not follow that a claim-of-right charge, derived from a statutory defense limited to certain types of larceny, is also available to defendants in robbery prosecutions.”

  • People v. Green, 78 N.Y.2d 1029 (1991): Admissibility of Identification Testimony After Improper Photo Identification

    People v. Green, 78 N.Y.2d 1029 (1991)

    When the prosecution fails to provide timely notice of a photographic identification, resulting in suppression of in-court identification, subsequent testimony about observing the defendant being chased near the crime scene is inadmissible if it relies on the tainted identification.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of identification testimony after the prosecution failed to provide timely notice of a photographic identification. A grocery store was robbed, and the clerk, Saleh, identified the defendant in a photo array. Due to the lack of timely notice, the in-court identification was suppressed. However, the trial court allowed Saleh to testify that the person he saw being chased by police near the store was the same person who committed the robbery. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that this testimony was also inadmissible because it was tainted by the improper photo identification, and without this testimony, the case rested solely on the store owner’s testimony, which was insufficient, as shown by the defendant’s acquittal on a related charge where only the owner testified.

    Facts

    A Brooklyn grocery store was robbed on July 8, 1988. The owner and clerk, Nasser Saleh, provided a description of the robber to the police. Four days later, the owner saw the defendant on the street and alerted a nearby officer. Saleh, inside the store, saw police chasing the defendant just before his arrest. The day after the arrest, police showed Saleh a photograph of the defendant, and Saleh identified him as the robber.

    Procedural History

    The People failed to provide timely notice of the photographic identification, leading the trial court to suppress Saleh’s in-court identification. However, the court allowed Saleh to testify that the person he observed being chased on July 12 was the person who committed the July 8 robbery. The defendant appealed, arguing that this testimony was also inadmissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the testimony of a witness, identifying the defendant as the person he saw being chased near the crime scene, is admissible when the witness’s prior photographic identification of the defendant was suppressed due to the prosecution’s failure to provide timely notice.

    Holding

    No, because the testimony was tainted by the prior improper photo identification, and there was no independent basis to demonstrate the perception testimony was untainted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing Saleh to testify that the person he saw being chased was the same person who committed the robbery was reversible error. The court emphasized that without the improper identification testimony, the case relied entirely on the store owner’s testimony. The court pointed to the defendant’s acquittal on a second related robbery charge, where only the owner testified, to highlight the weakness of the owner’s testimony alone. The court distinguished the present case from situations where a witness had communicated their perception of the defendant to the police prior to the tainted identification procedure. The Court cited People v. Myrick, 66 NY2d 903 and People v. Sanders, 66 NY2d 906. Here, there was no evidence that Saleh communicated to the police that the person he saw being arrested on July 12 was the same person he saw commit the robbery on July 8 *before* the improper photo identification. The court stated that “there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the perception testimony was untainted by the improper photo identification procedure.” Thus, the court reversed the order and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the need to exclude testimony influenced by inadmissible identification procedures. This case underscores the importance of proper notice and the exclusion of tainted evidence to ensure a fair trial.

  • People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427 (1982): Defining ‘Lesser Included Offense’ in New York Criminal Law

    People v. Green, 56 N.Y.2d 427 (1982)

    A crime is only a lesser included offense of another if it is impossible to commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment against the defendant, who was convicted of reckless endangerment in the first degree after the trial court reduced an attempted murder charge. The Court of Appeals held that reckless endangerment is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The court reasoned that it is theoretically possible to attempt murder without creating a grave risk of death, a necessary element of reckless endangerment. This decision reinforces a strict interpretation of the “lesser included offense” definition in New York criminal law, requiring impossibility of committing the greater crime without also committing the lesser.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including two counts of attempted murder in the second degree, one count of assault in the first degree, and three counts of criminal possession of a weapon.

    At the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial judge found insufficient evidence to prove intent to kill for one of the attempted murder charges.

    The judge reduced this charge to reckless endangerment in the first degree and dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of reckless endangerment in the first degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether reckless endangerment in the first degree is a lesser included offense of attempted murder in the second degree under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 1.20, subd. 37).

    Holding

    No, because it is theoretically possible to commit attempted murder in the second degree without also committing reckless endangerment in the first degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the statutory definition of “lesser included offense” as defined in CPL 1.20 (subd 37): “When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former, a lesser included offense.”

    The Court emphasized a strict interpretation of this definition, stating, “one crime cannot be a lesser included offense of another if it is theoretically possible to commit the greater crime without concomitantly committing the lesser.”

    The Court applied this interpretation to the case, noting that attempted murder requires intent to kill, while reckless endangerment requires creating a grave risk of death. The court reasoned that an attempted murder could be rendered “innocuous by some circumstance of factual impossibility,” meaning that no grave risk of death would be created. Therefore, a person could commit attempted murder without committing reckless endangerment.

    The court cited People v. Miguel, 53 N.Y.2d 920, to further support its holding, reinforcing the principle that the theoretical possibility of committing the greater crime without the lesser precludes the lesser crime from being a lesser included offense.

    The Court concluded that since reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law, § 120.25) is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law, §§ 110.00, 125.25, subd 1), the defendant’s conviction for the former could not stand after the attempted murder charge was reduced.

  • People v. Green, 47 N.Y.2d 230 (1979): Knowledge as an Element of Possessing a Forged Instrument

    People v. Green, 47 N.Y.2d 230 (1979)

    To be convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the instrument was forged at the time of possession.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a forged instrument, finding insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant knew the check was forged when he possessed it. The prosecution demonstrated that the check was stolen unendorsed and later possessed by the defendant with a forged endorsement. However, the prosecution failed to prove the defendant stole the check, how he obtained it, or that the endorsement was not already forged when he acquired it. While evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for petit larceny, the element of knowledge that the instrument was forged was not sufficiently proven, precluding a conviction for criminal possession of a forged instrument.

    Facts

    A check was stolen from its owner without an endorsement. Six days later, the defendant delivered the check, now bearing a forged endorsement, to an accomplice. The prosecution stipulated that the endorsement was not in the defendant’s handwriting. The prosecution presented evidence suggesting the defendant knew the check was stolen. However, they did not prove the defendant stole the check or how he came into possession of it. The prosecution also failed to prove the endorsement was not already forged when the defendant acquired the check.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of both petit larceny and criminal possession of a forged instrument. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the check was forged when he possessed it, an essential element of the crime of criminal possession of a forged instrument under New York Penal Law § 170.25.

    Holding

    No, because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the defendant knew the check was forged at the time he possessed it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a key element of criminal possession of a forged instrument is knowing the instrument is forged. While there was evidence that the check was unendorsed when stolen and had a forged endorsement when the defendant possessed it, there was no proof connecting the defendant to the forgery itself or demonstrating his knowledge of the forgery. The court stated, “There was no proof that defendant stole the check from its owner, or of how or where it came into his possession (other than that he must have obtained it prior to his delivery of it to his accomplice). There was no proof as to who had had the check after it was stolen before defendant acquired it or that the indorsement had not already been forged when it came into his hands.” Without this evidence, any finding that the defendant knew the check was forged would be based on speculation, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the petit larceny conviction, but not the conviction for criminal possession of a forged instrument, thus modifying the order to vacate that conviction.

  • People v. Green, 46 N.Y.2d 136 (1978): Application of the Plain View Doctrine and Harmless Error Analysis

    People v. Green, 46 N.Y.2d 136 (1978)

    Evidence seized under the plain view doctrine is inadmissible if its incriminating nature is not immediately apparent; however, the admission of such evidence may be deemed harmless error if the proof of the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.

    Summary

    In People v. Green, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of evidence seized under the plain view doctrine and the application of the harmless error rule. Police, lawfully in the defendant’s apartment to execute an arrest warrant, seized notebooks containing prostitution records. The court found that the incriminating nature of the notebooks was not immediately apparent and that their admission was erroneous. However, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and the admission of the notebooks did not contribute to the conviction.

    Facts

    Police officers lawfully entered the defendant’s apartment to execute a valid arrest warrant. While in the apartment, one of the officers seized two notebooks. These notebooks contained records related to prostitution activities. The notebooks were subsequently admitted as evidence against the defendant at trial, contributing to her conviction.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. She appealed, arguing that the notebooks were improperly admitted into evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the notebooks seized by the police officer were admissible under the plain view doctrine, given that the incriminating nature of the evidence was not immediately apparent.

    2. Whether the admission of the notebooks, if erroneous, constituted harmless error.

    Holding

    1. No, because the outward appearance of the notebooks did not immediately reveal them as evidence of a crime.

    2. Yes, because the proof of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of the notebooks contributed to the conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the plain view doctrine, as established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, requires that the incriminating nature of evidence be “immediately apparent” to justify seizure. The court agreed with the defendant that the notebooks’ outward appearance did not make it immediately obvious that they contained evidence of criminal activity. Therefore, the seizure and admission of the notebooks were erroneous.

    However, the court applied the harmless error rule, citing People v. Crimmins. The court stated, “Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the proof of defendant’s guilt is overwhelming and that there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s failure to suppress the notebooks in question might have contributed to defendant’s conviction. Thus, in our view, the error asserted is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court determined that the other evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt, making the erroneous admission of the notebooks inconsequential.

  • People v. Green, 46 N.Y.2d 974 (1979): Right to Explore Probable Cause for Arrest During Suppression Hearing

    People v. Green, 46 N.Y.2d 974 (1979)

    A defendant has the right to fully explore the issue of probable cause for their arrest during a suppression hearing to challenge the admissibility of statements obtained as a result of that arrest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s motion to suppress confessions should not have been denied because the trial court improperly restricted the defendant’s ability to cross-examine police officers regarding the probable cause for his arrest. The Court found that statements obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest or detention are inadmissible. The defendant was entitled to a new suppression hearing where he could fully explore the legality of his arrest, and his guilty plea was vacated.

    Facts

    Two police officers responded to a report of child molestation and went to the alleged victim’s home. After speaking with the victim and her mother, they proceeded to the defendant’s home, where they informed him that his stepdaughter had accused him of rape. The defendant made no response and was then advised of his rights, frisked, handcuffed, and taken to police headquarters. At headquarters, he was again informed of his rights and made inculpatory admissions, both orally and in a signed statement, after waiving his right to an attorney on three separate occasions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress his admissions, arguing they were the result of an unlawful arrest. The trial court limited the scope of questioning to the voluntariness of the statements, finding that the defendant had waived his rights and confessed voluntarily, and denied the motion. The defendant then pleaded guilty to attempted rape in the first degree and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in restricting the defendant’s ability to cross-examine police officers regarding the probable cause for his arrest during the suppression hearing, thus improperly denying his motion to suppress his confessions.

    Holding

    Yes, because statements obtained by exploitation of unlawful police conduct or detention must be suppressed, and the defendant was not given adequate opportunity to challenge the legality of his arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Fourth Amendment requires the suppression of statements obtained through the exploitation of unlawful police conduct or detention. The Court emphasized that a suppression court must allow inquiry into the propriety of the police conduct. The People have the burden of establishing probable cause for the arrest or detention, and the defendant must be given an opportunity to fully investigate the circumstances of the arrest. The court found that the trial court’s restriction on cross-examination prevented the defendant from adequately challenging the prosecution’s assertion of probable cause. Because the defendant was not afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of probable cause, the denial of the suppression motion was improper. The Court remanded the case for a new hearing on the issue of probable cause, vacated the defendant’s guilty plea, and restored the suppression motion to pending status. The court cited People v. Wise, 46 NY2d 321, 329 stating it is “incumbent upon the suppression court to permit an inquiry into the propriety of the police conduct”. The court also noted, “Unless the People establish that the police had probable cause to arrest or detain a suspect, and unless the defendant is accorded an opportunity to delve fully into the circumstances attendant upon his arrest or detention, his motion to suppress should be granted”.